September CRYPTO-GRAM newsletter

                  CRYPTO-GRAM

               September 15, 2004

               by Bruce Schneier
                Founder and CTO
       Counterpane Internet Security, Inc.
            schneier@counterpane.com
            <http://www.schneier.com>>
           <http://www.counterpane.com>>


A free monthly newsletter providing summaries, analyses, insights, and 
commentaries on security: computer and otherwise.

Back issues are available at 
<http://www.schneier.com/crypto-gram.html>>.  To subscribe, visit 
<http://www.schneier.com/crypto-gram.html>> or send a blank message to 
crypto-gram-subscribe@chaparraltree.com.

Crypto-Gram also has an RSS feed at 
<http://www.schneier.com/crypto-gram-rss.xml>>.

Or you can read it on the web at 
<http://www.schneier.com/crypto-gram-0409.html>>.


** *** ***** ******* *********** *************

In this issue:
      Beyond Fear: First Anniversary
      Security at the Olympics
      Cryptanalysis of MD5 and SHA
      Crypto-Gram Reprints
      Trusted Traveler Program
      Security Notes from All Over: Museum Security
      News
      Counterpane News
      Finnish Mobile Phone Spoofing
      No-Fly List
      Comments from Readers


** *** ***** ******* *********** *************

         Beyond Fear: First Anniversary



My latest book, Beyond Fear, is one year old this month.

I wrote it to explain how security works.  The idea was to take the 
methodical approach to security that was developed in the computer 
domain and apply it to the rest of security: personal, corporate, 
national.  In the book I talk about viewing security as a system, and 
all that implies.  I talk about the notion of a weakest link, and what 
that means for security effectiveness.  I talk about different security 
strategies -- barriers, authentication, compartmentalization, trusted 
people, counterattack -- that have been developed over the millennia, 
and how they can be applied to today's security problems.

I have a lot to say about national security and terrorism -- concepts 
and analyses that attempt to inject some sense in what has become an 
overly political debate.

The book was successful, but it never broke into the 
mainstream.  Reviews, even reviews in non-computer publications, were 
uniformly positive, but I never got reviewed by the major newspapers 
and magazines.  And without reviews like that, people who didn't 
already know my work never found out about the book.

Even today, I'm still seeing reviews.  The "New York Law Journal" (Aug 
17, 2004) published a glowing review.  So did a publication called 
"Knowledge, Technology, and Policy" (Winter 2004).  These are hardly 
niche computer publications, and illustrate that my goals in writing 
the book were successful.  I wanted to write a book that the average 
person could read, enjoy, and learn from.  Whenever I hear from one of 
those people after they've read the book, it's clear that I was successful.

Lately, I've taken to handing the book to seatmates on airplanes.  What 
I find is that people who start reading the book are hooked, and more 
often than not ask to buy it from me then and there.

Book publishing is an odd business.  More and more books are being 
published, but publishers concentrate most of their resources on the 
next bestseller.  Bookstores, too, primarily sell new and popular 
books.  What that means is that even good steady sellers like "Beyond 
Fear" only stay in bookstores for a few months, and they rarely make it 
to the tables and racks up front where people browsing might see them.

At this point, "Beyond Fear" can only be found in larger bookstores, 
and even there it'll be buried in the back somewhere.  As much as I 
want people to support local bookstores, the cheapest and easiest way 
to buy the book is on the Internet.  List price is $25, but you can 
find it cheaper.  (Normally I would recommend Amazon, but Overstock.com 
has the book for $16 including shipping.)

The publisher has no plans to do a paperback edition of the book.  Nor 
are there any plans to turn it into an e-book.  They will continue to 
reprint it, as long as people continue to buy it.

For those of you who have already bought it, consider lending it to a 
friend.


