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Diebold election insecurity systemsDiebold election insecurity systemsPosted May 18, 2006 5:41 UTC (Thu) by kirkengaard (subscriber, #15022)Parent article: Diebold election insecurity systems
" There seems to be a great deal of resistance to the idea of having a paper trail that can be verified by the voter as a backup system, at least from the voting equipment vendors, but this would seem to be the most sensible check on the proper functioning of the equipment. It still provides the instant gratification of vote counts that seem to be required, but also allows for an auditable recount should one be necessary. The lackadaisical approach to security and the resistance to an auditable paper trail might lead a cynical person to believe that those in power like things exactly as they are."
I have even heard designers of these systems suggest that beng able to regurgitate the same answer twice is sufficient to an auditable recount. After all, what you want is to get the same count twice, right?
When did repeatability replace accuracy?
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