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LWN.net Weekly Edition for March 2, 2006

A grumpy editor's bayesian followup

This article is part of the LWN Grumpy Editor series.
The Grumpy Editor's guide to bayesian spam filters was published one week ago. As has become traditional, it would seem, LWN readers have pointed out tools which evaded your editor's first pass. So here is the inevitable followup with a couple more filters and an updated table at the end.

SpamAssassin

One commenter complained last week about your editor having run SpamAssassin with the network tests enabled. The original reasoning had been that SpamAssassin, by its nature, comes with a large set of rules, and, for the purpose of the review, selectively disabling some of them was not appropriate. Still, the network tests do have a couple of important effects on the end result. As will be seen below, they make the filter much more effective; in your editor's experience, the source blacklists earn most of the credit there. But they also slow things down.

Your editor re-ran the test with network tests disabled, with the following results:

Batch: 1 2 3 4 5
Fn Fp T FnFpT Fn Fp T FnFpT Fn Fp T Size
SpamAssassin 8 0 1.1 301.1 5 0 1.1 301.0 2 0 1.0 10
SA untrained 32 0 0.6 901.0 18 0 1.0 1501.0 7 0 1.0 10
SA Local default 181 0 0.3 25900.3 271 0 0.3 22600.3 161 0 0.3 10
SA Local tweaked 53 0 0.3 4300.3 50 0 0.3 4400.3 37 0 0.3 10

(Last week's results have been included for comparison). The "default" results are actually a mistake on your editor's part, but, since they illustrate an interesting point, they have been included in the above table.

When SpamAssassin runs its bayesian filter on a message, it encodes the results as if a specific rule had fired. If the filter is absolutely convinced that the message is good, the score is adjusted by the value attached to the BAYES_00 rule. For obviously spam messages, BAYES_99 comes into play; there are several levels between the two as well. SpamAssassin, out of the box, assigns 3.5 points to BAYES_99. Since five points are required, by default, to condemn a message, the bayesian filter can never do that on its own. Any message, to be considered spam, must trigger some tests outside of the bayesian filter.

The "default" results, above, came about because your editor got a little over-zealous when clearing out the bayesian and whitelist databases for a new round of tests; so they use the default scoring for BAYES_99. The "tweaked" results, instead, have the score for that rule raised to 5.0 points, allowing the bayesian filter to condemn mail on its own. The difference in the results can be clearly seen from the table: spam filtering performance is vastly improved, with no false positives. With the default configuration, local-only SpamAssassin had the second-worst false negative rate of all the filters tested. Your editor is at a loss to understand why SpamAssassin comes configured to allow the bayesian filter to be bypassed so easily.

Back to the original point of running this test: putting SpamAssassin into the "local tests only" mode clearly worsens performance significantly, while also improving run time.

Popfile

A number of people were dismayed at the omission of popfile, a proxy-based filter coded in Perl. Popfile is intended to sit between the mail client and the POP or IMAP server; it filters mail before presenting it to the user. It includes a built-in web server which provides filtering statistics and allows the user to perform training.

Perhaps the most interesting feature in Popfile, however, is its approach to filtering. While the other filters reviewed are very much oriented around filtering spam, Popfile tries to be more general. So, instead of filtering into just two categories (plus the "unsure" result provided by a number of filters), popfile can handle an arbitrary number of categories. So it not only picks out the spam, but it can sort the rest of a mail stream based on whatever criteria the user might set. This approach makes Popfile a potentially more useful tool, but it has implications on its spam filtering performance, as will be seen from the testing results.

Your editor tested Popfile 0.22.4, using its standalone "pipe" and "insert" tools.

Batch: 1 2 3 4 5
Fn Fp T FnFpT Fn Fp T FnFpT Fn Fp T Size
Popfile 0 21 1.0 0161.1 1 24 1.0 0101.0 1 12 1.0 10
PF learn all 0 28 2.8 0283.5 0 44 4.2 0165.0 0 18 5.9 40

On one hand, Popfile was the most effective at removing spam of any of the filters reviewed; its false negative rate is almost zero. On the other hand, the false positive rate was high - unacceptably so. Popfile normally uses a "train on errors" approach; your editor ran a second test where the filter was trained on every message just to see if that would help with the false positive rate. Instead, that rate got worse, and the filter slowed down to a glacial pace. Clearly Popfile and comprehensive training were not meant to go together.

Your editor has a hypothesis explaining the behavior seen here. Bayesian filters which concern themselves only with spam have a built-in bias: false positives are bad and must be avoided. Popfile, instead, has no notion of a "false positive"; it only has various "buckets" into which mail can be sorted. The tool does not understand that some types of errors are worse than others. So, while most filters will err on the side of false negatives, Popfile just goes for whatever seems right. As a result, it catches more spam - and more of everything else.

From this experience, your editor has concluded that spam filtering should be done independently from any other sort of mail sorting. If bayesian filters are to be used for sorting of legitimate mail, it might be best to use two separate filters in series.

SpamOracle

SpamOracle is a straightforward Graham-style bayesian filter. It happens to be written in Caml, leading your editor to go looking for compilers; Fedora Extras came through nicely on that front. Initial training is easy and fast, and SpamOracle works well with procmail.

As a filter, however, it is not one of the more effective ones. Your editor ran two tests on SpamOracle v1.4, using train-on-errors and comprehensive training strategies.

Batch: 1 2 3 4 5
Fn Fp T FnFpT Fn Fp T FnFpT Fn Fp T Size
SpamOracle TOE 462 0 0.1 54600.1 445 0 0.1 46300.1 343 0 0.1 1.1
SpamOracle comp 461 0 0.2 51100.2 433 0 0.2 42000.2 339 0 0.3 2.6

As can be seen here, SpamOracle is fast, and it manages to avoid false positives altogether. Its filtering rate is poor, however, to the point that your editor would not want to have to depend on it to hold the spam stream at bay. Comprehensive training slowed the process down significantly, but did not improve the results in any appreciable way.

Thunderbird

There were some requests that Thunderbird be included in this evaluation. The problem is that Thunderbird's filter is buried deep within a monolithic graphical application, making it difficult to test in any sort of automated manner. Your editor, being the lazy person that he is, has no inclination to click through 15,000 messages to evaluate how well Thunderbird has classified them.

