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A cost analysis of Vista content protectionA cost analysis of Vista content protectionPosted Dec 26, 2006 13:32 UTC (Tue) by i3839 (guest, #31386)In reply to: A cost analysis of Vista content protection by csamuel Parent article: A cost analysis of Vista content protection
True, but in that case it's the driver checking the hardware, and as we want to replace the driver it's quite easy, as there's nothing stopping us, except some obfuscated binary code.
But if we can so easily replace the MSWindows driver with a Linux one (concerning DRM "protection"), then what would stop people bypassing the DRM from the software side? Nice expensive hardware all for nothing because the software can't keep any key secret... (Even the key on the hardware isn't safe if they aren't very careful.)
Only way to fix the above problem is to pass encrypted data to the hardware with the software not knowing the keys, which is what happens I think. But I don't believe that all those hardware companies and content industry can keep their keys secret. If this is the case, then there's no need at all to be secret about interfaces and drivers information, as all decryption is done by hardware.
Considering the draconian regulations it means they went for a half assed solution which can be broken, and thus will be broken. If the hardware really did all the verification then things would be very simple for the driver, as the only thing that changes would be that the hardware is more expensive and has an extra feature.
Maybe it is a sneaky way to try killing FOSS after all...
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A cost analysis of Vista content protection Posted Dec 27, 2006 23:52 UTC (Wed) by csamuel (✭ supporter ✭, #2624) [Link] My understanding was that the stated aim of the exercise is to stopsomeone writing software that poses as video hardware to an existing driver because the hardware & driver do a DH key exchange and the driver encrypts the "premium" content with the exchanged keys.
Thus if your software was able to masquerade as a plug in video card and
A cost analysis of Vista content protection Posted Dec 28, 2006 15:33 UTC (Thu) by i3839 (guest, #31386) [Link] Diffie-Hellman doesn't protect against man-in-the-middle attacks, so some form of authentication would be still needed. And for that there needs to be keys both in hardware and the driver.
The key in the driver could be replaced with any key the attacker wants, and then the authentication would seem to succeed and unencrypted content would be received by the fake videocard. I don't believe they're so stupid to bet on this...
But maybe they do, as it appears that the driver needs to do checks, and checks can be bypassed, so what the hell are they thinking? If the driver needs to do any checks then the system is broken by design.
A cost analysis of Vista content protection Posted Jan 23, 2007 10:43 UTC (Tue) by i3839 (guest, #31386) [Link] It seems they were indeed so stupid as this, both Blueray and HD-DVD are cracked because the encryption keys can be fished out of ram. Pathetic.
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