Mozilla is dead; long live SeaMonkey
Back in April, 2003, the Mozilla Project
stirred
things up by announcing a set of changes to its development model and
roadmap. Rather than continue to develop one huge suite which did
everything, the project would shift its efforts to the creation of smaller,
standalone applications. In particular, future development would go into
the browser then known as Phoenix, and the mail client called, at that
time, Minotaur. The full Mozilla suite was expected to fade away.
Over time, as the project continued to make new Mozilla releases, it seemed
that the suite might stay around for some time after all. The project made
several Mozilla 1.8 alpha releases, and one beta, leading some users
to believe, reasonably, that there might just be a Mozilla 1.8 final release
afterward. So the February 28 staff
meeting summary surprised a number of people with this brief item:
*Mozilla 1.8 final*
- To be discussed tomorrow whether we do one
The ensuing discussion was long and noisy. The suite still has a large and
dedicated user base, even if it has been somewhat overshadowed by Firefox
and Thunderbird. Some developers had been
working on Mozilla 1.8 and now wonder why. It seems that, over the
last couple of years, the big-picture plan had faded from view, and the
Mozilla Foundation didn't go out of its way to remind people of where it
was going.
That ended on March 10, when the Foundation posted its transition plan
for the Mozilla suite. According to that plan, the "alpha" and "beta"
1.8 releases were intended simply to test out the Mozilla backend code.
There will be no final, stable, supported Mozilla 1.8 release.
The Foundation does seem to recognize that not everybody will have expected
this decision:
There is no doubt that the series of 1.8 alpha and beta releases
have caused some confusion about whether there would be a 1.8
product released by the Mozilla Foundation. In addition, a set of
people have done a non-trivial amount of work on 1.8 features,
thinking this would be part of an official Mozilla Foundation
release. This has been a major error on our part.
The confusion was also clearly to be found within the project itself, as
can be seen by the fact that the question of whether a 1.8 release would
happen or not was
left as an open item for discussion at the February 28 staff meeting.
In any case, the decision has now been made. And that decision is
consistent with the project's stated long-term goals, even if people did
have reason to believe that things would happen differently. The interesting
question now is: what happens next?
What's next, it seems, is that the Mozilla suite gets a new name (almost
certainly "SeaMonkey," its longstanding name within the Mozilla Project)
and is developed and maintained by a group of volunteers. That group is
already organizing itself, and has posted a plan of sorts on the SeaMonkey home
page. The first priority will be to get a real 1.8 release out, but
the developers are already looking beyond that milestone. A
commonly-mentioned longer-term goal is moving over to XULRunner;
porting back some of the better Firefox and Thunderbird features is also on
the list.
The Mozilla Foundation claims to support this course of action. So
SeaMonkey will be able to use the Mozilla support infrastructure - CVS,
BugZilla, etc. It also appears that it will be able to use the SeaMonkey
name, though it appears that there may be a significant debate within the
new project about naming before this is all over. The Mozilla Foundation's
primary concern, it seems, is that the SeaMonkey releases cannot appear to be
an official Mozilla product.
The Mozilla Foundation's motives in making this decision are easy to
understand. The Foundation's resources are limited, so it wants to
concentrate those resources on the standalone applications which are at the
core of its stated plans - and which, it must be said, have been rather
more successful (in terms of user adoption) than the full-blown Mozilla
suite ever was. That suite is free software, however, so it can survive
abandonment by its creator as long as there are developers with the time
and interest to maintain it. The fact that the Foundation is providing the
support infrastructure (and, of course, Gecko engine and the rest of the
support code used by the Mozilla suite) is an added bonus. There is every
reason to expect that both projects will thrive; in a year or two, this
decision may be seen as a good thing by all parties involved.
Comments (12 posted)
A modest proposal from Debian's Release Team
The big news from the Debian Project this week is a proposal from the
Release Team and FTP masters that may result in several architectures being
"dropped." The Debian release team and FTP masters are
proposing some
criteria to determine which architectures will receive stable
releases after sarge:
The release team and the ftpmasters are mutually agreed that it is not
sustainable to continue making coordinated releases for as many
architectures as sarge currently contains, let alone for as many new
proposed architectures as are waiting in the wings.
The proposal would not affect the Sarge release, but would take effect for
the next stable Debian release, dubbed "Etch." The architectures that are
slated for release with Sarge will still go out the door, and will have
security support throughout Sarge's release cycle, but would not be
included in testing for the Etch release.
The proposal would relegate a number of architectures to "second class
citizen" (SCC) status, though even that does not come for free. At a
minimum, the architecture must have a functioning Debian build system
("buildd") which can run 24 hours per day without crashing.
