A cost analysis of Vista content protection
Posted Dec 26, 2006 13:32 UTC (Tue) by i3839
In reply to: A cost analysis of Vista content protection
Parent article: A cost analysis of Vista content protection
True, but in that case it's the driver checking the hardware, and as we want to replace the driver it's quite easy, as there's nothing stopping us, except some obfuscated binary code.
But if we can so easily replace the MSWindows driver with a Linux one (concerning DRM "protection"), then what would stop people bypassing the DRM from the software side? Nice expensive hardware all for nothing because the software can't keep any key secret... (Even the key on the hardware isn't safe if they aren't very careful.)
Only way to fix the above problem is to pass encrypted data to the hardware with the software not knowing the keys, which is what happens I think. But I don't believe that all those hardware companies and content industry can keep their keys secret. If this is the case, then there's no need at all to be secret about interfaces and drivers information, as all decryption is done by hardware.
Considering the draconian regulations it means they went for a half assed solution which can be broken, and thus will be broken. If the hardware really did all the verification then things would be very simple for the driver, as the only thing that changes would be that the hardware is more expensive and has an extra feature.
Maybe it is a sneaky way to try killing FOSS after all...
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