Book's homepage, including links to reviews:
<http://www.schneier.com/book-beyondfear.html>>

Buy the book on Overstock.com:
<http://www.overstock.com/cgi-bin/d2.cgi?cid=17436&PAG... 
894362&fp=F&siteID=oP5Nuw5q6fc-uG_3mP9kFSihDeuPR0RQZg> or 
<http://makeashorterlink.com/?J3C613849>>

Buy the book on Amazon:
<http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/ASIN/0387026207/counter... 
85-2471935> or <http://makeashorterlink.com/?B2D612849>>


** *** ***** ******* *********** *************

            Security at the Olympics



If you watched the Olympic games on television, you saw the 
unprecedented security surrounding the 2004 Olympics.  You saw shots of 
guards and soldiers, and gunboats and frogmen patrolling the 
harbors.  But there was a lot more security behind the scenes.  Olympic 
press materials state that there was a system of 1,250 infrared and 
high-resolution surveillance cameras mounted on concrete 
poles.  Additional surveillance data was collected from sensors on 12 
patrol boats, 4000 vehicles, 9 helicopters, 4 mobile command centers, 
and a blimp.  It wasn't only images; microphones collected 
conversations, speech-recognition software converted them to text, and 
then sophisticated pattern-matching software looked for suspicious 
patterns.  70,000 people were involved in Olympic security, about seven 
per athlete or one for every 76 spectators.

The Greek government reportedly spent $1.5 billion on security during 
the Olympics.  But aside from the impressive-looking guards and 
statistics, was the money well-spent?  In many ways, Olympic security 
is a harbinger of what life could be like in the U.S.  If the Olympics 
are going to be a security test bed, it's worth exploring how well the 
security actually worked.

Unfortunately, that's not easy to do.  We have press materials, but the 
security details remain secret.  We know, for example, that SAIC 
developed the massive electronic surveillance system, but we have to 
take their word for it that it actually works.  Now SAIC is no slouch; 
they were one of the contractors that built the NSA's ECHELON 
electronics eavesdropping system, and presumably have some tricks up 
their sleeves.  But how well does it detect suspicious conversations or 
objects, and how often does it produce false alarms?  We have no idea.

But while we can't examine the inner workings of Olympic security, we 
do have some glimpses of security in action.

A reporter from the Sunday Mirror, a newspaper in Britain, reported all 
sorts of problems with security.  First, he got a job as a driver with 
a British contractor.  He provided no references, underwent no formal 
interview or background check, and was immediately given access to the 
main stadium.  He found that his van was never thoroughly searched, and 
that he could have brought in anything.  He was able to plant three 
packages that were designed to look like bombs, all of which went 
undetected during security sweeps.  He was able to get within 60 feet 
of dozens of heads of state during the opening ceremonies.

In a separate incident, a man wearing a tutu and clown shoes managed to 
climb a diving platform, dive into the water, and swim around for 
several minutes before officials pulled him out.  He claimed that he 
wanted to send a message to his wife, but the name of an online 
gambling website printed on his chest implied a more commercial motive.

And on the last day of the Olympics, a Brazilian runner who was leading 
the men's marathon, with only a few miles to go, was shoved off the 
course into the crowd by a costumed intruder from Ireland.  He ended up 
coming in third; his lead was narrowing before the incident, but it's 
impossible to tell how much it might have cost him.

These three incidents are anecdotal, but they illustrate an important 
point about security at this kind of event: it's pretty much impossible 
to stop a lone operator intent on making mischief.  It doesn't matter 
how many cameras and listening devices you've installed.  It doesn't 
matter how many badge checkers and gun-toting security personnel you've 
hired.  It doesn't matter how many billions of dollars you've spent.

A lone gunman or a lone bomber can always find a crowd of people.

This is not to say that guards and cameras are useless, only that they 
have their limits.  Money spent on them rapidly reaches the point of 
diminishing returns, and after that more is just wasteful.

Far more effective would have been to spend most of that $1.5 billion 
on intelligence and on emergency response.  Intelligence is an 
invaluable tool against terrorism, and it works regardless of what the 
terrorists are plotting - even if the plots have nothing to do with the 
Olympics.  Emergency response preparedness is no less valuable, and it 
too works regardless of what terrorists manage to pull off--before, 
during, or after the Olympics.

No major security incidents happened this year at the Olympics  As a 
result, major security contractors will tout that result as proof that 
$1.5 billion was well-spent on security.  What it really shows is how 
quickly $1.5 billion can be wasted on security.  Now that the Olympics 
are over and everyone has gone home, the world will be no safer for 
spending all the money.  That's a shame, because that $1.5 billion 
could have bought the world a lot of security if spent properly.


