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A bid to resurrect Linux capabilitiesA bid to resurrect Linux capabilitiesPosted Sep 25, 2006 8:21 UTC (Mon) by cras (guest, #7000)In reply to: A bid to resurrect Linux capabilities by slamb Parent article: A bid to resurrect Linux capabilities
But locking down ptrace() might be a good way to prevent an exploited connection from messing with another one in forked servers. I think the only other way would be to bind as root, then setuid() to one of a pool of uids or something...I hope no one's doing thatA pool of UIDs is not required, just doing setuid() after exec() will make the kernel think the process is in "setuid state" and won't allow other processes ptrace it.
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