The next document format battleground
[Posted December 13, 2006 by corbet]
Recent weeks have seen a great deal of debate over Microsoft's OpenXML
document format. This format, which is headed for standard status, is a
complex beast. Some have questioned whether it will ever be able to create
independent implementations of OpenXML which are truly interoperable with
each other. Others ask whether it is right for the free software community
to even try. To many members of our community, the right path is to
encourage the use of OpenDocument, which already has standard status and
implementations in free software. Why get onto another document format
treadmill when a better solution is already available?
These questions are valid, they deserve full consideration. But they may
also, to an extent, be missing the real point. It is entirely possible
that the document format battles are done; even if OpenXML is not a perfect
standard, it is far more open than its predecessors. While
Microsoft is not inclined to make life easy for those who would
interoperate with its file formats, the company may well have realized that
obscure formats have outlived their usefulness as a way of maintaining
desktop domination. This might just be a battle we have won, even if the
victory is rather more messy than we would like.
Before we charter an aircraft carrier for our "mission accomplished" party,
however, it is worth reflecting on different forms this fight could take in
the future. Cory Doctorow gave us a good hint in this
InformationWeek article on "information rights management." IRM is a
feature touted by Microsoft for a few years now which has the potential to
complicate life considerably in the future.
IRM offers some interesting features to people who are worried about the
information they put into their documents, presentations, and
spreadsheets. With IRM, the document owner can specify exactly who can
read a particular file, and under what conditions. Access can have an
expiration time attached to it - or it can be revoked at any time. Actions
like printing can be restricted. For anybody who feels the need to control
information, these features cannot fail to be appealing.
But these features only work if the client plays along, and free software
clients have not always distinguished themselves in this area. Or, rather,
they have distinguished themselves very well by serving the needs of their
users. Even if a programmer implements the "this document can only be
printed once" flag, somebody else, perhaps after having lost their one
printing opportunity
to a particularly nasty paper jam, will hack it out. Clearly, Microsoft
must prevent the creation of free applications which can read IRM-protected
documents or it will be unable to live up to the promises it has made for
that technology.
Microsoft has a couple of weapons at its disposal (beyond pure obscurity)
which can be used against any potential free IRM implementation. One is
the DMCA, which, in the US (and countries which have implemented similar
laws), can be employed against those who bypass access restriction
mechanisms. Anybody who posted code that, say, allowed the user to cut and
paste text out of an IRM-protected document would likely face an unpleasant
reception in the US. They would be in a situation much like that faced by
Dmitry Sklyarov, who bypassed similar restrictions in PDF files, a few
years ago.
Of course, the Sklyarov case did not necessarily work to Adobe's advantage
in the end, and Microsoft might wish to avoid a similar storm of bad
publicity. So, as Cory's article points out, Microsoft might pursue a
different option: the use of the trusted computing module (TPM)
increasingly being built into new computers. With the remote attestation
feature of the TPM, it is possible to refuse to pass decryption keys to any
system which cannot be shown to be running approved software. This system
would be quite tight and hard to defeat - it might just work. And it would
no longer matter how "open" the document format is.
The full remote attestation scenario requires the cooperation of the entire
system, starting with a "secure" BIOS which initializes the TPM properly.
Most systems do not currently operate in this mode, so the realization of
this threat will not happen in the immediate future. One should not,
however, forget that the TPM has been designed to support just this mode of
operation. It does not take all that much paranoia to imagine that these
capabilities will not go unused forever. "Trusted computing" has yet to
touch most of us, but we ignore it at great risk. Among other things, it
could make the current discussion of open document formats entirely moot.
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