CRYPTO-GRAM, June 15, 2002

                  CRYPTO-GRAM
 
                  June 15, 2002
 
               by Bruce Schneier
                Founder and CTO
       Counterpane Internet Security, Inc.
            schneier@counterpane.com
          <http://www.counterpane.com>
 
 
A free monthly newsletter providing summaries, analyses, insights, and
commentaries on computer security and cryptography.
 
Back issues are available at
<http://www.counterpane.com/crypto-gram.html>. To subscribe, visit
<http://www.counterpane.com/crypto-gram.html> or send a blank message to
crypto-gram-subscribe@chaparraltree.com.
 
Copyright (c) 2002 by Counterpane Internet Security, Inc.
 
 
** *** ***** ******* *********** *************
 
In this issue:
      Fixing Intelligence Failures
      Crypto-Gram Reprints
      News
      Counterpane News
      More on Secrecy and Security
      Comments from Readers
 
 
** *** ***** ******* *********** *************
 
          Fixing Intelligence Failures
 
 
 
Could the intelligence community have connected the dots? Why didn't
anyone connect the dots? How can we make sure we connect the dots next
time? Dot connecting is the metaphor of the moment in Washington, as the
various politicians scramble to make sure that 1) their pet ideas for
improving domestic security are adopted, and 2) they don't get blamed for
any dot connection failures that could have prevented 9/11.
 
Unfortunately, it's the wrong metaphor. We all know how to connect the
dots. They're right there on the page, and they're all numbered. All you
have to do is move your crayon from one dot to another, and when you're
done you've drawn a lion. It's so easy a three-year-old could do it;
what's wrong with the FBI and the CIA?
 
The problem is that the dots can only be numbered after the fact. With the
benefit of hindsight, it's easy to draw lines from people in flight school
here, to secret meetings in foreign countries there, over to interesting
tips from foreign governments, and then to INS records. Before 9/11 it's
not so easy. Rather than thinking of intelligence as a simple
connect-the-dots picture, think of it as a million unnumbered pictures
superimposed on top of each other. Or a random-dot stereogram. Is it a
lion, a tree, a cast iron stove, or just an unintelligible mess of
dots? You try and figure it out.
 
This isn't to say that the United States didn't have some spectacular
failures in analysis leading up to 9/11. Way back in the 30 September 2001
issue of Crypto-Gram, I wrote: "In what I am sure is the mother of all
investigations, the CIA, NSA, and FBI have uncovered all sorts of data from
their files, data that clearly indicates that an attack was being
planned. Maybe it even clearly indicates the nature of the attack, or the
date. I'm sure lots of information is there, in files, intercepts,
computer memory." I was guessing there. It seems that there was more than
I thought.
 
Given the bits of information that have been discussed in the press, I
would have liked to think that we could have prevented this one, that there
was a single Middle Eastern Terrorism desk somewhere inside the
intelligence community whose job it was to stay on top of all of this. It
seems that we couldn't, and that there wasn't. A budget issue, most likely.
 
Still, I think the "whose fault is it?" witch hunt is a bit much. Not that
I mind seeing George Bush on the defensive. I've gotten sick of his "we're
at war, and if you criticize me you're being unpatriotic" nonsense, and I
think the enormous damage John Ashcroft has done to our nation's freedoms
and liberties will take a generation and another Warren Court to fix. But
all this finger-pointing between the CIA and FBI is childish, and I'm
embarrassed by the Democrats who are pushing through their own poorly
thought out security proposals so they're not viewed in the polls as being
soft on terrorism.
 
