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Cold Reboot Attacks on Disk EncryptionCold Reboot Attacks on Disk EncryptionPosted Feb 23, 2008 0:52 UTC (Sat) by jcm (subscriber, #18262)Parent article: Cold Reboot Attacks on Disk Encryption
The crux of the matter is that people are lazy. They don't want to reenter their password on resume, or after leaving the machine unattended, so passwords are retained in memory unnecessarily. As a partial aide, perhaps we should store passwords physically in the first few pages of RAM after any machine vectors - that would make it more likely you would have to remove the chips to read the important bits. Jon.
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