News articles:
<http://www.cnn.com/2004/TECH/08/10/olympics.security.ap/i...>
<http://www.elecdesign.com/Articles/ArticleID/8484/8484.html>>
<http://cryptome.org/nyt-athens.htm>>
<http://www.smh.com.au/olympics/articles/2004/07/27/109069...>
<http://www.news24.com/News24/Olympics2004/OutsideTrack/0,... 
574262,00.html> or <http://makeashorterlink.com/?V1E651849>>

A version of this essay originally appeared in the Sydney Morning 
Herald, during the Olympics:
<http://smh.com.au/articles/2004/08/25/1093246605489.html>>


** *** ***** ******* *********** *************

          Cryptanalysis of MD5 and SHA



At the CRYPTO conference in Santa Barbara, CA, last month, researchers 
announced several weaknesses in common hash functions.  These results, 
while mathematically significant, aren't cause for alarm.  But even so, 
it's probably time for the cryptography community to get together and 
create a new hash standard.

One-way hash functions are a cryptographic construct used in many 
applications.  They are used in conjunction with public-key algorithms 
for both encryption and digital signatures.  They are used in integrity 
checking.  They are used in authentication.  They have all sorts of 
applications in a great many different protocols.  Much more than 
encryption algorithms, one-way hash functions are the workhorses of 
modern cryptography.

In 1990, Ron Rivest invented the hash function MD4.  In 1992, he 
improved on MD4 and developed another hash function: MD5.  In 1993, the 
National Security Agency published a hash function very similar to MD5, 
called SHA (Secure Hash Algorithm).  Then, in 1995, citing a newly 
discovered weakness that it refused to elaborate on, the NSA made a 
change to SHA.  The new algorithm was called SHA-1.  Today, the most 
popular hash function is SHA-1, with MD5 still being used in older 
applications.

One-way hash functions are supposed to have two properties.  One, 
they're one way.  This means that it is easy to take a message and 
compute the hash value, but it's impossible to take a hash value and 
recreate the original message.   (By "impossible" I mean "can't be done 
in any reasonable amount of time.")  Two, they're collision free.  This 
means that it is impossible to find two messages that hash to the same 
hash value.  The cryptographic reasoning behind these two properties is 
subtle, and I invite curious readers to learn more in my book "Applied 
Cryptography."

Breaking a hash function means showing that either -- or both -- of 
those properties are not true.  Cryptanalysis of the MD4 family of hash 
functions has proceeded in fits and starts over the last decade or so, 
with results against simplified versions of the algorithms and partial 
results against the whole algorithms.  This year, Eli Biham and Rafi 
Chen, and separately Antoine Joux, announced some pretty impressive 
cryptographic results against MD5 and SHA.  Collisions have been 
demonstrated in SHA.  And there are rumors, unconfirmed at this 
writing, of results against SHA-1.

The magnitude of these results depends on who you are.  If you're a 
cryptographer, this is a huge deal.  While not revolutionary, these 
results are substantial advances in the field.  The techniques 
described by the researchers are likely to have other applications, and 
we'll be better able to design secure systems as a result.  This is how 
the science of cryptography advances: we learn how to design new 
algorithms by breaking other algorithms.  Additionally, algorithms from 
the NSA are considered a sort of alien technology: they come from a 
superior race with no explanations.  Any successful cryptanalysis 
against an NSA algorithm is an interesting data point in the eternal 
question of how good they really are in there.

To a user of cryptographic systems -- as I assume most readers are -- 
this news is important, but not particularly worrisome.  MD5 and SHA 
aren't suddenly insecure.  No one is going to be breaking digital 
signatures or reading encrypted messages anytime soon with these 
techniques.  The electronic world is no less secure after these 
announcements than it was before.

But there's an old saying inside the NSA: "Attacks always get better; 
they never get worse."  These techniques will continue to improve, and 
probably someday there will be practical attacks based on these techniques.

It's time for us all to migrate away from SHA-1.

Luckily, there are alternatives.  The National Institute of Standards 
and Technology already has standards for longer -- and harder to break 
-- hash functions:  SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384, and SHA-512.  They're 
already government standards, and can already be used.  This is a good 
stopgap, but I'd like to see more.

I'd like to see NIST orchestrate a worldwide competition for a new hash 
function, like they did for the new encryption algorithm, AES, to 
replace DES.  NIST should issue a call for algorithms, and conduct a 
series of analysis rounds, where the community analyzes the various 
proposals with the intent of establishing a new standard.

