OOXML loses a battle
By Jake Edge
September 5, 2007
The latest round in the battle for office document formats has
gone against Microsoft's Office Open XML (OOXML) submission. It certainly
won't be the last we hear about it, as there is another vote in February,
but it does, at least, slow down the fast-track proposal for making
the format an international standard. The process has been anything but
regular, with allegations of ballot box stuffing in Sweden and last minute
voting class changes by eleven countries. These kinds of shenanigans do
very little to enhance the reputation of the International Organization for
Standardization (ISO) nor do they promote confidence in their standards.
The vote, which closed 2 September, was made by members of the Joint
Technical Committee, Information Technology (JTC1). Each country which is
a member of ISO and wishes to join, can be either a Participating ("P") or
Observing ("O") member of the committee. In order to
pass, the proposal must get two-thirds support of the P members and no more
than one-quarter "no" votes amongst both P and O members. In both cases,
abstentions are removed before calculating the ratios.
The results, announced
on 4 September, were 53% "yes" votes by P members and 74% "yes" votes by P
and O
members, which fails both tests, though either failing is all that is
required to defeat the measure. Many of the votes, on both sides, were
made "with comments". The comments specify portions of the OOXML spec that need
clarification or change before it can be ratified.
Those comments will be passed on to the Ecma International, sponsor of
the OOXML standardization proposal, to propose resolutions to
the comments. Ecma is also the organization that rubber-stamped OOXML as a
standard last year. They have until mid-January 2008 to submit the
proposed changes and the committee members have until the Ballot Resolution
Meeting (BRM) in late February to review and discuss them. Microsoft's
Brian Jones estimated there would be in
the neighborhood of 10,000 comments, many probably duplicates. How a
committee is supposed to analyze and handle that many resolutions, in a
week-long meeting, is unclear.
If enough of the "no" votes are satisfied that their comments have been
addressed at the meeting, they can change their votes to yes. If that vote
takes place, it will be the P members in February who get to vote.
It is quite possible that, similar to the run-up to this vote, O members
will suddenly decide to switch to P members. At this point, OOXML
proponents know roughly how many votes they need.
Andy Updegrove has been following the approval process closely in his
Standards Blog
and reported
on eleven countries upgrading from O to P status in the two
weeks before the voting closed. Whether Microsoft is behind this sudden
interest by these countries can only be speculated upon, but nine of them
voted yes, one no, and one abstained. Regardless of why they felt the need
to jump into the voting at the last minute, it certainly seems
fishy.
If the vote fails at the BRM, we still may not have seen the last of OOXML
as a proposed international standard. All of this effort has been to
"fast-track" the proposal. Ecma and Microsoft can still submit it for
approval under the regular, lengthier, standardization process. That could
easily take several years, which is why there is a big push to fast-track it.
OOXML is a complicated, 6000+ page specification, requiring a great deal of
study and consideration before a sensible decision on it can be made. By
upgrading at the last minute, it certainly appears that some of that review
may have been skipped. If a country was interested in
the process and wanted to have more input, it seems that they might have
found time to do it in the nine months of review. If it is going to be an
international standard, it should, at least, be a well scrutinized standard.
Predictably, Microsoft is proclaiming
the voting result as a victory, of sorts, just a step along the way to
ISO acceptance. In the Microsoft view, the no voters will reverse course
"once their comments are resolved." Their confidence is palpable and, to
opponents, galling. There is some indication that the pressure applied to
national bodies resulted
in a backlash, with at least one switching to a no vote because of it.
It will certainly be interesting to see how some of the comments will be
"resolved."
Microsoft has admitted that an employee offered "marketing assistance" to
offset the $2500 entrance fee for Swedish companies to join their national
voting committee. More than twenty showed up, just before the vote, to vote
yes. Eventually, the vote was thrown out, not because of the blatant
ballot-box stuffing, but because somehow one company voted twice. Sweden
ended up abstaining, which was a win for OOXML, as it clearly would have
been a no vote otherwise.
Microsoft has made various noises about the "inadequacies" of the Open
Document Format (ODF) standard – ISO passed it with so few comments
that a BRM was not required – and there is some truth buried deeply
in the rhetoric. The proper response is not to propose another
standard, but to improve the one that exists. ODF is implemented by
multiple projects, with open source reference implementations. It is
very unlikely that anyone, other than Microsoft, will be able to fully
implement OOXML.
It's also not clear that anyone should want to implement OOXML
as international standard. Besides being complex, the proposed standard
contradicts other ISO standards. It also has the kind of bug-for-bug
compatibility that is one of Microsoft's calling cards. An international
standard should not have to implement a sloppy collection of bugs and
compatibility hacks. It should be noted that OOXML contains some very
important features – some not available in ODF – but that does
not make it a good standard. It should not be adopted just to appease the
world's largest software maker.
Microsoft is behaving like
a company that is terrified of losing their near-monopoly in the office
software market. If they, instead, embraced the standard – leaving
behind extend and extinguish – and competed on
the feature set of their office suite, their much touted "innovation" could
shine. Unfortunately, for anyone with a historical perspective on Microsoft's
tactics, this OOXML standardization move looks like the first act of some
kind of customer lock-in scheme.
There will be close scrutiny on the participants between now and the vote in
February. Hopefully, we will see no more gaming of the standards process,
by anyone; the committee will judge the resolutions on their technical
merit, coming to a sensible decision. From what we have seen so far, that
seems unlikely, but one can hope.