It would also require five Debian developers
that use or work on the port to send a signed request for its addition,
binaries for the port would need to be built and signed by Debian
developers, include "basic Unix functionality," and binaries
would need to be built from unmodified Debian source. Finally, the
architecture must be freely usable, and the port would require a sufficient
user base, or 10% of downloads "over a sampled set of
mirrors."
To be part of the Etch release, an architecture would have to meet yet
another set of criteria. The target systems must be available for
purchase, they must be able to compile at least 98% of the distribution's
packages, there must be a working installer, and there must be a machine
under debian.org, available to developers, for testing. It would also be
necessary for the security team, the system administration team, and the
release team to sign off on accepting the architecture.
We followed up on the proposal with Steve Langasek, one of the Debian
Release Team members. Using this set of criteria, Langasek predicts that
this would reduce the candidate architectures from 11 (for Sarge) to 4 for
Etch -- x86, PowerPC, IA-64 and AMD64. The list of ports is not set in
stone. Langasek told LWN that he hopes other ports will "strive for
inclusion in the Etch release, and that their efforts will contribute to
maintaining the high quality we have today even if they don't end up being
released."
We also asked Langasek how the Release Team had picked the criteria to be
used for future releases.
One of the items in the agenda I had set for this meeting in Vancouver
(with input from the rest of the team) was to talk about setting
per-architecture criteria for etch to address some of the problems we've
seen during the sarge cycle, where we've been fighting fires involving one
architecture or another not being able to keep up -- and what we've noticed
is that it's not consistently any particular architecture, it's been spread
out across the board, so we really needed to tell people up front what we
needed from ports in order to get etch out on-schedule.
As it turns out, the ftpmasters ran with this idea in a late-night
brainstorm session even before the meeting officially began, and had some
preliminary criteria put together by Saturday morning. By Saturday
evening, we'd hammered this into something we all agreed was a good idea,
and spent the next couple of days tweaking, refining it as one thought or
another popped into someone's head.
The release team has invited comments on the plan, and it is undergoing
quite a bit of discussion over on debian-devel.
We asked Langasek if the proposal would be dropped if there was a strong
reaction against it. Langasek said that the Release Team was open to ideas,
and was "happy to tweak the specific criteria in use if there are reasons
to do so." However, Langasek said that setting basic requirements
"shouldn't be all that controversial, because the only alternative to
holding our ports to a standard that reflects the demands of the release
process really is a slow, unpredictable release." He also said there
might be tweaks for ports not deemed release candidates.
It is pretty clear based on feedback that something more than the proposed
unstable snapshot mechanism is desired for those ports that aren't going to
be "release candidates". We don't know yet what form that will take, but
there's been a lot of good discussion about what the needs are that should
be met.
One criteria for release candidates that caught our eye was the requirement
that the architecture must be "publicly available to buy new."
We wondered if that would mean dropping support for 386 and 486 chips,
something that other distributions have done for some time. According to
Langasek, processors with the 486 instruction set are still in use.
The truth is that it's still possible to buy chips implementing a 486
instruction set, and a lot of people are still doing interesting things
with them in the embedded sphere -- and it doesn't really cost us anything,
release-wise, to maintain backwards-compatibility with those chips.
There have been a few ABI changes recently that have made current software
dependent on an instruction set that's only available in 486 chips and
higher; it's possible to emulate around this, but the only implementation
currently available has security problems, so it may yet turn out that
sarge is the first release of Debian's "i386" port that doesn't actually
support true 80386 processors. We've also dropped support in sarge for the
oldest of the 32-bit Sparc processors, for similar reasons.
From where we're sitting, this looks like a reasonable proposal. It doesn't
arbitrarily drop specific architectures, but allows for ports to be dropped
from Etch's release candidates if they fail to keep up. This may not be the
"magic bullet" needed to ensure more timely releases from the Debian
Project, but it should contribute to faster releases overall.
Comments (11 posted)
Remembering the crypto wars
One of the quieter announcements to come out of last month's RSA conference
was
this
release stating that Dorothy Denning had received the 2004 "Harold
F. Tipton Award" in recognition of her career in information security.
From the release:
"Over the past three decades, Dorothy Denning has been instrumental
in the battle to secure cyber infrastructure," said Tipton, who
will present the award to Dr. Denning. "She has an extensive
history of developing ways to protect highly sensitive information
for corporations and government agencies."
Ms Denning was certainly an early pioneer in this field. Her 1982
Cryptography and Data Security was, for some years, the book
on encryption, access control, and security models. A copy of it remains
on your editor's shelf. Dorothy Denning helped pave the way to where we
are now.