My preference is for less politics and more intelligent discussion. And
I'd rather see the discussion center on how to improve things for next
time, rather than on who gets the blame for this time. So, in the spirit
of bipartisanship (there are plenty of nitwits in both parties), here are
some points for discussion:
 
1. It's not about data collection; it's about data analysis. Again from
the 30 September 2001 issue of Crypto-Gram: "Demands for even more
surveillance miss the point. The problem is not obtaining data, it's
deciding which data is worth analyzing and then interpreting it. Everyone
already leaves a wide audit trail as we go through life, and law
enforcement can already access those records with search warrants [and
subpoenas]. The FBI quickly pieced together the terrorists' identities and
the last few months of their lives, once they knew where to look. If they
had thrown up their hands and said that they couldn't figure out who did it
or how, they might have a case for needing more surveillance data. But
they didn't, and they don't."
 
2. Security decisions need to be made as close to the source as
possible. This has all sorts of implications: airport X-ray machines
should be right next to the departure gates, like they are in some European
airports; bomb target decisions should be made by the generals on the
ground in the war zone, not by some bureaucrat in Washington; and
investigation approvals should be granted the FBI office that's closest to
the investigation. This mode of operation has more opportunities for
abuse, so oversight is vital. But it is also more robust, and the best way
to make things work. (The U.S. Marine Corps understands this principle;
it's the heart of their chain of command rules.)
 
3. Data correlation needs to happen as far away from the sources as
possible. Good intelligence involves finding meaning amongst enormous
reams of irrelevant data, and then organizing all those disparate pieces of
information into coherent predictions about what will happen next. It
requires smart people who can see connections, and access to information
from many different branches of government. It can't be by the various
individual pieces of bureaucracy, whether it be the CIA, FBI, NSA, INS,
Coast Guard, etc. The whole picture is larger than any of them, and each
one only has access to a small piece.
 
4. Intelligence and law enforcement have fundamentally different
missions. The FBI's model of operation -- investigation of past crimes --
does not lend itself to an intelligence paradigm: prediction of future
events. On the other hand, the CIA is prohibited by law from spying on
citizens. Expecting the FBI to become a domestic CIA is a terrible idea;
the missions are just too different and that's too much power to
consolidate under one roof. Turning the CIA into a domestic intelligence
agency is an equally terrible idea; the tactics that they regularly use
abroad are unconstitutional here.
 
5. Don't forget old-fashioned intelligence gathering. Enough with the
Echelon-like NSA programs where everything and anything gets sucked into an
enormous electronic maw, never to be looked at again. Lots of Americans
managed to become part of Al Qaeda (a 20-year-old Californian did it, for
crying out loud); why weren't any of them feeding intelligence to the
CIA? Get out in the field and do your jobs.
 
6. Organizations with investigative powers require constant oversight. If
we want to formalize a domestic intelligence agency, we are going to need
to be very careful about how we do it. Many of the checks and balances
that Ashcroft is discarding were put in place to prevent abuse. And abuse
is rampant -- at the federal, state, and local levels. Just because
everyone is feeling good about the police today doesn't mean that things
won't change in the future. They always do.
 
7. Fundamental changes in how the United States copes with domestic
terrorism requires, um, fundamental changes. Much as the Bush
Administration would like to ignore the constitutional issues surrounding
some of their proposals, those issues are real. Much of what the Israeli
government does to combat terrorism in its country, even some of what the
British government does, is unconstitutional in the United
States. Security is never absolute; it always involved tradeoffs. If
we're going to institute domestic passports, arrest people in secret and
deny them any rights, place people with Arab last names under continuous
harassment, or methodically track everyone's financial dealings, we're
going to have to rewrite the Constitution. At the very least, we need to
have a frank and candid debate about what we're getting for what we're
giving up. People might want to live in a police state, but let them at
least decide willingly to live in a police state. My opinion has been that
it is largely unnecessary to trade civil liberties for security, and that
the best security measures -- reinforcing the airplane cockpit door,
putting barricades and guards around important buildings, improving
authentication for telephone and Internet banking -- have no effect on
civil liberties. Broad surveillance is a mark of bad security.
 