Comments (11 posted)
Relicensing: what's legal and what's right
By Jonathan Corbet
September 4, 2007
The ath5k driver has been through more than the usual amount of legal
trouble. This driver, for Atheros wireless chipsets, was originally
reverse engineered and developed in the BSD community. It was reputed by
some to
have been improperly
copied from proprietary Atheros code, requiring two different studies by
the Software Freedom Legal Center before Linux developers were willing to
believe that it was safe to use. This driver should be the cause of great
joy - it will make it possible for vast numbers of laptop owners to run
Linux with free drivers for the first time. But, first, there would appear
to be one more set of legal hassles to overcome.
The latest trouble started when wireless developer Jiri Slaby posted a patch which stripped the
ISC and BSD license notices from the source,
replacing them with GPLv2 license text. It should be noted that this patch
was not accepted into any repository anywhere and never became part of any
exported Linux kernel tree. Nonetheless the BSD community exploded in a
very public way. It is interesting to compare their public response to
this posting with the sort of response they very loudly insisted was their
due when they were found to have carried improperly relicensed GPL code
in their repository for some time. That notwithstanding, it is worth
taking the time to look at what has happened here.
The situation this time around is an interesting one. Much of the affected
code was written by Reyk Floeter for OpenBSD and explicitly placed by him
under a BSD-style license. The patch posted by Jiri Slaby stripped his
license text; it was thus a clear violation of Reyk's license (which
requires that the license text be preserved)
and the wrong thing to do. This patch was never applied, and it will not
be. There is no interest in the kernel community in violating anybody's
license.
Much of the code, however, had been written earlier by Sam Leffler. He had
used the BSD license, but had also included this text:
Alternatively, this software may be distributed under the terms of
the GNU General Public License ("GPL") version 2 as published by
the Free Software Foundation.
So, when this code was relicensed under GPLv2, that act was clearly carried
out with the permission of the copyright holder. Mr. Leffler has since confirmed that this act was, by his intent,
explicitly allowed. Nobody can complain about the legality of this
particular change.
This did not stop OpenBSD leader Theo de Raadt from condemning the relicensing and calling it
illegal:
It may seem that the licenses let one _distribute_ it under either
license, but this interpretation of the license is false -- it is
still illegal to break up, cut up, or modify someone else's legal
document, and, it cannot be replaced by another license because it
may not be removed. Hence, a dual licensed file always remains
dual licensed, every time it is distributed.
How to square this statement with the clear notice saying that the
code may be distributed under either license is left as an exercise for the
reader. By this interpretation the BSD license becomes rather more viral
than the GPL; it cannot be removed even when the copyright notice says
otherwise. The BSD people are fine with their code being locked up and
made completely
proprietary, but it would seem that a GPLv2 relicensing, even when
explicitly allowed by the copyright owner, is a different matter entirely.
The situation has since been resolved with this patch, which was prepared
with the help of the Software Freedom Law Center. It is, perhaps, the only
kernel patch ever to have been signed off by Bradley Kuhn. All of the
required copyright attributions are now in place, and BSD-licensed code
retains that license. Some of the additions made by Linux developers,
however, remain under GPLv2, making the ath5k module, as a whole, a
GPLv2-only product.
This solution should keep the lawyers happy, but certain members of the BSD
community remain unimpressed. Quoting Theo de
Raadt again:
When companies have taken our wireless device drivers, many many of
them have given changes and fixes back. Some maybe didn't, but
that is OK.
When Linux took our changes back, they immediately locked the door
against changes moving back, by putting a GPL license on guard.
Why does our brother Linux take a file that is 90% BSD licensed,
and refuse to let us see the 10% he adds?
It is a rare day in which Theo declares brotherhood with the Linux
community. It may be tempting to dismiss this statement entirely, but, still,
there is a point here. This code was obtained from developers who
placed it under the BSD license; it was not written in the Linux community.
There is something to be said for keeping it under a permissive license so
that ongoing development can be shared between the Linux and BSD
communities. Maintaining the license would be a neighborly (or even
brotherly) thing to do, but it could also have immediate benefits in the
form of shared maintenance and good will going forward.
In the end, distributing versions of the ath5k driver under GPLv2 (with the
requisite copyright attributions maintained) is something which the Linux
community is entitled to do. Anybody who does not like more restrictive
conditions being applied to BSD-licensed code is well advised to avoid
using the BSD license to begin with. But the legal ability to do something
does not make that something the right course of action. Only the
developers who have worked on the ath5k driver have the right to decide
which license they will use, but it's worth saying that allowing the BSD
community to make use of work done on the ath5k driver would be a friendly
gesture and an acknowledgment of the value of the code we got from them.
The benefits from such an act would likely outweigh any cost
associated with allowing unwanted proprietary use of the code which has
been added to this driver.
Comments (75 posted)
LCE: Linux, hardware vendors, and enterprise distributors
By Jonathan Corbet
September 5, 2007
Enterprise distributions are an important part of the economic success
story of Linux. The creation of highly stable, highly supported
distributions has brought significant revenue streams to some distributors
and enabled the deployment of Linux into many "mission critical"
situations. Enterprise distributions encourage the commercial world to
take Linux seriously. At LinuxConf Europe, however, your editor has
stumbled into a few conversations which characterized enterprise
distributions as one of the bigger problems the development community has
now. Then a talk by Dirk Hohndel made that point again in a different
context.
