|| ||"Gerald (Jerry) Carter" <email@example.com>|
|| ||firstname.lastname@example.org, <email@example.com>,
|| ||[SECURITY] Samba 2.2.8 available for download|
|| ||Sat, 15 Mar 2003 08:13:20 -0600 (CST)|
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This release provides an important security fix outlined in the
release notes that follow. This is the latest stable release of
Samba and the version that all production Samba servers should be
running for all current bug-fixes.
The source code can be downloaded from :
in the file samba-2.2.8.tar.gz or samba-2.2.8.tar.bz2. The
uncompressed tarball has been signed using the Samba Distribution
Key (available in the same directory).
Binary packages will be released shortly for major platforms and
can be found at
As always, all bugs are our responsibility.
The Samba Team
* IMPORTANT: Security bugfix for Samba *
The SuSE security audit team, in particular Sebastian Krahmer
<firstname.lastname@example.org>, has found a flaw in the Samba main smbd code which
could allow an external attacker to remotely and anonymously gain
Super User (root) privileges on a server running a Samba server.
This flaw exists in previous versions of Samba from 2.0.x to 2.2.7a
inclusive. This is a serious problem and all sites should either
upgrade to Samba 2.2.8 immediately or prohibit access to TCP ports 139
and 445. Advice created by Andrew Tridgell, the leader of the Samba
Team, on how to protect an unpatched Samba server is given at the end
of this section.
The SMB/CIFS protocol implemented by Samba is vulnerable to many
attacks, even without specific security holes. The TCP ports 139 and
the new port 445 (used by Win2k and the Samba 3.0 alpha code in
particular) should never be exposed to untrusted networks.
A buffer overrun condition exists in the SMB/CIFS packet fragment
re-assembly code in smbd which would allow an attacker to cause smbd
to overwrite arbitrary areas of memory in its own process address
space. This could allow a skilled attacker to inject binary specific
exploit code into smbd.
This version of Samba adds explicit overrun and overflow checks on
fragment re-assembly of SMB/CIFS packets to ensure that only valid
re-assembly is performed by smbd.
In addition, the same checks have been added to the re-assembly
functions in the client code, making it safe for use in other
This security flaw was discovered and reported to the Samba Team by
Sebastian Krahmer <email@example.com> of the SuSE Security Audit Team.
The fix was prepared by Jeremy Allison and reviewed by engineers from
the Samba Team, SuSE, HP, SGI, Apple, and the Linux vendor engineers
on the Linux Vendor security mailing list.
The Samba Team would like to thank SuSE and Sebastian Krahmer for
their excellent auditing work and for drawing attention to this flaw.
As this is a security issue, patches for this flaw specific to earlier
versions of Samba will be posted on the firstname.lastname@example.org
mailing list as requested.
Protecting an unpatched Samba server
Samba Team, March 2003
This is a note on how to provide your Samba server some
protection against the recently discovered remote security
hole if you are unable to upgrade to the fixed version
immediately. Even if you do upgrade you might like to think
about the suggestions in this note to provide you with
additional levels of protection.
Using host based protection
In many installations of Samba the greatest threat comes for
outside your immediate network. By default Samba will accept
connections from any host, which means that if you run an
insecure version of Samba on a host that is directly
connected to the Internet you can be especially vulnerable.
One of the simplest fixes in this case is to use the 'hosts
allow' and 'hosts deny' options in the Samba smb.conf
configuration file to only allow access to your server from a
specific range of hosts. An example might be:
hosts allow = 127.0.0.1 192.168.2.0/24 192.168.3.0/24
hosts deny = 0.0.0.0/0
The above will only allow SMB connections from 'localhost'
(your own computer) and from the two private networks
192.168.2 and 192.168.3. All other connections will be
refused connections as soon as the client sends its first
packet. The refusal will be marked as a 'not listening on
called name' error.
Using interface protection
By default Samba will accept connections on any network
interface that it finds on your system. That means if you
have a ISDN line or a PPP connection to the Internet then
Samba will accept connections on those links. This may not be
what you want.
You can change this behavior using options like the
interfaces = eth* lo
bind interfaces only = yes
that tells Samba to only listen for connections on interfaces
with a name starting with 'eth' such as eth0, eth1, plus on
the loopback interface called 'lo'. The name you will need to
use depends on what OS you are using. In the above I used the
common name for ethernet adapters on Linux.
If you use the above and someone tries to make a SMB
connection to your host over a PPP interface called 'ppp0',
they will get a TCP connection refused reply. In that
case no Samba code is run at all as the operating system has
been told not to pass connections from that interface to any
Using a firewall
Many people use a firewall to deny access to services that
they don't want exposed outside their network. This can be a
very good idea, although I would recommend using it in
conjunction with the above methods so that you are protected
even if your firewall is not active for some reason.
If you are setting up a firewall then you need to know what
TCP and UDP ports to allow and block. Samba uses the
UDP/137 - used by nmbd
UDP/138 - used by nmbd
TCP/139 - used by smbd
TCP/445 - used by smbd
The last one is important as many older firewall setups may
not be aware of it, given that this port was only added to
the protocol in recent years.
Using a IPC$ share deny
If the above methods are not suitable, then you could also
place a more specific deny on the IPC$ share that is used in
the recently discovered security hole. This allows you to
offer access to other shares while denying access to IPC$
from potentially untrustworthy hosts.