All in all, I'm not sure how the Department of Homeland Security is going
to help with any of this. Taking a bunch of ineffectual little
bureaucracies and lumping them together into a single galumptious
bureaucracy doesn't seem like a step in the right direction. Leaving the
FBI and CIA out of the mix -- the largest sources of both valuable
information and turf-based problems -- doesn't help, either. And if the
individual organizations squabble and refuse to share information,
reshuffling the chain of command isn't really going to make any difference
-- it'll just add needless layers of management. And don't forget the $37
billion this is all supposed to cost, assuming there aren't the usual
massive cost overruns. Couldn't we better spend that money teaching Arabic
to case officers, hiring investigators, and doing various things that
actually will make a difference?
 
The problems are about politics and policy, and not about form and
structure. Fix the former, and fixing the latter becomes easy. Change the
latter without fixing the former, and nothing will change.
 
I'm not denying the need for some domestic intelligence capability. We
need something to respond to future domestic threats. I'm not happy with
this conclusion, but I think it may be the best of a bunch of bad
choices. Given this, the thing to do is make sure we approach that choice
correctly, paying attention to constitutional protections, respecting
privacy and civil liberty, and minimizing the inevitable abuses of power.
 
My original articles:
<http://www.counterpane.com/crypto-gram-0109a.html#4>
<http://www.counterpane.com/crypto-gram-0109a.html#8>
 
 
** *** ***** ******* *********** *************
 
             Crypto-Gram Reprints
 
 
 
Crypto-Gram is currently in its fifth year of publication. Back issues
cover a variety of security-related topics, and can all be found on
<http://www.counterpane.com/crypto-gram.html>. These are a selection of
articles that appeared in this calendar month in other years.
 
Honeypots and the Honeynet Project
<http://www.counterpane.com/crypto-gram-0106.html#1>
 
Microsoft SOAP:
<http://www.counterpane.com/crypto-gram-0006.html#SOAP>
 
The Data Encryption Standard (DES):
<http://www.counterpane.com/crypto-gram-0006.html#DES>
 
The internationalization of cryptography policy:
<http://www.counterpane.com/crypto-gram-9906.html#policy>
and products:
<http://www.counterpane.com/crypto-gram-9906.html#products>
 
The new breeds of viruses, worms, and other malware:
<http://www.counterpane.com/crypto-gram-9906.html#viruses>
 
Timing attacks, power analysis, and other "side-channel" attacks against
cryptosystems:
<http://www.counterpane.com/crypto-gram-9806.html#side>
 
 
** *** ***** ******* *********** *************
 
                      News
 
 
 
More biometric articles:
<http://www.anu.edu.au/people/Roger.Clarke/DV/NotesCFP02.html#BiomRC>
<http://www.anu.edu.au/people/Roger.Clarke/DV/BiomHKU.ppt>
 
And yet another:
<http://chris.fornax.net/download/thesis/thesis.pdf>
 
This is a particularly good article about failures in biometric sensors:
<http://www.heise.de/ct/english/02/11/114/>
 
And another one about fingerprints:
<http://keuning.com/biometry>
 
The Matsumoto paper I talked about last month is here:
<http://cryptome.org/gummy.htm>
And there are some news stories on my story in Crypto-Gram. (I think this
counts as my first "scoop.")
<http://news.com.com/2100-1001-915580.html>
<http://www.theregus.com/content/55/24956.html>
<http://news.zdnet.co.uk/story/0,,t269-s2110380,00.html>
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/sci/tech/newsid_1991000/1991517.stm>
<http://research.yale.edu/lawmeme/modules.php?name=News&file=article&sid=214>
In response, various fingerprint companies have issued statements claiming
that they're not vulnerable to the attack for a variety of
reasons. Remember the point of the story, though. Matsumoto is not a
professional forensic scientist. Even so, with a little bit of ingenuity
and some common household products, he was able to reliably defeat eleven
commercial fingerprint readers from latent fingerprints. If he could do
this, what would he do with a budget of $50? What could he do with a few
more weeks of thinking? What could a professional in the field
do? Fingerprint-sensor vendors have long claimed that their products could
not be spoofed. Why would anyone believe them when they say it now?
 