The release omits an important point in Ms Denning's career, however, which
would be worthwhile for the free software community to remember. Those who
were paying attention at the time will remember the encryption battles of
the 1990's, when governments (and the U.S. government in particular) tried
to control the spread of cryptographic technology. The breaking point in
that debate was the "Clipper" initiative, first proposed under Bush I,
then supported by the Clinton administration. Clipper would have required
that all encryption used in the United States implement a key escrow
mechanism which would enable the government to decrypt any communication
which caught its interest. Of course, the government promised not to abuse
this capability, honest, trust us. Strangely enough, people didn't trust
them.
Dorothy Denning was nearly unique in the cryptography community in that she
was a strong clipper supporter. Her essay, The
Future of Cryptography, remains available; it is worth reading for a
scary view on how the net should work. Here's what she was worried about:
Crypto anarchy can be viewed as the proliferation of cryptography
that provides the benefits of confidentiality protection but does
nothing about its harms. It is government-proof encryption which
denies access to the government even under a court order or other
legal order. It has no safeguards to protect users and their
organizations from accidents and abuse. It is like an automobile
with no brakes, no seat belts, no pollution controls, no license
plate, and no way of getting in after you've locked your keys in
the car.
Crypto anarchy, it was claimed, would lead to social disorder and the end
of life as we know it. But it could be prevented; all that was needed was
key escrow, and the "Skipjack" encryption algorithm, which happened to be
classified so nobody could see it. It was thought that key escrow might win
on its own merits, but this outcome was not to be left to the whim of
markets:
The manufacture, distribution, import, and export of unlicensed
encryption products would be illegal, but no particular method of
encryption would be mandated. Individuals would be allowed to
develop their own encryption systems for personal or educational
use without obtaining licenses, though they could not distribute
them to others.
It should be clear that this view of the world would not sit well with the
free software community. We want to be able to develop - and distribute -
software which satisfies our own sense of how much security we need. We
have little patience for coding in back doors for government, or for
anybody else. We do not believe in the security of government-mandated
back doors or classified encryption algorithms.
Clearly, the proponents of key escrow were not successful. There are two
reasons for this failure; the first, and perhaps strongest, of those is
economic. Somehow, the Powers That Be subscribed to the absurd notion that
there would be a worldwide market for encryption products with an explicit
back door for the U.S. government. People in the industry, however,
eventually figured out that key escrow and crypto export regulations would
destroy their business. They pushed for change, and got it.
The other reason, however, is public opposition. The debate was loud,
public, and effective. And a significant part of that debate came about as
a result of the public release of PGP, which let the strong cryptography
cat out of the bag in an irreversible way. Phillip Zimmermann's courageous
act demonstrated the repressive power that was poised to swoop down on
those who sought to protect their own data; it also made any attempt to
control the spread of encryption technology moot. Without the release of
that code, the software environment as we see it today might have been
quite different.
As we fight software patents, broadcast flags, or attempts to restrict
peer-to-peer software, we should keep these lessons in mind. These battles
can be won, even when strong interests are quite determined in their
opposition. And releasing code onto the net can change the world. By
developing and distributing our systems, which are designed with
our interests in mind, we are helping to bring about a more free
future.
Comments (8 posted)
Page editor: Jonathan Corbet
Security
Big Ideas for saving the Internet
CIO magazine has run an article called
How To Save The
Internet. The core idea is that the Internet threatens to collapse
under the load of spam, spyware, worms, etc., and that some sort of Big
Ideas must be found to save the situation. A few of the suggested ideas
merit a look...
The first is "hire a czar." The idea would seem to be that the appointment
of a high-level (U.S.) "cybersecurity" official would do something to make
our systems more secure. It looks mostly like a bully-pulpit role:
We propose a high-profile surgeon general for information security,
who reports to the secretary of DHS. Imagine labels on software
like those on cigarettes--Infosecurity General's
Warning: The use of software and hardware that is not certified
secure can harm your system and other people's systems, and you may
be held liable for those damages.
Aside from the idea of how hardware and software would be "certified
secure," one could imagine that people in the free software community could
have a lot of fun creating warning labels.
Another suggestion is giving vendors incentives to create more secure
software. Essentially, it is the return of the product liability idea.
This approach may still offer some promise, but it is hard to see how to
make it fit with the "no warranties" nature of free software.
Two related items are well described by the title applied to the first:
"Treat End Users Like the Dummies They Are." The suggestion to have ISPs
provide more filtering, detection, and response services to those who are
willing to pay for them is fine. The other one, however, is more
problematic:
Let's make all end user devices nonprogrammable.... No one can
connect to the Internet on a machine that creates code. If you want
a computer to do programming, you would have to be licensed. We
could license software companies to purchase programmable machines,
which would be completely traceable along with the code created on
them.
