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Cache poisoning vulnerability found in BIND
Cache poisoning vulnerability found in BIND
Posted Jul 26, 2007 4:49 UTC (Thu) by flewellyn (subscriber, #5047)In reply to: Cache poisoning vulnerability found in BIND by smoogen
Parent article: Cache poisoning vulnerability found in BIND
No, the only thing that would matter to the firewall is the destination port, which, since DNS is a
Well Known Service, is always the same. The source port for the querying machine could be
anything; unless the firewall is configured to block outgoing ports, which is just silly, the DNS
server can respond on any port. If the port in question is randomized for each query, it makes
no difference.
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Cache poisoning vulnerability found in BIND
Posted Jul 26, 2007 14:36 UTC (Thu) by jond (subscriber, #37669) [Link]
Isn't relying on an unpredictable source port a bit like relying on the current PID as an unguessable number? I.e. couldn't an attacker just forge 65,000-odd UDP packets, one per possible source address?
Cache poisoning vulnerability found in BIND
Posted Jul 26, 2007 19:06 UTC (Thu) by flewellyn (subscriber, #5047) [Link]
Not in a time-sensitive exploit like this one. Remember, cache-poisoning only works if the attacker's phony DNS reply can reach the querying machine prior to the legitimate one.