Most of the hash functions we have, and all the ones in widespread use, 
are based on the general principles of MD4.  Clearly we've learned a 
lot about hash functions in the past decade, and I think we can start 
applying that knowledge to create something even more secure.

Better to do it now, when there's no reason to panic, than years from 
now, when there might be.


<http://news.com.com/Crypto+researchers+abuzz+over+flaws/2... 
3655.html> or <http://makeashorterlink.com/?Z3F612849>>
<http://www.freedom-to-tinker.com/archives/000661.html>>
<http://www.mail-archive.com/cryptography%40metzdowd.com/m...> 
or <http://makeashorterlink.com/?Q20743849>>

Technical information:
<http://www.cs.technion.ac.il/users/wwwb/cgi-bin/tr-get.cg... 
004-09.ps.gz> or <http://makeashorterlink.com/?O11735849>>
<http://www.cs.technion.ac.il/~biham/Reports/Slides/invite... 
4.ps.gz> or <http://makeashorterlink.com/?T23731849>>

NIST's SHA site:
<http://csrc.nist.gov/CryptoToolkit/tkhash.html>>

This essay originally appeared in Computerworld:
<http://www.computerworld.com/printthis/2004/0,4814,95343,...>


** *** ***** ******* *********** *************

              Crypto-Gram Reprints



Crypto-Gram is currently in its seventh year of publication.  Back 
issues cover a variety of security-related topics, and can all be found 
on <http://www.schneier.com/crypto-gram.html>>.  These are a selection 
of articles that appeared in this calendar month in other years.

Accidents and security incidents:
<http://www.schneier.com/crypto-gram-0309.html#1>>

Benevolent worms:
<http://www.schneier.com/crypto-gram-0309.html#8>>

Special issue on 9/11, including articles on airport security, 
biometrics, cryptography, steganography, intelligence failures, and 
protecting liberty:
<http://www.schneier.com/crypto-gram-0109a.html>>

Full Disclosure and the Window of Exposure:
<http://www.schneier.com/crypto-gram-0009.html#1>>

Open Source and Security:
<http://www.schneier.com/crypto-gram-9909.html#OpenSourcea...> 
or <http://makeashorterlink.com/?U25716849>>

Factoring a 512-bit Number:
<http://www.schneier.com/crypto-gram-9909.html#Factoringa5...> 
or <http://makeashorterlink.com/?J17752849>>


** *** ***** ******* *********** *************

            Trusted Traveler Program



If you fly out of Logan Airport and don't want to take off your shoes 
for the security screeners and get your bags opened up, pay 
attention.  The U.S. government is testing its "Trusted Traveler" 
program, and Logan is the fourth test airport.  Currently only American 
Airlines frequent fliers are eligible, but if all goes well the program 
will be opened up to more people and more airports.

Participants provide their name, address, phone number, and birth date, 
a set of fingerprints, and a retinal scan.  That information is matched 
against law enforcement and intelligence databases.  If the applicant 
is not on any terrorist watch list, and is otherwise an upstanding 
citizen, he gets a card that allows him access to a special security 
lane.  The lane doesn't bypass the metal detector or X-ray machine for 
carry-on bags, but avoids more intensive secondary screening unless 
there's an alarm of some kind.

Unfortunately, this program won't make us more secure.  Some terrorists 
will be able to get Trusted Traveler cards, and they'll know in advance 
that they'll be subjected to less-stringent security.

Since 9/11, airport security has been subjecting people to special 
screening: sometimes randomly, and sometimes based on profile criteria 
as analyzed by computer.  For example, people who buy one-way tickets, 
or pay with cash, are more likely to be flagged for this extra screening.

Sometimes the results are bizarre.  Screeners have searched children 
and people in wheelchairs.  In 2002, Al Gore was randomly stopped and 
searched twice in one week.  And just last month, Senator Ted Kennedy 
was flagged - and denied boarding - because the computer decided he was 
on some "no fly" list.

Why waste precious time making Grandma Lillie from Worchester empty her 
purse, when you can search the carry-on items of Anwar, a 
twenty-six-year-old who arrived last month from Egypt and is traveling 
without luggage?