The idea of "traceable code" would appear to pose some technical challenges
of its own. But the idea that you could "save the Internet" by restricting
access to programmable devices is truly frightening. There are a few of us
out there who see the net as a bit more than a clothing-optional shopping
mall. We would not react well to the idea that we would have to be
licensed before getting a machine we could hack on.
There is an idea for the creation of reputation servers as an antidote to
phishing problem (though, of course, it has to be expressed as "using
XML and meta-data to tag websites with safety, reputation, past performance
and other security ratings"). Something like that may yet be part
of a solution to certain classes of problems. More likely, however, is
that it would just become another variant of the (nearly useless) SSL
certificate mechanism.
Almost as an afterthought, the article presents a couple of relevant Big
Ideas: make a bigger effort to write error-free software, and think
carefully about what features any given program should have. Maybe an
email client really should not be able to execute code received in
messages. One wonders why nobody ever thought of that before.
See the article for the full list of "Big Ideas." For the most part, this
article can be dismissed as just another silly journalistic exercise. But
the truth of the matter is that people are actually likely to try some of
these ideas. Look for a "Code Traceability and Programmer Licensing"
initiative in a legislature near you sometime soon.
Comments (16 posted)
New vulnerabilities
Ethereal: Multiple vulnerabilities
| Package(s): | ethereal |
CVE #(s): | CAN-2005-0699
CAN-2005-0704
CAN-2005-0705
|
| Created: | March 14, 2005 |
Updated: | March 28, 2005 |
| Description: |
There are multiple vulnerabilities in versions of Ethereal earlier than
0.10.10, including:
The Etheric and 3GPP2 A11 dissectors are vulnerable to buffer overflows
(CAN-2005-0704 and CAN-2005-0699), the GPRS-LLC could crash when the
"ignore cipher bit" option is enabled (CAN-2005-0705) and various
vulnerabilities in the IAPP, JXTA, and sFlow dissectors. |
| Alerts: |
|
Comments (none posted)
gnupg: information leak
| Package(s): | gnupg |
CVE #(s): | CAN-2005-0366
|
| Created: | March 16, 2005 |
Updated: | August 19, 2005 |
| Description: |
GnuPG (and other PGP-like systems) suffers from an information leak which could, in some situations, be used by an attacker to obtain plain text from an encrypted message. See this message for a detailed explanation of the problem. "We know of no real-world application that is affected by this type of attack. It is an attack that requires the active participation of someone who holds the actual key required to decrypt a message. Thus, it is not something you are likely to see." |
| Alerts: |
|
Comments (none posted)
grip: buffer overflow
| Package(s): | grip |
CVE #(s): | CAN-2005-0706
|
| Created: | March 10, 2005 |
Updated: | September 16, 2005 |
| Description: |
Grip, a CD ripper, has a buffer overflow vulnerability that can
occur when the CDDB server returns more than 16 matches. |
| Alerts: |
|
Comments (none posted)
IPsec-Tools: denial of service
| Package(s): | ipsec-tools setkey racoon |
CVE #(s): | CAN-2005-0398
|
| Created: | March 14, 2005 |
Updated: | April 5, 2005 |
| Description: |
The IPsec-Tools package is used to build other programs such as setkey and
racoon. There is a potential denial of service vulnerability when parsing
ISAKMP headers in racoon. |
| Alerts: |
|
Comments (none posted)
luxman: buffer overflow
| Package(s): | luxman |
CVE #(s): | CAN-2005-0385
|
| Created: | March 14, 2005 |
Updated: | March 16, 2005 |
| Description: |
Kevin Finisterre discovered a buffer overflow in luxman, an SVGA based
PacMan clone, that could lead to the execution of arbitrary commands
as root. |
| Alerts: |
|
Comments (none posted)
MySQL: input validation and temporary file vulnerabilities
| Package(s): | mysql |
CVE #(s): | CAN-2005-0709
CAN-2005-0710
CAN-2005-0711
|
| Created: | March 16, 2005 |
Updated: | July 19, 2005 |
| Description: |
MySQL (prior to version 4.0.24) suffers from two input validation errors and a temporary file vulnerability.
