Diebold election insecurity systems
Posted May 18, 2006 2:13 UTC (Thu) by glennc99
Parent article: Diebold election insecurity systems
I actually participated in an election in Ohio this month, and I can tell
you that 'auditable paper trails' (which Ohio mandates) are still going
to be useless.
The Diebold machines in Ohio are required to use the 'optional' "print
the ballots into a sealed canister" function. Unfortunately, none of the
voters actually look at the printout as it goes in, so if there *was* a
hacked firmware that deliberately mis-counted and mis-printed the
votes, odds are very good that it wouldn't be caught.
In my precincts, exactly *1* voter, a law professor, examined the ballot
closely. He caught the fact that for a certain race, the title of the
position was combined with the name of the candidate in such a way that
the printed tape truncated the name. The truncated name did not match
his idea of what the name of the person he voted for should be.
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