Dirk's talk was on how to get hardware vendors to support Linux. He knows
what he is talking about: as the Linux CTO at Intel, Dirk is charged with,
among other things, implementing Intel's commitment to provide free drivers
for all of its hardware. His core point is that hardware vendors
understand money better than anything else; getting them to support Linux
will require showing them that it is in their economic interest to do so.
To that end, he praised how Dell has taken care to put together hardware
which is entirely supportable with free drivers to ship with Ubuntu
pre-loaded. That sort of decision will quickly get the attention of the
relevant vendors.
There were some suggestions on what to tell hardware vendors who are
thinking about adding open source support for their products. Development
in the open is crucial; drivers should be released early and made available
for the community to work with. Intel did this with some of its early
network drivers; the resulting level of interest and community
participation exceeded all expectations. Vendors need to understand that
they cannot design software just for their device, that they need to think
bigger. This is a hard message for vendors to hear, but, in the long run,
they benefit from a better kernel which will be better suited to their
needs in the future.
It is important that software support be available immediately when
the hardware is made available. If there is no driver for several months
after the hardware release, competitors will have had time to get their
answering products to market before Linux users can use the original
product. That sort of time lag is forever in the hardware world.
Vendors also need to continue to maintain their code after it gets into the
mainline; there is nobody else who can ensure that it continues to work on
all versions of the hardware.
One thing that the community could do to help would be to improve the tone
of the discussion on our mailing lists. That tone is often quite hostile;
it does not create a friendly environment for engineers working for
hardware vendors who want to engage with the community.
There is another place where life gets difficult for hardware vendors,
though; this is where the enterprise distributors come in. When Intel
releases a driver for a new product, that driver goes into the mainline
kernel. But the release cycle implemented by the enterprise distributors
will not pick up that driver for as much as two years after it gets into
the mainline. So enterprise customers are not able to make use of that
hardware for a long time after its release, even though the driver is
available.
Intel has competitors which will never release free drivers for their
hardware. But they do put out closed-source modules for the
enterprise distributions. So their customers are able to use that hardware
from the outset.
In other words, Intel is being punished for playing by the rules and
releasing their drivers to the community. This is exactly the wrong sort
of incentive to create for hardware vendors. If they conclude that they
will do better by just shipping binary-only modules, that is the course
they will take.
Dirk's complaint echoes other conversations your editor has heard in the
last few days. The development community has been very insistent in its
message that code should be merged upstream, and that this merge should
happen early. In the kernel area, the development cycle has been shortened
to the point that changes find their way into a stable release after a
maximum of a few months. But the enterprise distributions, by freezing
kernels for years at a time, are pushing us back to the old, multi-year
development cycle and sending a very different message to vendors.
The discussion of enterprise distributor policies is not new; see this article from last June for
a previous installment. But this discussion appears to be reaching a new
level of urgency, with some developers calling enterprise distributions one
of the biggest problems the community is facing today. There is a
fundamental conflict between the fast-moving development community and the
sort of stasis that the enterprise distributions try to create. This
conflict becomes especially acute when customers want the best of both
worlds: no changes combined with fast-moving development and support for
current hardware.
There are no easy solutions in sight. The enterprise distributions may be
forcing a model from the proprietary software world on Linux, but there are
reasons for the creation of that model in the first place. The kernel
development community has gotten quite good at integrating vast numbers of
changes while still producing a stable result, but any software which has
recently seen significant changes will occasionally produce unwelcome
surprises when dropped into a production environment. Slowing the rate of
development is not an option, and it should be noted that the enterprise
distributors are at the top of the list of companies which are setting the
pace. Getting around this problem is going to be a challenge - but this
community is good at facing challenges.
Comments (33 posted)
LWN advertising update
The reader survey back in
February provided lots of interesting feedback, from the responses as well
as the comments. We have been slowly implementing some of the suggestions
and we are not finished yet. Some of the comments indicated that more
advertising would be tolerated, perhaps even encouraged. With that in mind, we
have been exploring more options in that area.
We are very aware of the fine line that must be walked here. The last
thing we (or our advertisers) want to do is to annoy our loyal readers, so we
are proceeding cautiously.
The latest advertising technique we are trying is "in-text advertising".
The idea is to serve ads that are relevant to keywords in an article by
highlighting those words and popping up an ad when a reader rolls over the
word with their mouse.
We have also added the ability of subscribers – at any level –
to choose whether they see them or not. Our "project leader" subscribers
have long had the ability to turn off all advertising via the customization
options behind the "My Account" link. For in-text advertising, we
defaulted the option to "off"; subscribers can alter that if they wish and
"project leaders" can control those ads independently of other
advertising. As with Google ads, those running with Javascript disabled
will not see the ads.
These new ads were just added late last week, and we are still fine tuning,
but we hope it is a relatively painless way to bring in some needed revenue
without filling every square inch of the site with ads. We will be looking
at other advertising options in the near term as well, with an eye towards
maintaining a reasonable balance. As always, we are very interested in the
thoughts of our readers, either via a comment below or email to lwn-AT-lwn.net.
While we are on the subject, please keep the LWN text ads in
mind for a very cost effective means of reaching LWN readers. If you, or
someone you know, is trying to get the word out about a product, service,
job, or project, the text ad box has a prominent place on roughly half of
our pageviews.
We are always open
to hearing other advertising options, feel free to contact us at
sales-AT-lwn.net to discuss.