|
| Alerts: |
|
Comments (none posted)
openslp: buffer overflows
| Package(s): | openslp |
CVE #(s): | |
| Created: | March 14, 2005 |
Updated: | March 21, 2005 |
| Description: |
The SUSE Security Team reviewed critical parts of the OpenSLP package, an
open source implementation of the Service Location Protocol (SLP). During
the audit, various buffer overflows and out of bounds memory access have
been fixed which can be triggered by remote attackers by sending malformed
SLP packets. |
| Alerts: |
|
Comments (none posted)
Ringtone Tools: buffer overflow
| Package(s): | ringtonetools |
CVE #(s): | |
| Created: | March 15, 2005 |
Updated: | March 16, 2005 |
| Description: |
Qiao Zhang has discovered a buffer overflow vulnerability in the
'parse_emelody' function in 'parse_emelody.c'. A remote attacker could
entice a Ringtone Tools user to open a specially crafted eMelody file,
which would potentially lead to the execution of arbitrary code with the
rights of the user running the application. |
| Alerts: |
|
Comments (none posted)
sylpheed: buffer overflow
| Package(s): | sylpheed |
CVE #(s): | CAN-2005-0667
|
| Created: | March 15, 2005 |
Updated: | April 15, 2005 |
| Description: |
Buffer overflow in Sylpheed before 1.0.3 and other versions before 1.9.5
allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code via an e-mail message
with certain headers containing non-ASCII characters that are not properly
handled when the user replies to the message. |
| Alerts: |
|
Comments (none posted)
Updated vulnerabilities
a2ps: input validation error
| Package(s): | a2ps |
CVE #(s): | CAN-2004-1170
CAN-2004-1377
|
| Created: | November 26, 2004 |
Updated: | December 19, 2005 |
| Description: |
The GNU a2ps utility fails to properly sanitize filenames, which can be
abused by a malicious user to execute arbitrary commands with the
privileges of the user running the vulnerable application. More
information at Security
Focus. |
| Alerts: |
|
Comments (none posted)
abuse: several vulnerabilities
| Package(s): | abuse |
CVE #(s): | CAN-2005-0098
CAN-2005-0099
|
| Created: | March 7, 2005 |
Updated: | March 9, 2005 |
| Description: |
Several vulnerabilities have been discovered in abuse, the SDL port of
the Abuse action game. Erik Sjölund discovered several buffer overflows in
the command line handling, which could lead to the execution of arbitrary
code with elevated privileges since it is installed setuid root. Steve
Kemp discovered that that abuse creates some files without dropping
privileges first, which may lead to the creation and overwriting of
arbitrary files. |
| Alerts: |
|
Comments (none posted)
cpio - file permissions error
| Package(s): | cpio |
CVE #(s): | CAN-1999-1572
|
| Created: | February 2, 2005 |
Updated: | July 19, 2005 |
| Description: |
Some versions of cpio contain an ancient vulnerability where files created by that utility have overly generous access permissions. |
| Alerts: |
|
Comments (none posted)
cURL: buffer overflow
| Package(s): | curl |
CVE #(s): | CAN-2005-0490
|
| Created: | February 28, 2005 |
Updated: | July 19, 2005 |
| Description: |
Multiple stack-based buffer overflows in libcURL and cURL 7.12.1, and
possibly other versions, allow remote malicious web servers to execute
arbitrary code via base64 encoded replies that exceed the intended buffer
lengths when decoded. |
| Alerts: |
|
Comments (none posted)
cyrus-imapd: buffer overflows
| Package(s): | cyrus-imapd |
CVE #(s): | CAN-2005-0546
|
| Created: | February 23, 2005 |
Updated: | April 9, 2006 |
| Description: |
Cyrus-imapd, prior to version 2.2.12, contains several buffer overflows which could be exploited by an (authenticated) attacker to run code on the server system. |
| Alerts: |
|
Comments (none posted)
cyrus-sasl: remote buffer overflow
| Package(s): | cyrus-sasl |
CVE #(s): | CAN-2004-0884
|
| Created: | October 7, 2004 |
Updated: | March 16, 2005 |
| Description: |
cyrus-sasl has a vulnerability involving a buffer overflow
in the digestmda5.c file. A remote attacker may be able
to compromise the system. Also, a local user may be able to
exploit a vulnerability by using the SASL_PATH environment
variable. |
| Alerts: |
|
Comments (none posted)
KDE dcopidlng: insecure temporary file creation
| Package(s): | dcopidlng |
CVE #(s): | |
| Created: | March 7, 2005 |
Updated: | March 9, 2005 |
| Description: |
Davide Madrisan has discovered that the dcopidlng script creates temporary
files in a world-writable directory with predictable names. A local
attacker could create symbolic links in the temporary files directory,
pointing to a valid file somewhere on the filesystem. When dcopidlng is
executed, this would result in the file being overwritten with the rights
of the user running the utility, which could be the root user. |
| Alerts: |
|
Comments (none posted)
dhcp: format string vulnerability
| Package(s): | dhcp |
CVE #(s): | CAN-2004-1006
|
| Created: | November 4, 2004 |
Updated: | July 13, 2005 |
| Description: |
Dhcp has a format string vulnerability in the log functions of dhcp 2.x
that may be exploited via a malicious DNS server. |
| Alerts: |
|
Comments (none posted)
emacs21: format string vulnerability in "movemail"
| Package(s): | emacs21 |
CVE #(s): | CAN-2005-0100
|
| Created: | February 7, 2005 |
Updated: | May 15, 2006 |
| Description: |
Max Vozeler discovered a format string vulnerability in the "movemail"
utility of Emacs. By sending specially crafted packets, a malicious
POP3 server could cause a buffer overflow, which could be exploited to
execute arbitrary code with the privileges of the user and the "mail"
group. |
| Alerts: |
|
Comments (none posted)
enscript: arbitrary code execution
| Package(s): | enscript |
CVE #(s): | CAN-2004-1184
CAN-2004-1185
CAN-2004-1186
|
| Created: | January 21, 2005 |
Updated: | May 27, 2006 |
| Description: |
Erik Sjölund has discovered several security relevant problems in enscript,
a program to convert ASCII text into Postscript and other formats.