The reason is security.  Imagine you're a terrorist plotter with half a 
dozen potential terrorists at your disposal.  They all apply for a 
card, and three get one.  Guess which three are going on the 
mission?  And they'll buy round-trip tickets with credit cards, and 
have a "normal" amount of luggage with them.

What the Trusted Traveler program does is create two different access 
paths into the airport: high security and low security.  The intent is 
that only good guys will take the low-security path, and the bad guys 
will be forced to take the high-security path, but it rarely works out 
that way.  You have to assume that the bad guys will find a way to take 
the low-security path.

The Trusted Traveler program is based on the dangerous myth that 
terrorists match a particular profile, and that we can somehow pick 
terrorists out of a crowd if we only can identify everyone.  That's 
simply not true.  Most of the 9/11 terrorists were unknown, and not on 
any watch list.  Timothy McVeigh was an upstanding U.S. citizen before 
he blew up the Oklahoma City Federal Building.  Palestinian suicide 
bombers in Israel are normal, nondescript people.  Intelligence reports 
indicate that al Qaeda is recruiting non-Arab terrorists for U.S. 
operations.  Airport security is best served by intelligent guards 
watching for suspicious behavior, and not dumb guards blindly following 
the results of a Trusted Traveler program.

Moreover, there's no need for the program.  Frequent fliers and 
first-class travelers already have access to special lanes that bypass 
long lines at security checkpoints, and the computers never seem to 
flag them for special screening.  And even the long lines aren't very 
long.  I've flown out of Logan repeatedly, and I've never had to wait 
more than ten minutes at security.  The people who could use the card 
don't need one, and infrequent travelers are unlikely to take the 
trouble -- or pay the fee -- to get one.

As counterintuitive as it may seem, it's smarter security to randomly 
screen people than it is to screen solely based on profile.  And it's 
smarter still to do a little bit of both: random screening and 
profile-based screening.  But to create a low-security path, one that 
guarantees someone on it less rigorous screening, is to invite the bad 
guys to use that path.


This essay originally appeared in the Boston Globe:
<http://www.boston.com/news/globe/editorial_opinion/oped/a... 
8/24/an_easy_path_for_terrorists/> or 
<http://makeashorterlink.com/?E2E224939>>


** *** ***** ******* *********** *************

     Security Notes from All Over: Museum Security



The theft of the Munch paintings from the Munch Museum in Oslo 
illustrates an interesting point: the conflicting requirements of 
security and public access for famous works of art are simply 
incompatible.  The level of security that the Smithsonian gives the 
Hope Diamond just doesn't scale, and most museums don't have the budget 
to even come close.

It's an interesting security problem.  Museum items, especially fine 
art, are incredibly valuable.  Lesser museum works have less value, but 
are easily resold.  (Think of all the Mesopotamian artifacts that were 
looted from Iraqi museums after the U.S. invaded.)  But more valuable 
items, especially fine art, is immediately recognizable and hence much 
less valuable when stolen.  It takes a very special kind of art 
collector to want a work that he can never display publicly.

Museum items can also be stolen and held for ransom, or defaced as an 
act of protest.

What this means is that works of art need to be secured in 
museums.  But most museums can't afford the level of security that 
these works of art require.  (Even insurance is often beyond a museum's 
budget.)  And the items need to be available to the public, which makes 
security even harder.

The choice seems to be good door locks and building alarms, and 
sometimes 24-hour guards.  This works most of the time, but 
occasionally there are some spectacular security failures.

And even worse, the prevalence of good after-hours museum security 
means that thieves are more likely to turn to more violent "crash and 
grab" means of theft.


<http://abcnews.go.com/wire/Entertainment/ap20040823_1236....>
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/3588282.stm>>


** *** ***** ******* *********** *************

                      News



Links about turning cell phones into listening devices:
<http://www.netline.co.il/CAA_product.htm>>
<http://www.advanced-intelligence.com/audio.html?1586>>
<http://seclists.org/lists/politech/2002/May/0087.html>>
<http://www.endoacustica.com/spy_telephone.htm>>
<http://www.spyshop.co.uk/basket/page08.htm>>

Phones that go to "ghost" mode:
<http://www.endoacustica.com/spy_telephone.htm>>
<http://www.gsmspy.com/>>