Comments (136 posted)
Page editor: Jake Edge
Security
Software liability laws: a dangerous solution
The readers of LWN do not need to be reminded that the software industry
as a whole has a big problem with computer security. One proposal aims to
redress this state of affairs: the concept of legislation designed to
create financial liability for the vendors of buggy software. This idea is
applauded by many such as Bruce Schneier,
author of the famous book Applied
Cryptography. But despite the support of notable authors, software
liability laws are themselves a dangerous liability to the software
industry.
One can readily find sympathy in the potential impact of
software liability laws on developers of free and open-source
software. Many of these developers are working on a volunteer basis, and
holding them financially liable for the code they write and release freely
could have a chilling effect on the development of free software. Of
course, liability laws might be written to exclude programs given away for
free, or they might concern themselves with vendors and leave individual
developers out of the picture.
Unfortunately, the dangers of software liability laws don't subside when
individual developers are granted immunity. One of our community's most
prominent projects, the Linux kernel, was never intended to grow off the
386 but is now found running everything from stock markets to
supercomputers and military gear. This ubiquity brings demand for services,
support, and a single throat to choke, which is the bread and butter of Red
Hat and other businesses. When a vendor is selling free software, and we
make the vendor financially liable for bugs in the code it is selling but
did not write, we risk significant disruption to our cherished development
models.
Further complications arise when we imagine possible liability
lawsuits. In the event of a security breach, directing blame and assigning
liability can be problematic. Picture a system that runs Oracle on top of
Red Hat Enterprise Linux, and imagine that the Oracle database is breached
due to a bug in glibc. Does the buck stop with Oracle, Red Hat, or both?
What if Novell provided the operating system, but the glibc developer who
introduced the bug responsible for the breach is paid by Red Hat? An
attorney might decide to sue all three parties, especially if it is unclear
which component was vulnerable.
Consider also that virtually all software developers attach disclaimers
of warranty to their products. These disclaimers are nearly ubiquitous in
free software licenses, and are even found attached to some public domain
declarations. For software liability laws to have teeth, these disclaimers
must be nullified. But when dealing with software designed to address a
broad range of users, one must carefully select use cases in which default
warranties apply. There is a big difference between a database full of blog
postings, a database full of credit card numbers and a database full of top
secret government intelligence.
We must also recognize the differences in the types of failures under
which warranty is considered appropriate. Ford Police Interceptors had a
reputation for exploding when they
were rear-ended. Ford also suffered a blow
to its reputation, along with tire manufacturer Firestone, when tires
on Ford Explorer vehicles were found to spontaneously fail. In both of
these cases, the loss of human life was not the result of a willful human
actor but was caused instead by spontaneous failure under expected
operating conditions. By sharp contrast, software security breaches
generally don't endanger life or limb, and successful exploits are not
accidents but are rather the result of willful attack.
The difference between accidental and intentional failure is an
important one. Because the laws of physics and the nature of accidents do
not change, we can expect auto manufacturers to build reliable gas tanks
and tires. But in computer security, attackers discover new techniques each
and every year. The equation for software is always on the move.
At this point, advocates of software liability laws still hoping to sell
their wares need to choose their words carefully, and so they plead for a
standard based on best practice. But who defines best practice in an
industry that is changing so fast? The pioneers of the Internet didn't
predict many of the problems we're facing today, yet few would call them
negligent. Real "best practice" is a moving target that is carried by the
tides of the times, and in the world of technology, the waves are a mile
tall and move thousands of miles per hour.
These and other questions must be addressed if software liability laws
are to succeed. Unfortunately, legislators are notoriously bad at
understanding and regulating technology. Observers of SCO v. IBM
surely agree that court cases are long, complicated and costly. Those with
faith in any branch of government to appropriately legislate technology
should reexamine the Digital
Millennium Copyright Act, a law that continues to have a chilling
effect on free software development, and Universal
v. Reimerdes, the case in which 2600 Magazine's publication of DeCSS
was suppressed.
Security is, of course, a problem, and the case can be made that
someone must be held liable. We prosecute the criminals who breach
computer security, but if we're going to put burden on anyone else, we
should choose the companies that leak personal information to these
criminals when their security fails. In some ways, these companies might be
held liable today, but we would do well to consider tightening down the
screws. By increasing the burden on these data aggregators, the demand for
secure software will increase. This gives the best solutions that engineers
produce a market advantage, and financially rewards security-conscious
vendors. This approach to liability also addresses the need for best
practices and defense in depth when implementing and maintaining networks
and databases. By concentrating liability in this way, we eliminate the
complications that result from playing the blame game with a group of
software vendors. Whose security was breached is a much easier question to
litigate than how it was done and how it might have been stopped.
As Schneier has pointed out,
companies tend to convert variable cost liabilities into fixed cost
insurance plans. Insurers have a financial incentive to excel at evaluating
risk, and it isn't inconceivable that they might view the use of open code
their experts can review a reason to offer lower premiums. Furthermore,
putting liability on data aggregators allows those organizations to make
choices on how much insurance they are willing to buy. A technologically
sound small business might adopt best practices and spend less on
insurance, or they might decide to skip out on insurance entirely. But if
insurance were expensive and the danger of a security breach was still
unacceptable, they might reconsider the practice of permanently storing
large amounts of customer data, something that their customers tend to
consider an invasion of their privacy anyway.
