Who reconciles the paper trail with electronic tallies?
Posted May 18, 2006 20:22 UTC (Thu) by kweidner
In reply to: Who reconciles the paper trail with electronic tallies?
Parent article: Diebold election insecurity systems
That approach is vulnerable to vote selling and other ways to pressure voters. A proper secret ballot is supposed to ensure that the people who voted have no way of proving that they voted a certain way.
Also, what's the procedure if people claim that the posted vote doesn't match who they intended to vote for? How many (unverified) complaints would be necessary to force a new election?
I think the old fashioned way of sticking pieces of paper in a ballot box still works best. A touchscreen system could still be useful for filling out the ballot and printing it, especially if it's a more complicated vote than a single check box. Automated scanning or an internal tally could provide a preliminary result, to be confirmed by manual count.
to post comments)