Turn this phone's ringer to silent, and you have a listening device 
with no modification:
<http://www.sanyo.com/wireless/handsets/downloads/PCS-4700...> 
or <http://makeashorterlink.com/?Z3A712849>>

Last month I mentioned this encrypted external drive, and wondered why 
decent key lengths weren't available.  Either I missed them when I 
looked at the site, or they've recently added them.  But they come in 
40-bit and 64-bit DES encryption, 128-bit triple DES encryption, and 
128-bit and 192-bit AES encryption.  Looks like a really neat product.
<http://www.ciphershield.com>>

Fascinating account of the uses, and limits, of interrogation:
<http://www.cia.gov/csi/studies/vol48no1/article06.html>>

Looks like ALL users of Windows XP will be able to download the install 
the SP2 upgrade, whether they have a legal copy or not.  This is 
excellent news for Internet security:
<http://finance.lycos.com/home/news/story.asp?story=42933801>>

Another airport false alarm:
<http://www.placidaudio.com/dfwshutdown.html>>

An analysis of port knocking:
<http://software.newsforge.com/software/04/08/02/1954253.s...>

Good article on cyberinsurance
<http://infosecuritymag.techtarget.com/ss/0,295796,sid6_is... 
.html> or <http://makeashorterlink.com/?S1C721849>>

Fascinating, and long, FBI document about concealed weapons.  Includes 
photographs and X-ray images:
<http://datacenter.ap.org/wdc/fbiweapons.pdf>>

Security discussion of supermarket self-checkout technology:
<http://www.eweek.com/article2/0,1759,1632986,00.asp>>

A Canada Revenue Agency (the branch of government that deals with 
taxes) employee wanted to fight a speeding ticket.  So he served the 
police officer who gave him the ticket with a phony tax audit 
notice.  The speeding ticket case was scheduled to be heard on the same 
day as the officer was supposed to appear for the tax audit.
<http://www.thestar.com/NASApp/cs/ContentServer?pagename=t... 
Article_Type1&c=Article&cid=1092694223071&call_pageid=968332188492&col=9 
68793972154> or <http://makeashorterlink.com/?D2D721849>>

Authentication vulnerabilities in the U.S. Emergency Alert System:
<http://www.securityfocus.com/news/9324>>

The Federal Reserve is going to be moving money over the Internet.  Yikes!
<http://www.nypost.com/business/18671.htm>>

The average time before an unpatched PC on the Internet is successfully 
attacked is 20 minutes.  As the article points out, that's not even 
long enough to download the patches you need to be secure.
<http://news.com.com/Study%3A+Unpatched+PCs+compromised+in... 
00-7349_3-5313402.html> or <http://makeashorterlink.com/?G6E722849>>
<http://www.gcn.com/vol1_no1/daily-updates/26967-1.html>>

Interview with the author of the Netsky and Sasser worms:
<http://reviews-zdnet.com.com/AnchorDesk/4520-7297_16-5501...>

There's a Chinese worm that attempts to steal exams, presumably because 
there's a black market in their sale:
<http://www.theregister.co.uk/2004/08/26/exam_virus/>>

Is encryption doomed?  Despite the sensational title of this article, 
it's not.  Don't expect this kind of thing to matter anytime soon.
<http://www.technologyreview.com/articles/04/09/wo_garfink...> 
or <http://makeashorterlink.com/?A50823849>>

Long and interesting review of Windows XP SP2, including a list of 
missed opportunities for increased security.  Worth reading:
<http://www.theregister.co.uk/2004/09/02/winxpsp2_security...>
Extensive comments are here:
<http://it.slashdot.org/it/04/09/03/1842252.shtml?tid=201&...>

Fascinating article on counterfeiting in Canada:
<http://www.canadianbusiness.com/features/article.jsp?cont... 
1496_61496#> or <http://makeashorterlink.com/?M22832849>>

Another "free information is more secure than secret information" 
story.  A science panel concludes that the value of freely sharing data 
on dangerous germs so vaccines and treatments can be developed 
outweighs the danger that bioterrorists may use the information to do harm.
<http://www.cnn.com/2004/HEALTH/09/09/bioterrorism.opennes... 
l> or <http://makeashorterlink.com/?K43835849>>

A model for disclosure and security:
<http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=531782>>