And as long as we're on the topic, consider whether Matsumoto's procedure
for making gummi fingers could be used to leave a latent fingerprint that
might fool the police.
 
High-speed worms, and a discussion on defenses:
<http://www.cs.berkeley.edu/~nweaver/cdc.web/>
 
Virtual credit cards. Randomized numbers for safer online shopping. Done
correctly, this is a really good idea.
<https://www.citibank.com/us/cards/tour/cmc_van.htm>
Remember, the real risks here are not sending credit card numbers in the
clear over the Internet; they're the databases of credit card numbers
stored in merchant computers.
 
Airport face scanners a dismal failure:
<http://www.wired.com/news/privacy/0,1848,52563,00.html>
The system failed to correctly identify airport employees 53 percent of the
time. And this is with standardized, high-quality photographs to start
with. Imagine the system trying to work with grainy photographs of
suspected terrorists.
 
For computer eavesdropping. This nifty hardware device sits between the
keyboard and the computer, where no one will think of looking for it, and
captures keystrokes for later analysis. Every spy needs one.
<http://www.thinkgeek.com/stuff/gadgets/5a05.shtml>
 
Keystroke logging was used by FBI to catch two Russian hackers. No details
on whether it was hardware or software, or administered locally or remotely.
<http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2002/05/14/eveningnews/main508953.shtml>
 
Video forgery. Make video recordings of people saying things they've never
said:
<http://www.paramount.com/television/babybob/>
<http://www.boston.com/dailyglobe2/135/metro/At_MIT_they_can_put_words_in_ou
r_mouths+.shtml>
 
NIST Report: The Economic Impact of Role-Based Access Control. Another
example of the interplay of economics and security.
<http://www.nist.gov/director/prog-ofc/report02-1.pdf>
 
Article on the buying and selling of stolen credit card numbers:
<http://www.siliconvalley.com/mld/siliconvalley/news/editorial/3252532.htm>
I believe that everyone has, in his wallet right now, a credit card number
that has been stolen. Almost none of those stolen numbers will ever be
bought, sold, or used. There are just too many large databases of credit
card numbers on Internet-accessible computers, and they're probably all
insecure. It's a good thing this isn't my liability.
 
"Photo flash" attacks against smart cards. (Yet another way to break smart
cards.)
<http://www.nwfusion.com/news/2002/0514smartcards.html>
<http://slashdot.org/articles/02/05/13/1355204.shtml?tid=172>
The paper:
<http://www.ftp.cl.cam.ac.uk/ftp/users/rja14/faultpap3.pdf>
 
And yet another way to eavesdrop on CRT displays:
<http://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/~mgk25/emsec/optical-faq.html>
 
Politically motivated hacking:
<http://www.newsfactor.com/perl/story/17763.html>
 
Microsoft's "Trustworthy Computing" initiative seems to be just a scam so
the company can avoid antitrust remedies by claiming that opening their
systems is a security risk. Pity.
<http://www.eweek.com/article/0,3658,s=701%26a=26605,00.asp>
<http://www.eweek.com/article/0,3658,s%253D701%2526a%253D26875,00.asp>
A comment on Slashdot sums it up best: "Microsoft has therefore taken the
position that their code is so bad that it must be kept secret to keep
people from being killed by it. Windows -- the Pinto of the 21st century."
 
Most interesting of the two articles above is the second eWeek article,
where Microsoft's Allchin mentions "at least one protocol and two APIs that
it plans to withhold from public disclosure under the security
carve-out." The protocol is Message Queuing. Apparently, Microsoft has
discovered a security flaw in the Message Queuing protocol so bad that
can't be fixed without breaking existing applications. So, until such time
as they can field a backwards-compatible fix, they're going to hope no one
else discovers it. (This is not a wholly unreasonable decision; security
researchers have made the same decision in the past.) Of course, Allchin
has undermined this decision by publicly naming the protocol. That's more
than enough for someone sufficiently motivated to find the flaw. In the
classified world, you can get your clearance pulled for blabbing like that.
Jim Allchin's testimony:
<http://www.microsoft.com/presspass/trial/mswitness/2002/allchin.asp>
 