As it happens, your editor uses Thunderbird for a low-bandwidth mail account which receives a mere 100 spams per day or so. The Thunderbird interface is certainly convenient; there is a nice "junk" button for training the filter (though the way it toggles to "not junk" can be confusing). Thunderbird can be configured to automatically sideline spam into a folder, and to age messages out of that folder after a given time. False positives are rare, in your editor's experience, but the false negative rate is relatively high. It is also impossible, as far as your editor can tell, to get any information on the filter and how it makes its decisions.

Conclusion

Here is the updated table, with the new and old results:

Test False neg. False pos. Time Size
bogofilter 4065.5% 0.02 5
bogofilter -u 2683.0% 0.06 32
CRM114 140.1% 160.3% 0.06 24
CRM114 pretrain 140.2% 150.3% 0.06 24
DSPAM teft 500.6% 0.1 305
DSPAM toe 670.7% 150.3% 0.1 276
DSPAM tum 830.9% 0.1 305
Popfile 20.02% 831.4% 1.0 10
Popfile comp 00% 1442.4% 4.3 40
SpamAssassin 210.2% 1.1 10
SpamAssassin untrained 810.9% 0.9 10
SpamAssassin local default 109812.2% 0.3 10
SpamAssassin local tweaked 2272.5% 0.3 10
SpamBayes 1852.1% 10.02% 0.4 4
SpamBayes comp 2943.3% 0.8 16
SpamOracle TOE 225925.1% 0.1 1.1
SpamOracle comp 216424.0% 0.2 2.6
SpamProbe train 2222.5% 30.05% 0.1 81
SpamProbe receive 2572.9% 40.07% 0.7 201

There is little in the new results to change the conclusions arrived at last week. The filters which stand out are SpamAssassin (in some modes at least), and DSPAM. Most of the others demonstrated overly high error rates, either with false negatives (annoying) or false positives (unacceptable). Stay tuned, however; there is clearly a great deal of work being done in this area.

Comments (21 posted)

Linux fragmenting at last?

Back in January, Novell announced that it was releasing the "AppArmor" security framework under the GPL. AppArmor had been developed by Immunix, and acquired by Novell last year. Novell makes a number of claims about AppArmor, but the one at the top of the list appears to be relative simplicity: AppArmor is said to be easier to understand, configure, and maintain than SELinux.

Dan Walsh, a Red Hat developer working on SELinux, has criticized this move:

Couldn't Novell have spent their money on making SELinux easier to use? No, [Novell] chooses to split the user and developer community. I am not sure what their goals are, but I feel this hurts Linux and the open source movement.

For years, critics have claimed that Linux would fragment much like Unix did, and that would be the downfall of the system. So far, Linux has steadfastly refused to fragment in this manner. But now we have a Linux developer saying that the same thing is happening. Red Hat and Novell also appear to be taking different approaches to 3D-enhanced window systems. Novell is pushing Xgl, Red Hat has AIGLX, and Linux users are left wondering when and how all that activity will yield better graphics support for them. At this level, too, it looks like Linux might finally be heading for a breakup.

Or is it? Perhaps we are simply seeing the development community at work.

With regard to SELinux, it is important to note that there is no real consensus, yet, on how the security problem should be solved. SELinux is a powerful system, beyond doubt; it allows the capabilities of users and programs to be specified in great detail. But SELinux is also highly complex, to the point that a large percentage of system administrators find themselves unable to cope with it. The fedora-devel list just had a discussion on how to get administrators to keep SELinux enabled on their systems. One participant, who teaches administration courses, noted:

By no means is this limited to home users. I would say that the *vast* majority of corporate admins just turn off SELinux. The story behind how & why they learned to do that to begin with only vary in details. It's almost always, "I had problems installing X or doing Y and I found a document on the Internet that said that SELinux was in the way and didn't work right anyway and was too complicated and didn't do me any good and that I couldn't learn enough about it to even understand what was happening, let alone deal with it, in less than a month and ... well, so I just turn off SELinux and then I don't have to deal with it."

The point here is not to criticize SELinux; that has been adequately done elsewhere. Instead, the real point is there is not, at this time, any sort of broad consensus that SELinux is the right tool for everybody's security problems. It may turn out that the best solution is to put more effort into making SELinux easier to deal with, but it seems premature to claim that SELinux will be the answer to security problems on Linux. It makes sense, in other words, to spend some time considering other approaches - especially those which are already implemented and relatively stable.

If SELinux is truly a superior solution, that will eventually become clear and users will vote with their keyboards. But to claim, at this point, that SELinux is the only solution and that looking at alternatives hurts the community would be a mistake. This community thrives on choices, and, to an extent, it thrives on competition between related projects. Since the alternatives are all free software, users are able to choose what works for them, and the best ideas (and code) can move from one project to another.

The process would be helped, however, if Novell would pull together the AppArmor source and submit it properly for review and eventual merging into the mainline kernel.

The story with Xgl and AIGLX is the same. There is no real consensus, yet, on how 3D graphics will be best supported in the X window system. So two groups have put together two different implementations, each with its advantages. It is easy to present this story as a classic developer flamewar, but that does not seem to match the reality of the situation. A look at the X.org mailing list, for example, shows Xgl developer David Reveman agreeing to adopt some interfaces put forward by the AIGLX group. Over the long term, the development community will almost certainly coalesce around the approach which seems to work best, but, for now, it is too early to say which one (if either) will be most successful.

If there is a problem here at all, it is that the distributors are being quick to make products out of technology which may not be entirely ready for prime time. Red Hat has operated this way for a very long time; anybody who remembers being pushed into, for example, the ELF or glibc2 transitions by Red Hat Linux upgrades knows that some of that code was a little rough around the edges then. But, by pushing that code out to the users, Red Hat almost certainly accelerated the stabilization process.

What we are seeing now is that Novell wants to get into the same game and put more leading technology into the traditionally conservative (by comparison) SUSE distribution. When things work well, Novell will be able to claim leading-edge features and the code will get wider testing, sooner. There is nothing that requires Novell, as it moves SUSE Linux toward the leading edge, to follow Red Hat's decisions on which approaches to adopt.