Interesting links between malware writers and organized crime:
<http://www.computerworld.com/securitytopics/security/stor... 
1,00.html> or <http://makeashorterlink.com/?F25852849>>

Nice essay on the difficulty, and importance, of erasing computer 
information:
<http://www.computerworld.com/securitytopics/security/stor... 
8,00.html> or <http://makeashorterlink.com/?K36822849>>

A website offers Caller ID falsification service:
<http://www.securityfocus.com/news/9419>>

A virus has penetrated a classified, completely separate, 
Internet-compatible network called SIPRNET.  How did the virus jump the 
air gap?  The article doesn't say. Why did the computers get 
infected?  They didn't have any antivirus protection.  Moral: even if 
your computer is not connected to the Internet, you still need to think 
about Internet security:
<http://www.fcw.com/fcw/articles/2004/0830/web-siprnet-08-...> or 
<http://makeashorterlink.com/?V27822849>>


** *** ***** ******* *********** *************

                Counterpane News



Bruce Schneier is hosting a series of roundtable events, discussing 
security concerns with CIOs and CISOs.  If you would like to receive an 
invitation to one of these events, please contact Teresa Buchholz at 
info@counterpane.com.  Locations I'll be visiting between now and the 
end of this year include New York, Washington DC, Houston, Dallas, San 
Francisco, and LA.

Schneier has been interviewed:
<http://www.neowin.net/articles.php?action=more&id=95>>
<http://www.washingtontechnology.com/news/19_11/last-byte/...> 
or <http://makeashorterlink.com/?M28811849>>
<http://www.cioupdate.com/trends/article.php/3406571>>

Schneier has written an article on "benevolent worms" for CSO Online:
<http://www.csoonline.com/online/083004_schneier.html>>

Schneier has written an article on DES for eWeek:
<http://www.eweek.com/article2/0,1759,1639918,00.asp>>


** *** ***** ******* *********** *************

          Finnish Mobile Phone Spoofing



An alert reader wrote to me about an interesting spoofing attack.  He 
demonstrated that it works in Finland with Nokia mobile phones; it may 
work elsewhere.

For an unimportant reason, this person ended up with two identical 
phone numbers with different prefixes: 040 1234567 and 050 1234567.  He 
was able to do this because the second operator -- with the second 
prefix -- allowed him to choose a number.

What he noticed is that if someone has one -- but not both -- of those 
phone numbers in his address book, and he calls that person from the 
other number, the Caller ID function of the phone correctly identifies 
him anyway.  This also works for text messages.

It turns out that mobile phones do not check the *whole* number when 
matching identities in the address book.

This suggests a very simple identity spoofing attack: attacker signs up 
for a mobile phone account with a different prefix than his victim, but 
chooses the number to be the same.  Attacker can then call and send 
text messages to contacts of the victim, and the recipients will 
believe that he is in fact the victim.

Fascinating.


** *** ***** ******* *********** *************

                   No-Fly List



Imagine a list of suspected terrorists so dangerous that we can't ever 
let them fly, yet so innocent that we can't arrest them -- even under 
the draconian provisions of the Patriot Act.

This is the federal government's "No Fly" list.  First circulated in 
the weeks after 9/11 as a counterterrorist tool, its details are 
shrouded in secrecy.  But because the list is filled with inaccuracies 
and ambiguities, thousands of innocent, law-abiding Americans have been 
subjected to lengthy interrogations and invasive searches every time 
they fly, and sometimes forbidden to board airplanes.  It also has been 
a complete failure,  and has not been responsible for a single 
terrorist arrest anywhere.

Instead, the list has snared Asif Iqbal, a Rochester, NY businessman 
who shares a name with a suspected terrorist currently in custody in 
Guantanamo.  It's snared a 71-year-old retired English teacher.  A man 
with a top-secret government clearance.  A woman whose name is similar 
to that of an Australian man 20 years younger.  Anyone with the name 
David Nelson is on the list.  And recently it snared Senator Ted 
Kennedy, who had the unfortunate luck to share a name with "T Kennedy," 
an alias once used by a person someone decided should be on the list.