Software code is quite complex, but we can write all kinds of new and
useful software because it is intangible and cheap to produce. Placing
liability on software vendors threatens to dramatically change this
landscape. We can expect to see reduced participation, hampered innovation,
and skyrocketing costs. We should carefully consider whether perfect
security is a goal or an expectation, and educate users on the need for
compartmentalization, defense in depth, patching, and best practices in
their networks. If we approach the issue in this way, we can improve
security overall with minimal risk to the efficiency of the software
industry.
Comments (32 posted)
New vulnerabilities
aide: checksum errors
| Package(s): | aide |
CVE #(s): | CVE-2007-3849
|
| Created: | September 4, 2007 |
Updated: | September 5, 2007 |
| Description: |
Advanced Intrusion Detection Environment (AIDE) is a file integrity checker
and intrusion detection program. A flaw was discovered in the way file
checksums were stored in the AIDE database. A packaging flaw in the Red Hat
AIDE rpm resulted in the file database not containing any file checksum
information. This could prevent AIDE from detecting certain file
modifications. |
| Alerts: |
|
Comments (none posted)
clamav: multiple vulnerabilities
| Package(s): | clamav |
CVE #(s): | CVE-2007-4510
CVE-2007-4560
|
| Created: | September 3, 2007 |
Updated: | February 13, 2008 |
| Description: |
Several remote vulnerabilities have been discovered in the Clam anti-virus
toolkit. The Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures project identifies the
following problems:
CVE-2007-4510:
It was discovered that the RTF and RFC2397 parsers can be tricked
into dereferencing a NULL pointer, resulting in denial of service.
CVE-2007-4560:
It was discovered clamav-milter performs insufficient input
sanitizing, resulting in the execution of arbitrary shell commands.
|
| Alerts: |
|
Comments (none posted)
fetchmail: denial of service
| Package(s): | fetchmail |
CVE #(s): | CVE-2007-4565
|
| Created: | September 5, 2007 |
Updated: | September 26, 2007 |
| Description: |
fetchmail before 6.3.9 allows context-dependent attackers to cause a denial of service (NULL dereference and application crash) by refusing certain warning messages that are sent over SMTP. |
| Alerts: |
|
Comments (none posted)
gallery2: multiple unspecified vulnerabilities
| Package(s): | gallery2 |
CVE #(s): | CVE-2007-4650
|
| Created: | September 5, 2007 |
Updated: | November 9, 2007 |
| Description: |
Multiple unspecified vulnerabilities in Gallery before 2.2.3 allow
attackers to (1) rename items, (2) read and modify item properties, or (3) lock and replace items
via unknown vectors in (a) the WebDAV module; and (4) edit unspecified data files using "linked
items" in (a) WebDAV and (b) Reupload modules. |
| Alerts: |
|
Comments (none posted)
kernel: denial of service
| Package(s): | kernel |
CVE #(s): | CVE-2006-0558
CVE-2007-1217
|
| Created: | September 4, 2007 |
Updated: | November 14, 2007 |
| Description: |
A flaw in the ISDN CAPI subsystem could allow a remote user to cause a
denial of service or potential remote access. Exploitation would require
the attacker to be able to send arbitrary frames over the ISDN network to
the victim's machine.
A flaw in the perfmon subsystem on ia64 platforms could allow a local user
to cause a denial of service. |
| Alerts: |
|
Comments (none posted)
krb5: buffer overflow, uninitialized pointer
| Package(s): | krb5 |
CVE #(s): | CVE-2007-3999
CVE-2007-4000
|
| Created: | September 4, 2007 |
Updated: | March 24, 2008 |
| Description: |
Tenable Network Security discovered a stack buffer overflow flaw in the RPC
library used by kadmind. A remote unauthenticated attacker who can access
kadmind could trigger this flaw and cause kadmind to crash.
Garrett Wollman discovered an uninitialized pointer flaw in kadmind. A
remote unauthenticated attacker who can access kadmind could trigger this
flaw and cause kadmind to crash. |
| Alerts: |
|
Comments (none posted)
mapserver: multiple cross-site scripting vulnerabilities
| Package(s): | mapserver |
CVE #(s): | CVE-2007-4542
CVE-2007-4629
|
| Created: | September 5, 2007 |
Updated: | April 7, 2008 |
| Description: |
CVE-2007-4542: Multiple cross-site scripting (XSS) vulnerabilities in MapServer before 4.10.3 allow remote attackers to inject arbitrary web script or HTML via unspecified vectors involving the (1) processLine function in maptemplate.c and the (2) writeError function in mapserv.c in the mapserv CGI program.
CVE-2007-4629: Buffer overflow in the processLine function in maptemplate.c in MapServer before 4.10.3 allows attackers to cause a denial of service and possibly execute arbitrary code via a mapfile with a long layer name, group name, or metadata entry name. |
| Alerts: |
|
Comments (none posted)
postfix-policyd: arbitrary code execution
| Package(s): | postfix-policyd |
CVE #(s): | CVE-2007-3791
|
| Created: | August 30, 2007 |
Updated: | September 5, 2007 |
| Description: |
The postfix-policyd anti-spam plugin for the postfix mta does not
correctly test the bounds of incoming SMTP commands. This can be
exploited for the remote execution of arbitrary code. |
| Alerts: |
|
Comments (none posted)
tcp-wrappers: unauthorized access
| Package(s): | tcp-wrappers |
CVE #(s): | CVE-2007-5137
|
| Created: | August 30, 2007 |
Updated: | October 13, 2007 |
| Description: |
The TCP wrapper library can improperly allow connections to services
that do not have server-side connection details specified.