The risk is that each distributor's user base will find itself locked in to a different set of still-green technologies, making it harder for the development community to settle on a single choice. In the cases of security policies and 3D acceleration, however, the potential for lock-in seems low; most users will not care about which approach they use, as long as the system works well. So, most likely, those critics who have predicted the death by fragmentation of Linux will have to wait a while longer yet.

Comments (52 posted)

Testing the bleeding edge

There is nothing like the joy of running a development distribution. Nowhere else can one find the same combination of huge updates (it's amazing how often the X bitmap fonts seem to change), unstable software, broken dependencies, and, for extra spice, the occasional blown-away configuration file. Whether it's called sid, Dapper, Rawhide, Cooker, or something else, a development distribution is a sure way to learn - usually at inopportune times - about what is happening at the leading edge of the development community.

Development distributions are also a good way to keep track of what developers and packagers are doing. A development distribution is alive, forever changing, forever interesting. It is a constant reminder that Linux and free software are a process, not a product. When compared to the vitality of a development distribution, stable releases seem flat and boring.

These distributions exist for a reason: having more people testing the system will help the creation of more stable releases. So developers want to have outsiders running the development version. But those developers might, perhaps, prefer to do without users who don't know what they are getting into. Consider, for example, this note sent to the fedora-testers list:

I think somewhere along the way netizens appear to think that Rawhide is stable (or at least for public consumption). I'd think we need to discuss how we can provide more constructive information for developers and send a clear message to non-testers that Rawhide (a.k.a FC5 ) is not for general use.

Another participant responded with this suggestion:

I can scream that the development tree will eat your children and destroy not only your data but your neighbor's data until I'm blue in the face... but for people who don't want to hear the warning.. they will choose not to hear the warning... and the only way for them to learn is to actually have rawhide eat their data. So i say.. every week there should be a deliberate package update in the development tree which destroys data. Thrown into the package pool at random, with an appropriate changelog entry so those of us who read the daily rawhide reports will know exactly which package to exclude.

One can safely assume that this idea was offered in a tongue in cheek mode. But the discussion as a whole does raise a question: who should be running development distributions, and for what purposes?

Development releases routinely come with warnings about their explosive nature and admonitions not to use them for any serious purpose. But the fact is that the only way to find the problems with these distributions is to use them for serious purposes. There is little to be learned by putting the distribution on a test box, noting that the installer works, and admiring the pretty desktop graphics. It's only through serious use that one discovers, say, that the web server does not handle load as well as before, that the compiler produces bogus code in certain situations, that emacs feels pretty today, or that the Wesnoth sound effects have stopped working. These are all things which are best discovered before the release is shipped; having to put together Wesnoth patches in a hurry to satisfy a service contract to a large corporation is just a real pain.

So it is important to have "real users" working with development distributions; those are the users who will come up with many of the important bug reports. Discouraging them can be a counterproductive thing to do. On the other hand, these users do need to know what they are getting into. A development distribution will bite back, sooner or later, and it's important to be able to put the pieces back together when that happens. Testers who are not prepared when disaster strikes will not, in the long run, be helpful to the development process.

This aspect of the free software development process is not often talked about. But, without widespread testing in real-world environments, software will not stabilize as well as it should. Proprietary companies run closed beta programs to obtain this testing; the free software world, for the most part, has moved away from that mode in favor of open development repositories. Open development systems are a good thing, they allow a wide variety of participants to try out the software. But these development releases are not for everybody; finding the right way to communicate that fact may be an ongoing challenge.

Comments (18 posted)

Page editor: Jonathan Corbet

Security

Some mailer difficulties

Thunderbird users generally take some comfort from the fact that their mail client can be configured to refuse to load external images which might be called for in HTML mail. The loading of such images is, at a minimum, a privacy problem - it lets somebody know that a given message has been read. Remote images can be used to note the times that messages are read, or to judge the effectiveness of spam delivery. So turning off this "feature" makes a lot of sense.

Unfortunately, it turns out that Thunderbird 1.5 does not block all external loads, even when image loading is turned off. In particular, it seems that <iframe> tags can be used to force remote loads to happen. Thunderbird can also be made to request style sheets from remote sites. Either of those operations will, once again, disclose that the message was read, along with the usual ancillary information such as the user's IP address.

It has been pointed out that at least one company is exploiting this Thunderbird "feature" already. The message describing the exploit also has a temporary workaround for those who don't want to wait for an official fix; it works by setting restrictive limits on the allowed HTML tags - which seems like a good idea in any case.

Alan Cox, meanwhile, has found a problem with evolution. If it receives a sufficiently large message with enough links in it, it will grow to vast size and think for a long time. On a large enough system, with enough time, it will succeed in rendering the message; on smaller systems, it will run out of memory and crash. And, if that weren't enough:

Worse, and the reason this becomes more than irritating is that evolution tries to be smart when it is killed or dies. On restarting it will go to great trouble to attempt to restart in the same position it died or was shut down - which triggers the DoS again each time evolution is opened.

Alan reported the problem in January, and has been dismayed to see that no fixes or advisories have been issued so far. So he has disclosed the vulnerability, presumably with the idea of inspiring some effort to get it fixed. We'll see if it works.

Comments (2 posted)

New vulnerabilities

postgresql: improper validation with Asserts enabled

Package(s):postgresql CVE #(s):CVE-2006-0678
Created:February 27, 2006 Updated:February 28, 2006
Description: PostgreSQL 7.3.x before 7.3.14, 7.4.x before 7.4.12, 8.0.x before 8.0.7, and 8.1.x before 8.1.3, when compiled with Asserts enabled, allows local users to cause a denial of service (server crash) via a crafted SET SESSION AUTHORIZATION command, a different vulnerability than CVE-2006-0553.
Alerts:
Ubuntu USN-258-1 2006-02-27

Comments (none posted)

squirrelmail: multiple vulnerabilities

Package(s):squirrelmail CVE #(s):CVE-2006-0188 CVE-2006-0195 CVE-2006-0377
Created:February 28, 2006 Updated:June 8, 2006
Description: Webmail.php in SquirrelMail 1.4.0 to 1.4.5 allows remote attackers to inject arbitrary web pages into the right frame via a URL in the right_frame parameter. NOTE: this has been called a cross-site scripting (XSS) issue, but it is different than what is normally identified as XSS. (CVE-2006-0188)