Unsanitized input can cause the execution of arbitrary commands via EPSF
pipe support. Due to missing sanitizing of filenames it is possible that a
specially crafted filename can cause arbitrary commands to be executed.
Multiple buffer overflows can cause the program to crash. |
| Alerts: |
|
Comments (none posted)
evolution: arbitrary code execution
| Package(s): | evolution |
CVE #(s): | CAN-2005-0102
|
| Created: | January 24, 2005 |
Updated: | May 19, 2005 |
| Description: |
Max Vozeler discovered an integer overflow in camel-lock-helper. A
user-supplied length value was not validated, so that a value of -1
caused a buffer allocation of 0 bytes; this buffer was then filled by
an arbitrary amount of user-supplied data. A local attacker or a malicious
POP3 server could exploit this to execute arbitrary code with root
privileges (because camel-lock-helper is installed as setuid root). |
| Alerts: |
|
Comments (1 posted)
f2c: insecure temp files
| Package(s): | f2c |
CVE #(s): | CAN-2005-0017
CAN-2005-0018
|
| Created: | January 27, 2005 |
Updated: | April 20, 2005 |
| Description: |
The f2c fortran to C translator has a vulnerability due to
insecure opening of temporary files. A local attacker can use this
to launch a symlink attack. |
| Alerts: |
|
Comments (none posted)
Foomatic: Arbitrary command execution in foomatic-rip
| Package(s): | foomatic |
CVE #(s): | CAN-2004-0801
|
| Created: | September 20, 2004 |
Updated: | May 31, 2006 |
| Description: |
There is a vulnerability in the foomatic-filters package. This
vulnerability is due to insufficient checking of command-line parameters
and environment variables in the foomatic-rip filter. This vulnerability
may allow both local and remote attackers to execute arbitrary commands on
the print server with the permissions of the spooler. |
| Alerts: |
|
Comments (none posted)
gaim: DoS issue in parsing malformed HTML
| Package(s): | gaim |
CVE #(s): | CAN-2005-0208
|
| Created: | February 25, 2005 |
Updated: | March 14, 2005 |
| Description: |
Gaim has a DoS issue in parsing malformed HTML, and a MSN related crash. |
| Alerts: |
|
Comments (none posted)
gaim: client freezes
| Package(s): | gaim |
CVE #(s): | CAN-2005-0472
CAN-2005-0473
|
| Created: | February 22, 2005 |
Updated: | April 27, 2005 |
| Description: |
The Gaim client freezes when receiving certain invalid messages and crashes
when receiving specific malformed HTML. See this Secunia Advisory for
additional information. |
| Alerts: |
|
Comments (none posted)
gettext: Insecure temporary file handling
| Package(s): | gettext |
CVE #(s): | CAN-2004-0966
|
| Created: | October 11, 2004 |
Updated: | March 1, 2006 |
| Description: |
gettext insecurely creates temporary files in world-writeable directories
with predictable names. A local attacker could create symbolic links in
the temporary files directory, pointing to a valid file somewhere on the
filesystem. When gettext is called, this would result in file access with
the rights of the user running the utility, which could be the root user. |
| Alerts: |
|
Comments (1 posted)
gftp: missing input sanitizing
| Package(s): | gftp |
CVE #(s): | CAN-2005-0372
CAN-2004-1376
|
| Created: | February 17, 2005 |
Updated: | July 13, 2005 |
| Description: |
gftp has a directory traversal vulnerability.