Remote attackers can connect to blocked services. |
| Alerts: |
|
Comments (none posted)
vavoom: multiple vulnerabilities
| Package(s): | vavoom |
CVE #(s): | CVE-2007-4533
CVE-2007-4534
CVE-2007-4535
|
| Created: | September 5, 2007 |
Updated: | September 5, 2007 |
| Description: |
Security update fixing various format strings vulnerabilities and a DOS vulnerability in the vavoom
server, this fixes: CVE-2007-4533, CVE-2007-4534 & CVE-2007-4535. Also see bugzilla bug 256621. |
| Alerts: |
|
Comments (none posted)
Updated vulnerabilities
apache2: information disclosure
| Package(s): | apache |
CVE #(s): | CVE-2007-1862
|
| Created: | June 20, 2007 |
Updated: | February 18, 2008 |
| Description: |
From the Mandriva advisory: "The recall_headers function in mod_mem_cache in Apache 2.2.4 does not
properly copy all levels of header data, which can cause Apache to
return HTTP headers containing previously-used data, which could be
used to obtain potentially sensitive information by unauthorized users." |
| Alerts: |
|
Comments (2 posted)
apache: multiple vulnerabilities
| Package(s): | apache |
CVE #(s): | CVE-2007-3304
CVE-2006-5752
|
| Created: | June 27, 2007 |
Updated: | February 18, 2008 |
| Description: |
The Apache HTTP Server did not verify that a process was an Apache child
process before sending it signals. A local attacker who has the ability to
run scripts on the Apache HTTP Server could manipulate the scoreboard and
cause arbitrary processes to be terminated, which could lead to a denial of
service. (CVE-2007-3304)
A flaw was found in the Apache HTTP Server mod_status module. Sites with
the server-status page publicly accessible and ExtendedStatus enabled were
vulnerable to a cross-site scripting attack. On Red Hat Enterprise Linux
the server-status page is not enabled by default and it is best practice to
not make this publicly available. (CVE-2006-5752) |
| Alerts: |
|
Comments (1 posted)
apache: cross-site scripting
| Package(s): | apache |
CVE #(s): | CVE-2006-3918
|
| Created: | August 9, 2006 |
Updated: | April 4, 2008 |
| Description: |
From the Red Hat advisory: "A bug was found in Apache where an invalid Expect header sent to the server
was returned to the user in an unescaped error message. This could
allow an attacker to perform a cross-site scripting attack if a victim was
tricked into connecting to a site and sending a carefully crafted Expect
header." |
| Alerts: |
|
Comments (none posted)
avahi: denial of service
| Package(s): | avahi |
CVE #(s): | CVE-2007-3372
|
| Created: | June 28, 2007 |
Updated: | September 18, 2007 |
| Description: |
Avahi is vulnerable to a local denial of service that can be caused by
making an erroneous call to the assert() function. |
| Alerts: |
|
Comments (none posted)
bochs: buffer overflow
| Package(s): | bochs |
CVE #(s): | CVE-2007-2893
|
| Created: | July 20, 2007 |
Updated: | November 19, 2007 |
| Description: |
A heap-based buffer overflow in the bx_ne2k_c::rx_frame function in
iodev/ne2k.cc in the emulated NE2000 device in Bochs 2.3 allows local users
of the guest operating system to write to arbitrary memory locations and
gain privileges on the host operating system via vectors that cause TXCNT
register values to exceed the device memory size, aka "RX Frame heap
overflow." |
| Alerts: |
|
Comments (none posted)
bugzilla: several vulnerabilities
| Package(s): | bugzilla |
CVE #(s): | |
| Created: | August 28, 2007 |
Updated: | August 29, 2007 |
| Description: |
This Bugzilla security
advisory covers several vulnerabilities in Bugzilla 2.20.4, 2.22.2, and
3.0. |
| Alerts: |
|
Comments (1 posted)
centericq: buffer overflows
| Package(s): | centericq |
CVE #(s): | CVE-2007-3713
|
| Created: | July 20, 2007 |
Updated: | December 17, 2007 |
| Description: |
Multiple buffer overflows in Konst CenterICQ 4.9.11 through 4.21 allow
remote attackers to execute arbitrary code via unspecified vectors. NOTE:
the provenance of this information is unknown; the details are obtained
solely from third party information. NOTE: this might overlap
CVE-2007-0160. |
| Alerts: |
|
Comments (none posted)
clamav: denial of service
| Package(s): | clamav |
CVE #(s): | CVE-2007-3725
|
| Created: | July 24, 2007 |
Updated: | February 27, 2008 |
| Description: |
A NULL pointer dereference has been discovered in the RAR VM of Clam
Antivirus (ClamAV) which allows user-assisted remote attackers to
cause a denial of service via a specially crafted RAR archives. |
| Alerts: |
|
Comments (none posted)
cups: denial of service
| Package(s): | cups |
CVE #(s): | CVE-2007-0720
|
| Created: | March 26, 2007 |
Updated: | February 7, 2008 |
| Description: |
Previous versions of the cups package could be forced to hang via a client