Interpretation conflict in the MagicHTML filter in SquirrelMail 1.4.0 to 1.4.5 allows remote attackers to conduct cross-site scripting (XSS) attacks via style sheet specifiers with invalid (1) "/*" and "*/" comments, or (2) a newline in a "url" specifier, which is processed by certain web browsers including Internet Explorer. (CVE-2006-0195)

CRLF injection vulnerability in SquirrelMail 1.4.0 to 1.4.5 allows remote attackers to inject arbitrary IMAP commands via newline characters in the mailbox parameter of the sqimap_mailbox_select command, aka "IMAP injection." (CVE-2006-0377)

Alerts:
Fedora-Legacy FLSA:190884 2006-06-06
Red Hat RHSA-2006:0283-01 2006-05-03
Gentoo 200603-09 2006-03-12
Debian DSA-988-1 2006-03-08
Fedora FEDORA-2006-133 2006-03-03
Mandriva MDKSA-2006:049 2006-02-27

Comments (none posted)

xpdf: potential vulnerabilities

Package(s):xpdf gpdf CVE #(s):CVE-2006-1244
Created:February 27, 2006 Updated:April 13, 2006
Description: Derek Noonburg has fixed several potential vulnerabilities in xpdf, which are also present in gpdf, the Portable Document Format (PDF) viewer with Gtk bindings.
Alerts:
Ubuntu USN-270-1 2006-04-13
Debian DSA-1019-1 2006-03-24
Debian DSA-998-1 2006-03-14
Debian DSA-984-1 2006-03-02
Debian DSA-983-1 2006-02-28
Debian DSA-982-1 2006-02-27

Comments (none posted)

Updated vulnerabilities

ADOdb: PostgresSQL command injection

Package(s):adodb CVE #(s):CVE-2006-0410
Created:February 6, 2006 Updated:April 17, 2006
Description: Andy Staudacher discovered that ADOdb does not properly sanitize all parameters. By sending specifically crafted requests to an application that uses ADOdb and a PostgreSQL backend, an attacker might exploit the flaw to execute arbitrary SQL queries on the host.
Alerts:
Gentoo 200604-07 2006-04-14
Debian DSA-1031-1 2006-04-08
Debian DSA-1030-1 2006-04-08
Debian DSA-1029-1 2006-04-08
Gentoo 200602-02 2006-02-06

Comments (none posted)

apache: cross-site scripting

Package(s):apache CVE #(s):CVE-2005-3352
Created:December 14, 2005 Updated:May 10, 2006
Description: Versions 1 and 2 of the apache web server suffer from a cross-site scripting vulnerability in the mod_imap module; see this bugzilla entry for details.
Alerts:
Slackware SSA:2006-129-01 2006-05-10
SuSE SUSE-SR:2006:004 2006-02-24
Fedora-Legacy FLSA:175406 2006-02-18
Gentoo 200602-03 2006-02-06
Fedora FEDORA-2006-052 2006-01-20
Red Hat RHSA-2006:0158-01 2006-01-17
Ubuntu USN-241-1 2006-01-12
Trustix TSLSA-2005-0074 2005-12-23
Mandriva MDKSA-2006:007 2006-01-05
Red Hat RHSA-2006:0159-01 2006-01-05
OpenPKG OpenPKG-SA-2005.029 2005-12-14

Comments (none posted)

auth_ldap: format string vulnerability

Package(s):auth_ldap CVE #(s):CVE-2006-0150
Created:January 10, 2006 Updated:February 28, 2006
Description: The auth_ldap package is an httpd module that allows user authentication against information stored in an LDAP database. A format string flaw was found in the way auth_ldap logs information. It may be possible for a remote attacker to execute arbitrary code as the 'apache' user if auth_ldap is used for user authentication.
Alerts:
Fedora-Legacy FLSA:177694 2006-02-27
Debian DSA-952-1 2006-01-23
Mandriva MDKSA-2006:017 2006-01-19
Red Hat RHSA-2006:0179-01 2006-01-10

Comments (none posted)

blender: integer overflow

Package(s):blender CVE #(s):CVE-2005-4470
Created:January 6, 2006 Updated:June 15, 2006
Description: Damian Put discovered that Blender did not properly validate a 'length' value in .blend files. Negative values led to an insufficiently sized memory allocation. By tricking a user into opening a specially crafted .blend file, this could be exploited to execute arbitrary code with the privileges of the Blender user.
Alerts:
Debian-Testing DTSA-29-1 2006-06-15
Debian DSA-1039-1 2006-04-24
Gentoo 200601-08 2006-01-13
Ubuntu USN-238-2 2006-01-06
Ubuntu USN-238-1 2006-01-06

Comments (none posted)

bluez-hcidump: buffer overflow

Package(s):bluez-hcidump CVE #(s):CVE-2006-0670
Created:February 17, 2006 Updated:March 10, 2006
Description: A buffer overflow in l2cap.c in hcidump allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (crash) through a wireless Bluetooth connection via a malformed Logical Link Control and Adaptation Protocol (L2CAP) packet.
Alerts:
Debian DSA-990-1 2006-03-10
Ubuntu USN-256-1 2006-02-21
Mandriva MDKSA-2006:041 2006-02-17

Comments (none posted)

BomberClone: remote execution of arbitrary code

Package(s):bomberclone CVE #(s):CVE-2006-0460
Created:February 17, 2006 Updated:March 14, 2006
Description: Stefan Cornelius of the Gentoo Security team discovered multiple missing buffer checks in BomberClone's code. By sending overly long error messages to the game via network, a remote attacker may exploit buffer overflows to execute arbitrary code with the rights of the user running BomberClone.
Alerts:
Debian DSA-997-1 2006-03-13
Gentoo 200602-09 2006-02-16