A remote server could use specially crafted filenames to overwrite
local files.
|
| Alerts: |
|
Comments (none posted)
ghostscript: symlink vulnerabilities
| Package(s): | ghostscript |
CVE #(s): | CAN-2004-0967
|
| Created: | October 20, 2004 |
Updated: | September 28, 2005 |
| Description: |
The ghostscript package (prior to version 7.07.1-r7) contains several scripts which are vulnerable to symlink attacks. |
| Alerts: |
|
Comments (none posted)
glibc: Information leak with LD_DEBUG
| Package(s): | glibc |
CVE #(s): | CAN-2004-1453
|
| Created: | August 17, 2004 |
Updated: | May 26, 2005 |
| Description: |
Silvio Cesare discovered a potential information leak in glibc. It allows
LD_DEBUG on SUID binaries where it should not be allowed. This has various
security implications, which may be used to gain confidential information.
An attacker can gain the list of symbols a SUID application uses and their
locations and can then use a trojaned library taking precedence over those
symbols to gain information or perform further exploitation. |
| Alerts: |
|
Comments (1 posted)
glibc: tempfile vulnerability in catchsegv script
| Package(s): | glibc |
CVE #(s): | CAN-2004-0968
|
| Created: | October 21, 2004 |
Updated: | November 14, 2005 |
| Description: |
The catchsegv script in the glibc package has a symlink vulnerability
that may allow a local user to overwrite arbitrary
files with the permissions of the user that is running the script. |
| Alerts: |
|
Comments (none posted)
groff: insecure temporary directory
| Package(s): | groff |
CVE #(s): | CAN-2004-0969
|
| Created: | November 1, 2004 |
Updated: | February 9, 2006 |
| Description: |
Recently, Trustix Secure Linux discovered a vulnerability in the groff
package. The utility "groffer" created a temporary directory in an
insecure way, which allowed exploitation of a race condition to create
or overwrite files with the privileges of the user invoking the
program. |
| Alerts: |
|
Comments (none posted)
gtkhtml: malformed messages cause crash
| Package(s): | gtkhtml |
CVE #(s): | CAN-2003-0133
CAN-2003-0541
|
| Created: | April 14, 2003 |
Updated: | April 18, 2005 |
| Description: |
GtkHTML is the HTML rendering widget used by the Evolution mail reader.
GtkHTML supplied with versions of Evolution prior to 1.2.4 contain a bug
when handling HTML messages. Alan Cox discovered that certain malformed
messages could cause the Evolution mail component to crash. |
| Alerts: |
|
Comments (none posted)
hashcash: format string vulnerability
| Package(s): | hashcash |
CVE #(s): | |
| Created: | March 7, 2005 |
Updated: | March 9, 2005 |
| Description: |
Tavis Ormandy of the Gentoo Linux Security Audit Team identified a flaw
in the Hashcash utility that an attacker could expose by specifying a
malformed reply address. Successful exploitation would permit an attacker
to disrupt Hashcash users, and potentially execute arbitrary code. |
| Alerts: |
|
Comments (none posted)
HelixPlayer: buffer overflows
| Package(s): | HelixPlayer |
CVE #(s): | CAN-2005-0455
CAN-2005-0611
|
| Created: | March 3, 2005 |
Updated: | March 9, 2005 |
| Description: |
The Helix Player 1.0 media player has two buffer overflows
that can be exploited by playing specially crafted
SMIL and WAV files. This can allow a remote attacker to
execute code with the user's permissions. |
| Alerts: |
|
Comments (none posted)
htdig: cross site scripting
| Package(s): | htdig |
CVE #(s): | CAN-2005-0085
|
| Created: | February 14, 2005 |
Updated: | January 10, 2006 |
| Description: |
Michael Krax discovered that ht://Dig fails to validate the 'config'
parameter before displaying an error message containing the parameter.
This flaw could allow an attacker to conduct cross-site scripting
attacks. |
| Alerts: |
|
Comments (none posted)
imagemagick: .psd image file decode vulnerability
| Package(s): | imagemagick |
CVE #(s): | CAN-2005-0005
|
| Created: | January 18, 2005 |
Updated: | March 23, 2005 |
| Description: |
According to this iDEFENSE advisory,
ImageMagick is vulnerable to a heap overflow when decoding .psd image
files. This could be remotely exploited allowing an attacker to execute
arbitrary code. |
| Alerts: |
|
Comments (1 posted)
imagemagick: format string vulnerability
| Package(s): | imagemagick |
CVE #(s): | CAN-2005-0397
|
| Created: | March 3, 2005 |
Updated: | April 4, 2005 |
| Description: |
The ImageMagick file
name handling code has a format string vulnerability.
