Securing our votes
Posted Aug 9, 2007 2:54 UTC (Thu) by Baylink
Parent article: Securing our votes
I shake my head in disbelief.
There are clearly obvious solutions to all of these problems, and I didn't even think them up.
*Don't use the computers to count the votes*. Just use them to do the UI. Get the votes, and print everything as OCR-A on a cardboard card that drops through the printer into a clear plexiglas box where the voter can confirm that it contains everything they voted for (by the simple expedient of printing everything for which they did *not* vote as well, clearly tagged differently), then have them turn a mechanical knob that drops the ballot into a locked box, or into a trash box/small shredder.
Count the ballots using an OCR-A optical scanner. Serial number and checksum the data. 100.00% accuracy shouldn't be hard at all.
Your counting machines then reduce to one per precinct... or per area. And humans can count the ballots too, should the Republicans try to steal yet another election.
Sure, you can keep a running count in each machine, but that shouldn't be the *certifiable* count. You can't *recount* that (says a Floridian, looking over his shoulder). You can recount printed cards.
I can't personally think of a failure mode in this design that can't be avoided.
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