"partially negotiating" an ssl connection. In this state, cups would not
allow other connections to be made, a denial of service. |
| Alerts: |
|
Comments (none posted)
gpdf: integer overflow
| Package(s): | cups poppler xpdf |
CVE #(s): | CVE-2007-3387
|
| Created: | July 31, 2007 |
Updated: | November 28, 2007 |
| Description: |
The gpdf library contains an integer overflow which can be exploited via a malicious PDF file. This code finds its way into multiple packages, including xpdf, kpdf, poppler, cups, and more. |
| Alerts: |
|
Comments (1 posted)
Cyrus-SASL: DIGEST-MD5 Pre-Authentication Denial of Service
| Package(s): | cyrus-sasl |
CVE #(s): | CVE-2006-1721
|
| Created: | April 21, 2006 |
Updated: | September 4, 2007 |
| Description: |
Cyrus-SASL contains an unspecified vulnerability in the DIGEST-MD5
process that could lead to a Denial of Service. An attacker could possibly
exploit this vulnerability by sending specially crafted data stream to the
Cyrus-SASL server, resulting in a Denial of Service even if the attacker is
not able to authenticate. |
| Alerts: |
|
Comments (none posted)
dovecot: privilege escalation
| Package(s): | dovecot |
CVE #(s): | CVE-2007-4211
|
| Created: | August 15, 2007 |
Updated: | May 21, 2008 |
| Description: |
From the rPath advisory: "Previous versions of the dovecot package are vulnerable to a
minor privilege escalation attack in which an authenticated
user may exploit an ACL plugin weakness to save message flags
without having proper permissions." |
| Alerts: |
|
Comments (none posted)
dovecot: directory traversal
| Package(s): | dovecot |
CVE #(s): | CVE-2007-2231
|
| Created: | May 8, 2007 |
Updated: | May 21, 2008 |
| Description: |
Directory traversal vulnerability in index/mbox/mbox-storage.c in Dovecot
before 1.0.rc29, when using the zlib plugin, allows remote attackers to
read arbitrary gzipped (.gz) mailboxes (mbox files) via a .. (dot dot)
sequence in the mailbox name. |
| Alerts: |
|
Comments (none posted)
emacs21: denial of service
| Package(s): | emacs21 |
CVE #(s): | CVE-2007-2833
|
| Created: | June 21, 2007 |
Updated: | August 29, 2007 |
| Description: |
The emacs21 editor has a denial of service vulnerability.
emacs21 can be made to crash by viewing "certain types of images". |
| Alerts: |
|
Comments (none posted)
evolution: format string error
| Package(s): | evolution |
CVE #(s): | CVE-2007-1002
|
| Created: | March 27, 2007 |
Updated: | February 27, 2008 |
| Description: |
A format string error in the "write_html()" function in calendar/gui/
e-cal-component-memo-preview.c when displaying a memo's categories can
potentially be exploited to execute arbitrary code via a specially crafted
shared memo containing format specifiers. |
| Alerts: |
|
Comments (1 posted)
evolution-data-server: malicious server arbitrary code execution
| Package(s): | evolution-data-server |
CVE #(s): | CVE-2007-3257
|
| Created: | June 18, 2007 |
Updated: | November 7, 2007 |
| Description: |
From the GNOME
bugzilla: "The "SEQUENCE" value in the GData of the IMAP code
(camel-imap-folder.c) is converted from a string using strtol. This allows
for negative values. The imap_rescan uses this value as an int. It checks
for !seq and seq>summary.length. It doesn't check for seq <
0. Although seq is used as the index of an array." |
| Alerts: |
|
Comments (1 posted)
file: integer overflow
| Package(s): | file |
CVE #(s): | CVE-2007-2799
|
| Created: | June 1, 2007 |
Updated: | October 19, 2007 |
| Description: |
Colin Percival from FreeBSD reported that the previous fix for the
file_printf() buffer overflow introduced a new integer overflow. A remote
attacker could entice a user to run the file program on an overly large
file (more than 1Gb) that would trigger an integer overflow on 32-bit
systems, possibly leading to the execution of arbitrary code with the
rights of the user running file. |
| Alerts: |
|
Comments (3 posted)
firebird: buffer overflow
| Package(s): | firebird |
CVE #(s): | CVE-2007-3181
|
| Created: | July 2, 2007 |
Updated: | March 27, 2008 |
| Description: |
The Firebird DBMS has a buffer overflow vulnerability involving
the processing of connect requests with an overly large p_cnct_count
value. Remote attackers can send a specially crafted
request to the server in order to potentially execute arbitrary code with
the permissions of the Firebird user. |
| Alerts: |
|
Comments (none posted)
firefox: multiple vulnerabilities
| Package(s): | firefox |
CVE #(s): | CVE-2007-3844
CVE-2007-3845
|
| Created: | August 1, 2007 |
Updated: | February 20, 2008 |
| Description: |
A flaw was discovered in handling of "about:blank" windows used by
addons. A malicious web site could exploit this to modify the contents,
or steal confidential data (such as passwords), of other web pages.