Specially crafted file names can be used to crash ImageMagick
and possibly execute arbitrary code. |
| Alerts: |
|
Comments (none posted)
imap: buffer overflow in c-client
| Package(s): | imap |
CVE #(s): | CAN-2003-0297
|
| Created: | February 18, 2005 |
Updated: | April 9, 2006 |
| Description: |
A buffer overflow flaw was found in the c-client IMAP client. An attacker
could create a malicious IMAP server that if connected to by a victim could
execute arbitrary code on the client machine. |
| Alerts: |
|
Comments (none posted)
imlib2: buffer overflows
| Package(s): | imlib2 |
CVE #(s): | CAN-2004-0802
CAN-2004-0817
|
| Created: | September 8, 2004 |
Updated: | October 26, 2005 |
| Description: |
The imlib2 library contains buffer overflows in the BMP handling code. |
| Alerts: |
|
Comments (none posted)
kdelibs: unsanitzied input
| Package(s): | kdelibs |
CVE #(s): | CAN-2004-1165
|
| Created: | January 10, 2005 |
Updated: | July 19, 2005 |
| Description: |
Thiago Macieira discovered a vulnerability in the kioslave library,
which is part of kdelibs, which allows a remote attacker to execute
arbitrary FTP commands via an ftp:// URL that contains an URL-encoded
newline before the FTP command. |
| Alerts: |
|
Comments (none posted)
kdenetwork: file descriptor leak
| Package(s): | kdenetwork |
CVE #(s): | CAN-2005-0205
|
| Created: | March 3, 2005 |
Updated: | March 16, 2005 |
| Description: |
The kdenetwork networking applications package has a bug
with the handling of privileged file descriptors in kppp.
A local user can use this to modify the /etc/hosts
and /etc/resolv.conf files, allowing them to
spoof domain information. |
| Alerts: |
|
Comments (none posted)
less: heap based buffer overflow
| Package(s): | less |
CVE #(s): | CAN-2005-0086
|
| Created: | March 8, 2005 |
Updated: | March 9, 2005 |
| Description: |
Victor Ashik discovered a heap based buffer overflow in less, caused by
a patch added to the less package in Red Hat Linux 9. An attacker could
construct a carefully crafted file that could cause less to crash or
possibly execute arbitrary code when opened. |
| Alerts: |
|
Comments (none posted)
libdbi-perl: insecure temporary file
| Package(s): | libdbi-perl |
CVE #(s): | CAN-2005-0077
|
| Created: | January 25, 2005 |
Updated: | March 2, 2006 |
| Description: |
Javier Fernández-Sanguino Peña from the Debian Security Audit Project
discovered that the DBI library, the Perl5 database interface, creates
a temporary PID file in an insecure manner. This can be exploited by a
malicious user to overwrite arbitrary files owned by the person
executing the parts of the library. |
| Alerts: |
|
Comments (none posted)
libexif: improper validation
| Package(s): | libexif |
CVE #(s): | CAN-2005-0664
|
| Created: | March 7, 2005 |
Updated: | April 15, 2005 |
| Description: |
Sylvain Defresne discovered that the EXIF library did not properly
validate the structure of the EXIF tags. By tricking a user to load an
image with a malicious EXIF tag, an attacker could exploit this to
crash the process using the library, or even execute arbitrary code
with the privileges of the process. |
| Alerts: |
|
Comments (none posted)
libgd2: buffer overflows in PNG handling
| Package(s): | libgd2 |
CVE #(s): | CAN-2004-0990
CAN-2004-0941
|
| Created: | October 29, 2004 |
Updated: | June 28, 2006 |
| Description: |
Several buffer overflows have been discovered in libgd's PNG handling
functions.
If an attacker tricked a user into loading a malicious PNG image, they
could leverage this into executing arbitrary code in the context of
the user opening image. Most importantly, this library is commonly
used in PHP. One possible target would be a PHP driven photo website
that lets users upload images. Therefore this vulnerability might lead
to privilege escalation to a web server's privileges.
Multiple buffer overflows in the gd graphics library (libgd) 2.0.21 and
earlier may allow remote attackers to execute arbitrary code via malformed
image files that trigger the overflows due to improper calls to the
gdMalloc function. |
| Alerts: |
|
Comments (none posted)
libtiff: buffer overflow
| Package(s): | libtiff |
CVE #(s): | CAN-2004-1308
|
| Created: | December 22, 2004 |
Updated: | May 19, 2005 |
| Description: |
The libtiff image manipulation library contains several exploitable buffer overflows. |
| Alerts: |
|
Comments (none posted)
libXpm: new buffer overflows
| Package(s): | libXpm |
CVE #(s): | CAN-2005-0605
|
| Created: | March 4, 2005 |
Updated: | March 8, 2006 |
| Description: |
A new vulnerability has been discovered in libXpm, which is included in
OpenMotif and LessTif, that can potentially lead to remote code
execution. |
| Alerts: |
|
Comments (none posted)
linux-source-2.6.8.1: multiple vulnerabilities