Comments (none posted)

bzip2: race condition and infinite loop

Package(s):bzip2 CVE #(s):CAN-2005-0953 CAN-2005-1260
Created:May 17, 2005 Updated:January 10, 2007
Description: A race condition in bzip2 1.0.2 and earlier allows local users to modify permissions of arbitrary files via a hard link attack on a file while it is being decompressed, whose permissions are changed by bzip2 after the decompression is complete. Also specially crafted bzip2 archives may cause an infinite loop in the decompressor.
Alerts:
rPath rPSA-2007-0004-1 2007-01-09
Debian DSA-741-1 2005-07-07
Red Hat RHSA-2005:474-01 2005-06-16
OpenPKG OpenPKG-SA-2005.008 2005-06-10
SuSE SUSE-SR:2005:015 2005-06-07
Debian DSA-730-1 2005-05-27
Mandriva MDKSA-2005:091 2005-05-18
Ubuntu USN-127-1 2005-05-17

Comments (2 posted)

CASA: buffer overflow

Package(s):CASA CVE #(s):CVE-2006-0736
Created:February 22, 2006 Updated:February 22, 2006
Description: The pam_micasa module from the CASA authentication system suffers from a remotely exploitable buffer overflow. "Since this module is added to /etc/pam.d/sshd automatically on installation of CASA it was possible for remote attackers to gain root access to any machine with CASA installed." If you are using CASA, fixing this one in a hurry would be a good idea.
Alerts:
SuSE SUSE-SA:2006:010 2006-02-22

Comments (none posted)

ktools: buffer overflow

Package(s):centericq CVE #(s):CVE-2005-3863
Created:December 7, 2005 Updated:August 29, 2006
Description: From the Debian-Testing alert: Mehdi Oudad "deepfear" and Kevin Fernandez "Siegfried" from the Zone-H Research Team discovered a buffer overflow in kkstrtext.h of the ktools library, which is included in (at least) centericq and motor.
Alerts:
Gentoo 200608-27 2006-08-29
Debian DSA-1088-1 2006-06-03
Debian DSA-1083-1 2006-05-31
Gentoo 200512-11 2005-12-20
Debian-Testing DTSA-23-1 2005-12-05

Comments (none posted)

cpio: arbitrary code execution

Package(s):cpio CVE #(s):CVE-2005-4268
Created:January 2, 2006 Updated:May 8, 2007
Description: Richard Harms discovered that cpio did not sufficiently validate file properties when creating archives. Files with e. g. a very large size caused a buffer overflow. By tricking a user or an automatic backup system into putting a specially crafted file into a cpio archive, a local attacker could probably exploit this to execute arbitrary code with the privileges of the target user (which is likely root in an automatic backup system).
Alerts:
rPath rPSA-2007-0094-1 2007-05-07
Red Hat RHSA-2007:0245-02 2007-05-01
Ubuntu USN-234-1 2006-01-02

Comments (none posted)

curl: buffer overflow

Package(s):curl CVE #(s):CVE-2005-4077
Created:December 8, 2005 Updated:March 27, 2006
Description: The curl file transfer utility has a buffer overflow vulnerability in the URL authentication code. If an overly long URL is used, a buffer overflow can result, allowing for local unauthorized access.
Alerts:
Gentoo 200603-25 2006-03-27
Debian DSA-919-2 2006-03-10
Trustix TSLSA-2005-0072 2005-12-16
Red Hat RHSA-2005:875-01 2005-12-20
Gentoo 200512-09 2005-12-16
Ubuntu USN-228-1 2005-12-12
Fedora FEDORA-2005-1137 2005-12-12
Fedora FEDORA-2005-1136 2005-12-12
Debian DSA-919-1 2005-12-12
OpenPKG OpenPKG-SA-2005.028 2005-12-10
Mandriva MDKSA-2005:224 2005-12-08
Fedora FEDORA-2005-1129 2005-12-08
Fedora FEDORA-2005-1130 2005-12-08

Comments (none posted)

cyrus-imapd: buffer overflows

Package(s):cyrus-imapd CVE #(s):CAN-2005-0546
Created:February 23, 2005 Updated:April 9, 2006
Description: Cyrus-imapd, prior to version 2.2.12, contains several buffer overflows which could be exploited by an (authenticated) attacker to run code on the server system.
Alerts:
Fedora-Legacy FLSA:156290 2006-04-04
Red Hat RHSA-2005:408-01 2005-05-17
Fedora FEDORA-2005-339 2005-04-27
OpenPKG OpenPKG-SA-2005.005 2005-04-05
Conectiva CLA-2005:937 2005-03-17
Mandrake MDKSA-2005:051 2005-03-04
Ubuntu USN-87-1 2005-02-28
SuSE SUSE-SA:2005:009 2005-02-24
Gentoo 200502-29 2005-02-23

Comments (none posted)

dia: missing input sanitizing

Package(s):dia CVE #(s):CAN-2005-2966
Created:October 4, 2005 Updated:April 6, 2006
Description: Joxean Koret discovered that the SVG import plugin did not properly sanitize data read from an SVG file. By tricking an user into opening a specially crafted SVG file, an attacker could exploit this to execute arbitrary code with the privileges of the user.
Alerts:
Debian DSA-1025-1 2006-04-06
Mandriva MDKSA-2005:187 2005-10-20
Gentoo 200510-06 2005-10-06
Debian DSA-847-1 2005-10-08
SuSE SUSE-SR:2005:022 2005-10-07
Ubuntu USN-193-1 2005-10-04

Comments (none posted)

emacs21: format string vulnerability in "movemail"

Package(s):emacs21 CVE #(s):CAN-2005-0100
Created:February 7, 2005 Updated:May 15, 2006
Description: Max Vozeler discovered a format string vulnerability in the "movemail" utility of Emacs. By sending specially crafted packets, a malicious POP3 server could cause a buffer overflow, which could be exploited to execute arbitrary code with the privileges of the user and the "mail" group.
Alerts:
Fedora-Legacy FLSA:152898 2006-05-12
Debian DSA-685-1 2005-02-17
Mandrake MDKSA-2005:038 2005-02-15
Gentoo 200502-20 2005-02-15
Fedora FEDORA-2005-146 2005-02-14
Fedora FEDORA-2005-145 2005-02-14
Red Hat RHSA-2005:133-01 2005-02-15
Red Hat RHSA-2005:110-01 2005-02-15
Red Hat RHSA-2005:134-01 2005-02-10
Red Hat RHSA-2005:112-01 2005-02-10
Fedora FEDORA-2005-116 2005-02-08
Fedora FEDORA-2005-115 2005-02-08
Debian DSA-671-1 2005-02-08
Debian DSA-670-1 2005-02-08
Ubuntu USN-76-1 2005-02-07

