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The /proc vulnerabilityThe /proc vulnerabilityPosted Jul 20, 2006 9:50 UTC (Thu) by nix (subscriber, #2304)In reply to: The /proc vulnerability by ekj Parent article: The /proc vulnerability
The latter doesn't work in recent versions of glibc, but a determined attacker could build a modified ld.so that doesn't check noexec.
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efficacy of mounting with noexec Posted Jul 20, 2006 13:15 UTC (Thu) by sweikart (guest, #4276) [Link] > The latter doesn't work in recent versions of glibc ...
It worked with ld-2.2.5.so (Red Hat Linux 7.3), but not ld-2.3.3.so (Fedora Core 2).
> ... but a determined attacker could build a modified ld.so that
Which can be foiled in a chroot jail by mounting writable filing systems noexec.
-scott
The /proc vulnerability Posted Jul 22, 2006 16:21 UTC (Sat) by Ross (subscriber, #4065) [Link] If an attacker could write to a filesystem with exec permissions, then they wouldn't have to bother with trying to run an existing executable.
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