At the same time, Microsoft tries to convince the Pentagon that open source
software threatens security, and using proprietary Microsoft software is
much safer (and better for the economy, to boot). This article is
hilarious in light of the above.
<http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A60050-2002May22.html>
 
A white paper that makes the case that open source software is less
secure. However, it's from a group that has received funding from Microsoft.
<http://zdnet.com.com/2100-1104-929669.html>
<http://www.theregister.co.uk/content/4/25656.html>
<http://www.adti.net/html_files/defense/opensource_whitepaper.pdf>
 
Good essay on security negligence:
<http://www.gigaweb.com/content_display/popup/1,,PubID=MCO-052002-00001,00.h
tml>
 
Thousands illegally obtain fraudulent Social Security numbers in the United
States. Any reason to believe a national ID card would be any less
abuse-prone?
<http://www.nytimes.com/2002/05/20/national/20FRAU.html>
 
Attacks against Yahoo:
<http://www.ddj.com/news/fullstory.cgi?id=5887>
 
Defeating copy-protected CDs with a magic marker. What bozos design these
security systems, anyway?
<http://news.com.com/2100-1023-918273.html>
 
An analysis of Bernstein's factoring proposal. I agree with this paper;
there's less in the proposal than appears.
<http://www.cryptosavvy.com/mesh.pdf>
<http://www.cryptosavvy.com/mesh.ps>
<http://slashdot.org/article.pl?sid=02/06/04/1936239&mode=thread&tid=93>
 
Interview with a senior architect of the Echelon project:
<http://cryptome.org/echelon2-arch.htm>
 
Passwords still suck:
<http://news.com.com/2009-1001-916719.html>
 
I've already written about how UNICODE can evade IDSs. Here's another
essay on the topic:
<http://online.securityfocus.com/infocus/1232>
 
FBI agents sell a stock short, and then leak unpleasant personal
information about the corporate officers. Other companies are blackmailed
with threat of the same.
<http://slashdot.org/articles/02/05/22/2347219.shtml?tid=158>
 
Thomas Friedman writes in the New York Times: "Silicon Valley staunchly
opposed the Clipper Chip, which would have given the government a back-door
key to all U.S. encrypted data. Now some wonder whether they shouldn't
have opposed it. John Doerr, the venture capitalist, said, 'Culturally,
the Valley was already maturing before 9/11, but since then it's definitely
developed a deeper respect for leaders and government
institutions.'" That's completely wrong. We opposed Clipper not because
we don't trust the government, but because we don't trust the
technology. Respect is not sufficient to make complex systems secure.
<http://www.nytimes.com/2002/05/26/opinion/26FRIE.html>
Via Usenet, so no annoying registration:
<http://groups.google.com/groups?q=clipper+doerr&hl=en&lr=&ie=utf-8&oe=utf-8
&scoring=d&selm=3CF2A8C2.10145.2B3C2394%40localhost&rnum=1>
 
Interesting paper on the relationship between user interface and security:
<http://zesty.ca/sid>
 
Protecting your privacy online, a four-part article:
<http://online.securityfocus.com/infocus/1568>
<http://online.securityfocus.com/infocus/1573>
<http://online.securityfocus.com/infocus/1579>
<http://online.securityfocus.com/infocus/1585>
 
Japanese hackers arrested for industrial spying.
<http://europe.cnn.com/2002/WORLD/asiapcf/east/05/30/japan.spacehackers.ap/i
ndex.html>
 
The story of a rather lame hacking contest gone badly wrong:
<http://zdnet.com.com/2100-1105-930689.html>
<http://news.zdnet.co.uk/story/0,,t269-s2111243,00.html>
 