Comments (none posted)

enscript: arbitrary code execution

Package(s):enscript CVE #(s):CAN-2004-1184 CAN-2004-1185 CAN-2004-1186
Created:January 21, 2005 Updated:May 27, 2006
Description: Erik Sjölund has discovered several security relevant problems in enscript, a program to convert ASCII text into Postscript and other formats. Unsanitized input can cause the execution of arbitrary commands via EPSF pipe support. Due to missing sanitizing of filenames it is possible that a specially crafted filename can cause arbitrary commands to be executed. Multiple buffer overflows can cause the program to crash.
Alerts:
rPath rPSA-2006-0083-1 2006-05-26
Fedora-Legacy FLSA:152892 2005-12-17
Red Hat RHSA-2005:040-01 2005-02-15
Mandrake MDKSA-2005:033 2005-02-10
Gentoo 200502-03 2005-02-02
Red Hat RHSA-2005:039-01 2005-02-01
Fedora FEDORA-2005-096 2005-01-31
Fedora FEDORA-2005-092 2005-01-28
Fedora FEDORA-2005-091 2005-01-28
Fedora FEDORA-2005-016 2005-01-26
Fedora FEDORA-2005-015 2005-01-26
Ubuntu USN-68-1 2005-01-24
Debian DSA-654-1 2005-01-21

Comments (none posted)

evolution: format string issues

Package(s):evolution CVE #(s):CAN-2005-2549 CAN-2005-2550
Created:August 15, 2005 Updated:March 23, 2006
Description: Evolution has format string issues. SITIC advisory SA05-001 contains more information.
Alerts:
Debian DSA-1016-1 2006-03-23
SuSE SUSE-SA:2005:054 2005-09-16
Red Hat RHSA-2005:267-01 2005-08-29
Gentoo 200508-12 2005-08-23
Mandriva MDKSA-2005:141 2005-08-17
Fedora FEDORA-2005-742 2005-08-11
Fedora FEDORA-2005-743 2005-08-11

Comments (2 posted)

fetchmail: multidrop bug

Package(s):fetchmail CVE #(s):CVE-2005-4348
Created:December 20, 2005 Updated:May 27, 2006
Description: Fetchmail contains a bug which allows a malicious mail server to crash the client by sending a message without headers. This occurs when running in multidrop mode.
Alerts:
rPath rPSA-2006-0084-1 2006-05-26
Fedora-Legacy FLSA:164512 2006-05-12
Slackware SSA:2006-045-01 2006-02-15
Debian DSA-939-1 2006-01-13
Ubuntu USN-233-1 2006-01-02
Mandriva MDKSA-2005:236 2005-12-23
Fedora FEDORA-2005-1187 2005-12-20
Fedora FEDORA-2005-1186 2005-12-20

Comments (none posted)

ffmpeg: buffer overflow

Package(s):ffmpeg CVE #(s):CVE-2005-4048
Created:December 15, 2005 Updated:March 17, 2006
Description: The avcodec_default_get_buffer() function of the ffmpeg library has a buffer overflow vulnerability. A user can be tricked into playing a maliciously created PNG movie, allowing the attacker to run arbitrary code with the user's privileges.
Alerts:
Debian DSA-1005-1 2006-03-16
Debian DSA-1004-1 2006-03-16
Debian DSA-992-1 2006-03-10
Gentoo 200603-03 2006-03-04
Gentoo 200602-01 2006-02-05
Gentoo 200601-06 2006-01-10
Ubuntu USN-230-2 2005-12-16
Ubuntu USN-230-1 2005-12-14
Mandriva MDKSA-2005:228 2005-12-14
Mandriva MDKSA-2005:229 2005-12-14
Mandriva MDKSA-2005:232 2005-12-14
Mandriva MDKSA-2005:230 2005-12-14
Mandriva MDKSA-2005:231 2005-12-14

Comments (none posted)

Foomatic: Arbitrary command execution in foomatic-rip

Package(s):foomatic CVE #(s):CAN-2004-0801
Created:September 20, 2004 Updated:May 31, 2006
Description: There is a vulnerability in the foomatic-filters package. This vulnerability is due to insufficient checking of command-line parameters and environment variables in the foomatic-rip filter. This vulnerability may allow both local and remote attackers to execute arbitrary commands on the print server with the permissions of the spooler.
Alerts:
SuSE SUSE-SA:2006:026 2006-05-30
Fedora-Legacy FLSA:2076 2004-11-05
Conectiva CLA-2004:880 2004-10-27
Fedora FEDORA-2004-303 2004-09-21
Gentoo 200409-24 2004-09-20

Comments (none posted)

gaim: buffer overflow

Package(s):gaim CVE #(s):CAN-2005-2103
Created:August 10, 2005 Updated:February 27, 2006
Description: Gaim suffers from a heap-based buffer overflow which can be exploited via a hostile "away message" to execute arbitrary code.
Alerts:
Fedora-Legacy FLSA:158543 2006-02-25
Slackware SSA:2005-242-03 2005-08-31
Fedora FEDORA-2005-751 2005-08-17
Fedora FEDORA-2005-750 2005-08-17
Mandriva MDKSA-2005:139 2005-08-15
Gentoo 200508-06 2005-08-15
Ubuntu USN-168-1 2005-08-12
Red Hat RHSA-2005:589-01 2005-08-09

Comments (none posted)

gdb: multiple vulnerabilities

Package(s):gdb CVE #(s):CAN-2005-1704 CAN-2005-1705
Created:May 20, 2005 Updated:August 11, 2006
Description: Tavis Ormandy of the Gentoo Linux Security Audit Team discovered an integer overflow in the BFD library, resulting in a heap overflow. A review also showed that by default, gdb insecurely sources initialization files from the working directory. Successful exploitation would result in the execution of arbitrary code on loading a specially crafted object file or the execution of arbitrary commands.
Alerts:
Red Hat RHSA-2006:0354-01 2006-08-10
Red Hat RHSA-2006:0368-01 2006-07-20
Mandriva MDKSA-2005:215 2005-11-23
Fedora FEDORA-2005-1033 2005-10-27
Fedora FEDORA-2005-1032 2005-10-27
Red Hat RHSA-2005:801-01 2005-10-18
Red Hat RHSA-2005:763-01 2005-10-11
Red Hat RHSA-2005:709-01 2005-10-05
Red Hat RHSA-2005:673-01 2005-10-05
Red Hat RHSA-2005:659-01 2005-09-28
Fedora FEDORA-2005-498 2005-06-29
Fedora FEDORA-2005-497 2005-06-29
Gentoo 200506-01 2005-06-01
Trustix TSLSA-2005-0025 2005-05-31
Mandriva MDKSA-2005:095 2005-05-30
Ubuntu USN-136-2 2005-05-27
Ubuntu USN-136-1 2005-05-27
Ubuntu USN-135-1 2005-05-27
Gentoo 200505-15 2005-05-20