(CVE-2007-3844)
Jesper Johansson discovered that spaces and double-quotes were
not correctly handled when launching external programs. In rare
configurations, after tricking a user into opening a malicious web page,
an attacker could execute helpers with arbitrary arguments with the
user's privileges. (CVE-2007-3845) |
| Alerts: |
|
Comments (none posted)
firefox: multiple vulnerabilities
| Package(s): | firefox mozilla seamonkey thunderbird |
CVE #(s): | CVE-2007-1362
CVE-2007-2867
CVE-2007-2868
CVE-2007-2869
CVE-2007-2870
CVE-2007-2871
|
| Created: | June 4, 2007 |
Updated: | August 29, 2007 |
| Description: |
Various flaws were discovered in the layout and JavaScript engines. By
tricking a user into opening a malicious web page, an attacker could
execute arbitrary code with the user's privileges. (CVE-2007-2867,
CVE-2007-2868)
A flaw was discovered in the form autocomplete feature. By tricking a user
into opening a malicious web page, an attacker could cause a persistent
denial of service. (CVE-2007-2869)
Nicolas Derouet discovered flaws in cookie handling. By tricking a user
into opening a malicious web page, an attacker could force the browser to
consume large quantities of disk or memory while processing long cookie
paths. (CVE-2007-1362)
A flaw was discovered in the same-origin policy handling of the
addEventListener JavaScript method. A malicious web site could exploit
this to modify the contents, or steal confidential data (such as
passwords), of other web pages. (CVE-2007-2870)
Chris Thomas discovered a flaw in XUL popups. A malicious web site
could exploit this to spoof or obscure portions of the browser UI,
such as the location bar. (CVE-2007-2871) |
| Alerts: |
|
Comments (3 posted)
firefox, thunderbird, seamonkey: multiple vulnerabilities
| Package(s): | firefox, thunderbird, seamonkey |
CVE #(s): | CVE-2007-3738
CVE-2007-3656
CVE-2007-3670
CVE-2007-3285
CVE-2007-3737
CVE-2007-3089
CVE-2007-3736
CVE-2007-3734
CVE-2007-3735
|
| Created: | July 18, 2007 |
Updated: | May 12, 2008 |
| Description: |
shutdown and moz_bug_r_a4 reported two separate ways to modify an
XPCNativeWrapper such that subsequent access by the browser would result in
executing user-supplied code. (CVE-2007-3738)
Michal Zalewski reported that it was possible to bypass the same-origin
checks and read from cached (wyciwyg) documents It is possible to access
wyciwyg:// documents without proper same domain policy checks through the
use of HTTP 302 redirects. This enables the attacker to steal sensitive
data displayed on dynamically generated pages; perform cache poisoning; and
execute own code or display own content with URL bar and SSL certificate
data of the attacked page (URL spoofing++). (CVE-2007-3656)
Internet Explorer calls registered URL protocols without escaping quotes
and may be used to pass unexpected and potentially dangerous data to the
application that registers that URL Protocol. (CVE-2007-3670)
Ronald van den Heetkamp reported that a filename URL containing %00
(encoded null) can cause Firefox to interpret the file extension
differently than the underlying Windows operating system potentially
leading to unsafe actions such as running a program. This is only
accessible locally. (CVE-2007-3285)
An attacker can use an element outside of a document to call an event
handler allowing content to run arbitrary code with chrome
privileges. (CVE-2007-3737)
Ronen Zilberman and Michal Zalewski both reported that it was possible to
exploit a timing issue to inject content into about:blank frames in a
page. When opening a window from a script, it is possible to spoof the
content of the newly opened window's frames within a short time frame,
while the window is loading. (CVE-2007-3089)
Mozilla contributor moz_bug_r_a4 demonstrated that the methods
addEventListener and setTimeout could be used to inject script into another
site in violation of the browser's same-origin policy. This could be used
to access or modify private or valuable information from that other
site. (CVE-2007-3736)
As part of the Firefox 2.0.0.5 update releases Mozilla developers fixed
many bugs to improve the stability of the product. Some of these crashes
that showed evidence of memory corruption under certain circumstances and
we presume that with enough effort at least some of these could be
exploited to run arbitrary code. Note: Thunderbird shares the browser
engine with Firefox and could be vulnerable if JavaScript were to be
enabled in mail. This is not the default setting and we strongly discourage
users from running JavaScript in mail. Without further investigation we
cannot rule out the possibility that for some of these an attacker might be
able to prepare memory for exploitation through some means other than
JavaScript, such as large images. (CVE-2007-3734, CVE-2007-3735) |
| Alerts: |
|
Comments (none posted)
flac123: arbitrary code execution
| Package(s): | flac123 |
CVE #(s): | CVE-2007-3507
|
| Created: | July 13, 2007 |
Updated: | October 22, 2007 |
| Description: |
A stack-based buffer overflow in the local__vcentry_parse_value function in
vorbiscomment.c in flac123 (aka flac-tools or flac) before 0.0.10 allows
user-assisted remote attackers to execute arbitrary code via a large
comment value_length. |
| Alerts: |
|
Comments (none posted)
freetype: integer overflows
| Package(s): | freetype |
CVE #(s): | CVE-2006-0747
CVE-2006-1861
CVE-2006-2493
CVE-2006-2661
CVE-2006-3467
|
| Created: | June 8, 2006 |
Updated: | October 10, 2007 |
| Description: |
The FreeType library has several integer overflow vulnerabilities.
If a user can be tricked into installing a specially
crafted font file, arbitrary code can be executed with the privilege
of the user. |
| Alerts: |
|
Comments (none posted)
gcc: file overwrite vulnerability
| Package(s): | gcc |
CVE #(s): | CVE-2006-3619
|
| Created: | September 6, 2006 |
Updated: | March 14, 2008 |
| Description: |
The fastjar utility found in the GNU compiler collection does not perform adequate file path checking, allowing the creation or overwriting of files outside of the current directory tree. |
| Alerts: |
|