Posted Nov 26, 2004 5:55 UTC (Fri) by spender
In reply to: Civilizing SELinux
Parent article: Civilizing SELinux
Again, the same old "granularity = security" argument, which is basically the only position SELinux users can have. As we all know, inserting data into message queues (a HUGE attack vector, from all the evidence I've seen on the Internet) is much more important than preventing kernel exploits. Clearly, the best security solution is one that focuses on these WIDELY used attack vectors like using gettimeofday() and semaphores, and ignores things like kernel exploits, keeping X from writing outside of necessary regions in /dev/mem, preventing arbitrary data writes to /etc/shadow, etc.
Nothing keeps someone from running PaX with SELinux indeed, but that doesn't mean SELinux does the things PaX needs to be used in production. SELinux does none of this other than using the PaX MAC hooks. So sure, someone can use PaX with SELinux, and they'll have a system wherein PaX can be easily bypassed, almost as bad as Exec-Shield.
I don't think you understand at all the userbase you're trying to force SELinux upon (I can tell you, they don't even know what IPC stands for, let alone know what its security implications are), and that is why SELinux will never be sucessful, no matter how much hype you continue to generate about it.
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