To do that you could use:
hosts allow = 192.168.115.0/24 127.0.0.1
hosts deny = 0.0.0.0/0
this would tell Samba that IPC$ connections are not allowed
from anywhere but the two listed places (localhost and a
local subnet). Connections to other shares would still be
allowed. As the IPC$ share is the only share that is always
accessible anonymously this provides some level of protection
against attackers that do not know a username/password for
If you use this method then clients will be given a 'access
denied' reply when they try to access the IPC$ share. That
means that those clients will not be able to browse shares,
and may also be unable to access some other resources.
I don't recommend this method unless you cannot use one of
the other methods listed above for some reason.
Of course the best solution is to upgrade Samba to a version
where the bug has been fixed. If you wish to also use one of
the additional measures above then that would certainly be a
Please check regularly on http://www.samba.org/ for updates
and important announcements.
Changes since 2.2.7a
* acl compatibility
See the cvs log for SAMBA_2_2 for more details
1) smbumount lazy patch from Mandrake
2) Check for too many processes *before* the fork.
3) make sure we don't run over the end of 'name' in unix_convert()
4) set umask to 0 before creating socket directory.
5) Fix the LARGE_SMB_OFF_T problems and allow smbd to do the right
thing in interactive mode when a log file dir is also specified.
6) Fix delete on close semantics to match W2K.
7) Correctly return access denied on share mode deny when we can't
open the file.
8) Always use safe_strcpy not pstrcpy for malloc()'d strings
9) Fixes for HP-UX only having limited POSIX lock range
10) Added uid/gid caching code. Reduces load on winbindd.
11) Removed extra copy of server name in the printername field (it was
mangling the the name to be \\server\\\server\printer
12) Fix dumb perror used without errno being set.
13) Do retries correctly if the connection to the DC has failed.
14) Correctly check for inet_addr fail.
15) Ensure we use getgrnam() unless BROKEN_GETGRNAM is defined.
16) Fix for missing if (setting_acls) on default perms.
17) Fix to cache the sidtype
18) fix printer settings on Solaris (big-endian) print servers.
ASCII -> UNICODE conversion bug.
19) Small fix check correct error return.
20) Ensure space_avail is unsigned.
21) patch to check for a valid [f]chmod_acl function pointer
before calling it. Fixes seg fault in audit VFS module
22) When checking is_locked() new WRITE locks conflict with existing
READ locks even if the context is the same.
23) Merge off-by-one crash fixes from HEAD
24) Move off-by-one buggy malloc()/safe_strcpy() combination to
25) Merge from HEAD. Use pstrcpy not safe_strcpy.
26) Fix to allow blocking lock notification to be done rapidly (no wait
for smb -> smb lock release). Adds new PENDING_LOCK type to lockdb
(does not interfere with existing locks).
27) Doxygen cleanups for code documentation
28) limit the unix domain sockets used by winbindd by adding a
"last_access" field to winbindd connections, and will close
the oldest idle connection once the number of open connections goes
over WINBINDD_MAX_SIMULTANEOUS_CLIENTS (defined in local.h as 200
29) Fix a couple of string handling errors in smbd/dir.c that would
cause smbd to crash
30) Fix seg fault in smbpasswd when specifying the new password
as a command line argument
31) Correct 64-but file sizes issues with smbtar and smbclient
32) Add batch mode option to pdbedit
33) Add protection in nmbd against malformed reply packets
34) Fix bug with sendfile profiling support in smbstatus output
35) Correct bug in "hide unreadable" smb.conf parameter that
resulted in incorrect directory listings
36) Fix bug in group enumeration in winbindd
37) Correct build issues with libsmbclient on Solaris
38) Fix memory leak and bad pointer dereference in password
changing code in smbd
39) Fix for changing attributes on a file truncate
40) Ensure smbd process count never gets to -1 if limiting number
41) Ensure we return disk full by default on short writes
42) Don't delete jobs submitted after the lpq time
43) Fix reference count bug where smbds would not terminate
with no open resources
44) Performance fix when using quota support on HP-UX
45) Fixes for --with-ldapsam
* Default to port 389 when "ldap ssl != on"
* add support for rebinding to the master directory server
for password changes when "ldap server" points to a read-only
46) Add -W and -X command line flags to smbpasswd for extracting and
setting the machine/domain SID in secrets.tdb. See the
smbpasswd(8) man page for details.
47) Added (c) Luke Howard to winbind_nss_solaris.c for coded
obtained from PADL's nss_ldap library.
48) Fix bug in samr_dispinfo query in winbindd
49) Fix segfault in NTLMSSP password changing code for
50) Correct pstring/fstring mismatches
51) Send level II oplock break requests synchronously to prevent
condition where one smbd would continually lock a share entry
52) Miscellaneous cleanups for tdb error conditions and appending
data in a record
53) Implement correct open file truncate semantics with DOS
54) Enforce wide links = no on files as well as directories
55) Include shared library checks for Stratus VOS
56) Include support for CUPS printer classes and logging the remote
57) Include "WinXP" (Windows XP) and "Win2K3" (Windows .NET) values
58) Increase the max PDU size to deal with some troublesome printer
drivers and Windows NT 4.0 clients
59) increment the process counter immediately after the fork
(not just when we receive the first smb packet)
60) Ensure rename sets errno correctly
61) Unify ACL code (back-port from 3.0)
62) Fix some further issues around off_t and large offsets
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