A report on something called a Tactical Web Page, which purports to be a
secret combat Web site, through which American commanders in the United
States can direct troops in Afghanistan. My favorite quote: "'There have
been a few instances when unidentified computers have tried to get in, in
which case we throw up additional firewalls,' Lt. Col. Bryan Dyer
said." Is it just me, or does Lt. Col. Dyer come from I-Don't-Get-It Land?
<http://www.wired.com/news/politics/0,1283,52861,00.html>
 
Yet more comments from the clueless. In response to the report that
someone hacked into Experian's database and stole 13,000 credit-card
numbers, a PR flack said: "Our files are protected by state-of-the-art,
Star Wars-style security and encryption technology."
<http://www.lendingintelligence.com/news.ez?viewStory=1123&Form.sess_id=8455
21234&Form.sess_key=1022430845>
 
And this review of PGP. "PGP's basic encryption is about 10 times higher
than that of other apps" -- but only if you compare RSA with
triple-DES. "Fortunately, PGP includes a primer on encryption
principles. Read the primer carefully, and you'll rev right up to
speed." Maybe the reviewer should read it, too.
<http://www.cnet.com/software/0-806183-8-4792641-2.html>
 
VeriSign is offering companies the ability to outsource their compliance
with U.S. Internet wiretap regulations. They will comply with government
wiretap court orders, so companies don't have to redesign their
infrastructure. I've seen a lot of VeriSign-bashing over this, but I think
it's a fine example of a company stepping in and filling a market
need. VeriSign wants to be the trusted infrastructure company, and this is
just another aspect of that. Complain about the U.S. law, not the vehicle
for compliance.
<http://corporate.verisign.com/news/2002/pr_20020603a.html>
<http://www.siliconvalley.com/mld/siliconvalley/news/editorial/3391113.htm>
 
Amusing story of lousy passwords at the New York Times:
<http://www.oreillynet.com/cs/weblog/view/wlg/1482>
 
NIST wants comments on Part 1 of their Key Management Guidelines:
<http://www.nist.gov/kms>
 
Hacking for good. Password cracked; Norwegian history saved!
<http://news.com.com/2100-1001-934060.html>
 
Microsoft's editorial on government-mandated digital copy protection. I
actually agree with a lot of this.
<http://www.microsoft.com/issues/essays/2002/06-03digitalrights.asp>
 
Hacking the Xbox. Interesting stuff, especially the fact that the security
is based on a single global secret. Hack one box, hack them all.
<http://news.com.com/2100-1040-931296.html>
<http://www.theregus.com/content/3/25130.html>
<ftp://publications.ai.mit.edu/ai-publications/2002/AIM-2002-008.pdf>
<http://web.mit.edu/bunnie/www/proj/anatak/xboxmod.html>
 
Using a cell phone as a room bug:
<http://www.cnn.com/2002/TECH/ptech/06/11/israel.netline.reut/index.html>
 
ASN.1 security:
<http://online.securityfocus.com/news/474>
<http://online.wsj.com/article_email/0,,SB1023731908761703280,00.html>
 
 
** *** ***** ******* *********** *************
 
                Counterpane News
 
 
More news on the VeriSign/Counterpane agreement:
<http://www.counterpane.com/pr-verisign.html>
 
A good article about Counterpane from Computerworld:
<http://www.computerworld.com/securitytopics/security/story/0,10801,71773,00
.html>
 
Schneier is speaking about Counterpane monitoring in California (Anaheim
and Irvine, both near Los Angeles), Dallas, and Cincinnati. For details see:
<http://www.counterpane.com/conf.html>
 
 
** *** ***** ******* *********** *************
 
         More on Secrecy and Security
 
 
 
In case you think this is an easy issue, here's something to mull over.
 
The New York Times Magazine recently carried a fascinating article on the
terrorist threat -- myths and realities -- of a nuclear bomb. The article
talks about one atomic researcher's nightmare scenario: a homemade nuclear
explosive device being detonated in New York. The researcher suggests that
the attackers would detonate the device inside a tunnel, because that
"would vaporize many tons of concrete and dirt and river water into an
enduring cloud of lethal fallout."
 