Comments (5 posted)

gdk-pixbuf: multiple vulnerabilities

Package(s):gdk-pixbuf gtk2 CVE #(s):CVE-2005-3186 CVE-2005-2976 CVE-2005-2975
Created:November 15, 2005 Updated:March 20, 2006
Description: The gdk-pixbuf package contains an image loading library used with the GNOME GUI desktop environment. A bug was found in the way gdk-pixbuf processes XPM images. An attacker could create a carefully crafted XPM file in such a way that it could cause an application linked with gdk-pixbuf to execute arbitrary code when the file was opened by a victim.

Ludwig Nussel discovered an integer overflow bug in the way gdk-pixbuf processes XPM images. An attacker could create a carefully crafted XPM file in such a way that it could cause an application linked with gdk-pixbuf to execute arbitrary code or crash when the file was opened by a victim.

Ludwig Nussel also discovered an infinite-loop denial of service bug in the way gdk-pixbuf processes XPM images. An attacker could create a carefully crafted XPM file in such a way that it could cause an application linked with gdk-pixbuf to stop responding when the file was opened by a victim.

Alerts:
Fedora-Legacy FLSA:173274 2006-03-16
Debian DSA-913-1 2005-12-01
Debian DSA-911-1 2005-11-29
Trustix TSLSA-2005-0066 2005-11-18
Mandriva MDKSA-2005:214 2005-11-18
Ubuntu USN-216-1 2005-11-16
SuSE SUSE-SA:2005:065 2005-11-16
Gentoo 200511-14 2005-11-16
Fedora FEDORA-2005-1088 2005-11-15
Fedora FEDORA-2005-1087 2005-11-15
Fedora FEDORA-2005-1086 2005-11-15
Fedora FEDORA-2005-1085 2005-11-15
Red Hat RHSA-2005:811-01 2005-11-15
Red Hat RHSA-2005:810-01 2005-11-15

Comments (none posted)

gettext: Insecure temporary file handling

Package(s):gettext CVE #(s):CAN-2004-0966
Created:October 11, 2004 Updated:March 1, 2006
Description: gettext insecurely creates temporary files in world-writeable directories with predictable names. A local attacker could create symbolic links in the temporary files directory, pointing to a valid file somewhere on the filesystem. When gettext is called, this would result in file access with the rights of the user running the utility, which could be the root user.
Alerts:
Mandriva MDKSA-2006:051 2006-02-28
Fedora-Legacy FLSA:136323 2006-01-09
Gentoo 200410-10:02 2004-10-10
OpenPKG OpenPKG-SA-2004.055 2004-12-23
Ubuntu USN-5-1 2004-10-27
Gentoo 200410-10 2004-10-10

Comments (1 posted)

gnupg: false positive signature verification

Package(s):gnupg CVE #(s):CVE-2006-0455
Created:February 17, 2006 Updated:March 10, 2006
Description: Tavis Ormandy noticed that gnupg, the GNU privacy guard - a free PGP replacement, verifies external signatures of files successfully even though they don't contain a signature at all. See this update from the gnuPG team for more information.
Alerts:
SuSE SUSE-SA:2006:014 2006-03-10
SuSE SUSE-SR:2006:005 2006-03-03
SuSE SUSE-SA:2006:013 2006-03-01
Trustix TSLSA-2006-0008 2006-02-17
SuSE SUSE-SA:2006:009 2006-02-20
Gentoo 200602-10 2006-02-18
OpenPKG OpenPKG-SA-2006.001 2006-02-18
Mandriva MDKSA-2006:043 2006-02-17
Fedora FEDORA-2006-116 2006-02-17
Ubuntu USN-252-1 2006-02-17
Debian DSA-978-1 2006-02-17

Comments (2 posted)

gnutls: denial of service

Package(s):gnutls CVE #(s):CVE-2006-0645
Created:February 13, 2006 Updated:March 6, 2006
Description: Several flaws were found in the way libtasn1 decodes DER. An attacker could create a carefully crafted invalid X.509 certificate in such a way that could trigger this flaw if parsed by an application that uses GNU TLS. This could lead to a denial of service (application crash). It is not certain if this issue could be escalated to allow arbitrary code execution.
Alerts:
Debian DSA-986-1 2006-03-06
Debian DSA-985-1 2006-03-06
Fedora-Legacy FLSA:181014 2006-02-27
Gentoo 200602-08 2006-02-16
Ubuntu USN-251-1 2006-02-16
Mandriva MDKSA-2006:039 2006-02-13
Fedora FEDORA-2006-107 2006-02-10
Red Hat RHSA-2006:0207-01 2006-02-10

Comments (none posted)

gzip: arbitrary command execution

Package(s):gzip CVE #(s):CAN-2005-0758
Created:August 1, 2005 Updated:January 9, 2007
Description: zgrep in gzip before 1.3.5 does not handle shell metacharacters like '|' and '&' properly when they occurred in input file names. This could be exploited to execute arbitrary commands with user privileges if zgrep is run in an untrusted directory with specially crafted file names.
Alerts:
OpenPKG OpenPKG-SA-2007.002 2007-01-08
Mandriva MDKSA-2006:027 2006-01-30
Mandriva MDKSA-2006:026 2006-01-30
Fedora-Legacy FLSA:158801 2005-11-14
Fedora-Legacy FLSA:157696 2005-08-10
Ubuntu USN-161-1 2005-08-04
Ubuntu USN-158-1 2005-08-01