My reactions were 1) now that's clever, 2) I never thought of that, and 3)
should he have published that? I have to admit that I don't know.
 
Information about poisons is kept relatively secret. I'm sure there are
sites on the Internet -- however, we all know how accurate the Internet can
be -- but doctors are generally reluctant to divulge recipes to the general
public. Those in the field know, but there's little benefit to announcing
the information to every would-be killer.
 
Nuclear information is different. It's possible that anyone with enough
skill to create a home-made nuclear bomb already knows about the "detonate
it in a tunnel" trick, and a dozen other tricks that I, without any
specialized education, doesn't. It's also possible that the average
amateur nuclear warrior would never think of it. I don't know.
 
<http://www.nytimes.com/2002/05/26/magazine/26NUKES.html>
 
 
** *** ***** ******* *********** *************
 
             Comments from Readers
 
 
 
From: Bob Chase <bchase@scoreboardinc.com>
Subject: Secrecy, Security, and Obscurity
 
I accept your general argument wholeheartedly, but this corollary has a
gotcha. Secrets can work in parallel or in serial.
 
For instance, suppose we want to gain root on a box to which we have
physical access. There are several "secrets" that we might try (boot from
CD, special boot parameters, guessing screen saver passwords, etc). If any
of these methods works, then security is compromised; each of these methods
works in parallel.
 
Suppose instead that the box is in a room with a secret combination which
is in a building with a secret combination. We have a serial combination
of secrets, which will continue to hold -- in a weaker state -- if any one
secret is known.
 
Again, I think what you are saying is important, and needs to be said! And
the systems that you use as examples are good examples of bad combinations
of parallel secrets! I simply think that there is a case for strengthening
security through multiple serial secrets.
 
 
 
From: Pekka Pihlajasaari <pekka@data.co.za>
Subject: Secrecy, Security, and Obscurity
 
Kerckhoffs' principle "in a well-designed cryptographic system, only the
key needs to be secret" is not necessarily reflexive, and makes no
statement about aspects other than the key. While non-disclosure may
restrict the validation of the algorithms, it does not necessarily reduce
the security of the system.
 
Whereas a key is an independent value, a cryptographic algorithm may result
in artifacts, and information about it could be inferred through analysis
of the encrypted text. As such, security based on secrecy of the algorithm
may be discounted in an analysis of a system. There is no need to invoke
quality or correctness arguments to show the futility of suppressing the
choice of the algorithm as a security measure.
 
This principle can be generalised to other environments when the algorithm
forms a part of a cryptographic system where the economic value is
exclusively embodied in the key. In many cases competitive advantage is
derived from the algorithm in the form of limiting markets through export
restrictions, or reduced credit default exposure. Such systems provide
benefits outside the scope of pure cryptographic protocols and should be
analysed separately.
 
Your observation "the fewer secrets a system has, the more secure it is" is
a corollary. If the secrets are keys, then they may be coalesced into a
single key, giving the traditional interpretation of a system with an
algorithm and a single key. Otherwise, the system has multiple secrets
that are not keys, but components of a business process (the algorithm)
that is inferable and not possible to secure. Given sufficient willing
participants it is possible to determine the threshold of an airport
security sensor, and even the placement of mines in a mine field, allowing
reverse-engineering of a security process.
 
It may be better to state that if a system can contains a single secret,
then full disclosure does not affect its security and simply introduces
obscurity, whereas if other information needs to be secured, secrecy is
necessary, but not sufficient for continued protection against disclosure
through inference.
 
 
 
From: pieterek@spamcop.net
Subject: Fun with Fingerprint Readers
 
Matsumoto-san is most likely not using what Americans would purchase in
groceries as gelatin, which is definitely not stable at room temperature or
higher. Have you ever seen a Jell-O salad at a picnic on a hot summer
day? Not a pretty sight, even if you fortify it.
 
Matsumoto-san is more likely using kanten, commonly known in English as
"agar-agar." This is a sea vegetable gelatin which does not need to be
refrigerated and is quite hard at room temperature. (Kanten is the
Japanese name for the product; I do not know what it is called in other
Asian languages.) Kanten can be purchased at Asian groceries in sheets,
strips, or powder: cook's choice as to which you find easiest to work
with. Personally, I find the powder easiest.
 
 
 
From: Gunnar Peterson <ngp@woodshole.visi.com>
Subject: Web Services and SOAP
 
One thing that I have heard you mention before that I disagree with is that
Web Services and things like SOAP are bad for security.
 
First off, any technology will have some security issues and Web Services
are no different, but this does not mean that they are "bad," because you
have to look at what they are replacing. If I am writing a distributed app
today that needs to traverse the firewall or WAN my choices are RMI-IIOP
(J2EE or CORBA) or DCOM (Microsoft) or some type of proprietary messaging
system.
 
As you have often said, complexity is the enemy of security...well...Web
Services represent a much more simplistic approach to distributed app
development. For one thing I can use SOAP in either a J2EE or .Net app, so
the security team only needs to understand this one protocol to be useful
to either style of development team (for the distributed programming part
of the project).
 
For another thing, Web Services and SOAP are a shift away from code and
towards semantic meaning (as Don Box says) and this also aids the
understanding of a complex system. Given a good architect, development,
and security team, a Web Services-based system has a better chance at being
secure in development and production than RMI-IIOP- or DCOM-based apps.
 
So I would say that Web Services and SOAP are an imperfect yet incremental
improvement over the current situation.
 
 
 
From: Glenn Welt <glennwelt@checksnet.com>
Subject: 10 Day Notice: Welt vs. Counterpane & Schneier
 
I hereby request the immediate removal of false & defamatory comments about
my software, ChecksNet, from the following website within ten days of this
notice:
 
http://www.counterpane.com/crypto-gram-9906.html#doghouse2
 
Be sure to also remove all mirror sites containing the same false and
defamatory statements.
 
My website, checksnet.com offers both secure SSL order pages and non-secure
order pages, thus your accusations are totally false. Whereas your
defamatory pages appear via numerous search engines, it is damaging to the
reputation and sales of my software.
 
This is not an empty threat. In the past 2 years I have taken people to
court and been awarded 6 figure judgments for defamation.
 
This will be my only notice prior to commencement of legal action.
 
I suggest removing the "doghouse" editorials unless you wish to personally
and corporately appear in a "courthouse."
 
 
** *** ***** ******* *********** *************
 
 
CRYPTO-GRAM is a free monthly newsletter providing summaries, analyses,
insights, and commentaries on computer security and cryptography. Back
issues are available on <http://www.counterpane.com/crypto-gram.html>.
 
To subscribe, visit <http://www.counterpane.com/crypto-gram.html> or send a
blank message to crypto-gram-subscribe@chaparraltree.com. To unsubscribe,
visit <http://www.counterpane.com/unsubform.html>.
 
Please feel free to forward CRYPTO-GRAM to colleagues and friends who will
find it valuable. Permission is granted to reprint CRYPTO-GRAM, as long as
it is reprinted in its entirety.
 
CRYPTO-GRAM is written by Bruce Schneier. Schneier is founder and CTO of
Counterpane Internet Security Inc., the author of "Secrets and Lies" and
"Applied Cryptography," and an inventor of the Blowfish, Twofish, and
Yarrow algorithms. He is a member of the Advisory Board of the Electronic
Privacy Information Center (EPIC). He is a frequent writer and lecturer on
computer security and cryptography.
 
Counterpane Internet Security, Inc. is the world leader in Managed Security
Monitoring. Counterpane's expert security analysts protect networks for
Fortune 1000 companies world-wide.
 
<http://www.counterpane.com/>
 
Copyright (c) 2002 by Counterpane Internet Security, Inc.