Comments (2 posted)

heimdal: remote denial of service

Package(s):heimdal CVE #(s):CVE-2006-0677
Created:February 17, 2006 Updated:February 24, 2006
Description: A remote Denial of Service vulnerability was discovered in the heimdal implementation of the telnet daemon. A remote attacker could force the server to crash due to a NULL de-reference before the user logged in, resulting in inetd turning telnetd off because it forked too fast.
Alerts:
SuSE SUSE-SA:2006:011 2006-02-24
Ubuntu USN-253-1 2006-02-17

Comments (none posted)

heimdal: privilege escalation

Package(s):heimdal CVE #(s):CVE-2006-0582
Created:February 13, 2006 Updated:March 17, 2006
Description: A privilege escalation flaw has been found in the heimdal rsh (remote shell) server. This allowed an authenticated attacker to overwrite arbitrary files and gain ownership of them.
Alerts:
Gentoo 200603-14 2006-03-17
Debian DSA-977-1 2006-02-16
Ubuntu USN-247-1 2006-02-10

Comments (none posted)

imagemagick: arbitrary command execution

Package(s):imagemagick CVE #(s):CVE-2005-4601 CVE-2006-0082
Created:January 24, 2006 Updated:March 24, 2006
Description: Florian Weimer discovered that the delegate code did not correctly handle file names which embed shell commands (CVE-2005-4601). Daniel Kobras found a format string vulnerability in the SetImageInfo() function (CVE-2006-0082). By tricking a user into processing an image file with a specially crafted file name, these two vulnerabilities could be exploited to execute arbitrary commands with the user's privileges. These vulnerability become particularly critical if malicious images are sent as email attachments and the email client uses imagemagick to convert/display the images (e. g. Thunderbird and Gnus).
Alerts:
SuSE SUSE-SR:2006:006 2006-03-17
Gentoo 200602-13 2006-02-26
Slackware SSA:2006-045-03 2006-02-15
Red Hat RHSA-2006:0178-01 2006-02-14
Gentoo 200602-06 2006-02-13
Debian DSA-957-2 2006-01-31
Mandriva MDKSA-2006:024 2006-01-26
Debian DSA-957-1 2006-01-26
Ubuntu USN-246-1 2006-01-24

Comments (none posted)

imap: buffer overflow in c-client

Package(s):imap CVE #(s):CAN-2003-0297
Created:February 18, 2005 Updated:April 9, 2006
Description: A buffer overflow flaw was found in the c-client IMAP client. An attacker could create a malicious IMAP server that if connected to by a victim could execute arbitrary code on the client machine.
Alerts:
Fedora-Legacy FLSA:184074 2006-04-04
Fedora-Legacy FLSA:152912 2005-05-12
Red Hat RHSA-2005:114-01 2005-02-18

Comments (none posted)

ipsec-tools: denial of service

Package(s):ipsec-tools CVE #(s):CVE-2005-3732
Created:December 1, 2005 Updated:June 8, 2006
Description: ipsec-tools has a remote denial of service vulnerability in the racoon daemon. If racoon is running in aggressive mode, it fails to check all peer payloads during When the daemon the IKE negotiation phase, allowing a malicious peer to crash the daemon. One should always be careful around aggressive racoons.
Alerts:
Fedora-Legacy FLSA:190941 2006-06-06
Red Hat RHSA-2006:0267-01 2006-04-25
Debian DSA-965-1 2006-02-06
Mandriva MDKSA-2006:020 2006-01-25
SuSE SUSE-SA:2005:070 2005-12-20
Gentoo 200512-04 2005-12-12
Ubuntu USN-221-1 2005-12-01

Comments (none posted)

kdebase: local root vulnerability

Package(s):kdebase CVE #(s):CAN-2005-2494
Created:September 7, 2005 Updated:August 11, 2006
Description: The kdebase package (and kcheckpass in particular) found in KDE versions 3.2.0 through 3.4.2 suffers from a lock file handling error which can enable a local attacker to obtain root access. See this advisory for details.
Alerts:
Red Hat RHSA-2006:0582-01 2006-08-10
Debian DSA-815-1 2005-09-16
Slackware SSA:2005-251-01 2005-09-09
Ubuntu USN-176-1 2005-09-07
Mandriva MDKSA-2005:160 2005-09-06

Comments (none posted)

kdelibs: heap overflow

Package(s):kdelibs CVE #(s):CVE-2006-0019
Created:January 19, 2006 Updated:March 17, 2006
Description: Konqueror's kjs JavaScript interpreter engine has a heap overflow vulnerability. Specially crafted JavaScript code could be placed on a web site, leading to arbitrary code execution. Other kde applications are also subject to this vulnerability.
Alerts:
Fedora-Legacy FLSA:178606 2006-03-16
Slackware SSA:2006-045-05 2006-02-15
Gentoo 200601-11 2006-01-22
Mandriva MDKSA-2006:019 2006-01-20
Fedora FEDORA-2006-050 2006-01-20
SuSE SUSE-SA:2006:003 2006-01-20
Debian DSA-948-1 2005-01-20
Ubuntu USN-245-1 2006-01-20
Red Hat RHSA-2006:0184-01 2006-01-19

Comments (none posted)

kdelibs: kate backup file permission leak

Package(s):kdelibs kate kwrite CVE #(s):CAN-2005-1920
Created:July 19, 2005 Updated:November 27, 2006
Description: Kate / Kwrite, as shipped with KDE 3.2.x up to including 3.4.0, creates a file backup before saving a modified file. These backup files are created with default permissions, even if the original file had more strict permissions set. See this advisory for more information.
Alerts:
Gentoo 200611-21 2006-11-27
Debian DSA-804-2 2005-11-10
Debian DSA-804-1 2005-09-08
Red Hat RHSA-2005:612-01 2005-07-27
Ubuntu USN-150-1 2005-07-21
Mandriva MDKSA-2005:122 2005-07-20
Fedora FEDORA-2005-594 2005-07-19

Comments (none posted)

kernel: multiple vulnerabilities

Package(s):kernel CVE #(s):CAN-2005-0449 CAN-2005-0209 CAN-2005-0529 CAN-2005-0530 CAN-2005-0532 CAN-2005-0384 CAN-2005-0210 CAN-2005-0504