There is no recourse for those on the list, and their stories quickly 
take on a Kafkaesque tone.  People can be put on the list for any 
reason; no standards exist.  There's no ability to review any evidence 
against you, or even confirm that you are actually on the list.  And 
for most people, there's no way to get off the list or to "prove" once 
and for all that they're not whoever the list is really looking 
for.  It took Senator Kennedy three weeks to get his name off the 
list.  People without his political pull have spent years futilely 
trying to clear their names.

There's something distinctly un-American about a secret government 
blacklist, with no right of appeal or judicial review.  Even worse, 
there's evidence that it's being used as a political harassment tool: 
environmental activists, peace protestors, and anti-free-trade 
activists have all found themselves on the list.

But security is always a trade-off, and some might make the reasonable 
argument that these kinds of civil liberty abuses are required if we 
are to successfully fight terrorism in our country.  The problem is 
that the no-fly list doesn't protect us from terrorism.

It's not just that terrorists are not stupid enough to fly under 
recognized names.  It's that the very problems with the list that make 
it such an affront to civil liberties also make it less effective as a 
counterterrorist tool.

Any watch list where it's easy to put names on and difficult to take 
names off will quickly fill with false positives.  These false 
positives eventually overwhelm any real information on the list, and 
soon the list does no more than flag innocents -- which is what we see 
happening today, and why the list hasn't resulted in any arrests.

A quick search through an Internet phone book shows 3,400 listings for 
"T Kennedy" in the United States.  Since many couples only have one 
phone book entry, many T Kennedy's are unlisted spouses -- that 
translates to about 5,000 people total.  Adding "T Kennedy" to the 
no-fly list is irresponsible, especially since it was known to be an alias.

Even worse, this behavior suggests an easy terrorist tactic: use common 
American names to refer to co-conspirators in your 
communications.  This will make the list even less effective as a 
security tool, and more effective as a random harassment tool.  There 
might be 5,000 people named "T Kennedy" in the U.S., but there are 
54,000 listings for "J. Brown."

Watch lists can be good security, but they need to be implemented 
properly.  It should be harder than it currently is to add names to the 
list.  It should be possible to add names to the list for short periods 
of time.  It should be easy to take names off the list, and to add 
qualifiers to the list.  There needs to be a legal appeals process for 
people on the list who want to clear their name.  For a watch list to 
be a part of good security, there needs to be a notion of maintaining 
the list.

This isn't new, and this isn't hard.  The police deal with this problem 
all the time, and they do it well.  We do worse identifying potential 
terrorists than the police do identifying crime suspects.  Imagine if 
all the police did when having a witness identify a suspect was asking 
whether the names "sounded about right."  No suspect picture book.   No 
line up.

In a country built on the principles of due process, the current no-fly 
list is an affront to our freedoms and liberties.  And it's lousy 
security to boot.


Additional information:
<http://www.aclu.org/SafeandFree/SafeandFree.cfm?ID=12740&...>
<http://www.wired.com/news/privacy/0,1848,58386,00.html>>
<http://www.salon.com/tech/feature/2003/04/10/capps/index....>
<http://www.commondreams.org/headlines02/0927-01.htm>>
<http://www.truthout.org/cgi-bin/artman/exec/view.cgi/6/3520>>
<http://www.belleville.com/mld/newsdemocrat/8371700.htm>>

Kennedy's story
<http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/5765143>>
<http://abcnews.go.com/wire/US/reuters20040820_78.html>>

Getting off the list by using your middle name:
<http://www.contracostatimes.com/mld/cctimes/news/world/94...>

This essay originally appeared in Newsday:
<http://www.newsday.com/news/opinion/ny-vpsch253941385aug2... 
ory> or <http://makeashorterlink.com/?W29816849>>


** *** ***** ******* *********** *************

              Comments from Readers



From: Wayne Schroeder <schroede@zuri.sdsc.edu>
Subject: BOB on Board

I agree with most of your comments concerning the BOB incident.  The 
captain overreacted when deciding to turn the plane around after a bag 
was found with "BOB" written on it (which could have meant "Bomb On 
Board" or a few other things).  Even though, as one report indicated, 
there was a VIP on board.  The fear was excessive, and only results in 
more fear.

But I disagree with your statement that "Fear won't make anyone more 
secure" and I think it is worth a few moments to consider fear and 
other emotions in the context of our rational decisions.

There are, as you point out, situations in which fear will make us less 
secure.  We can become so concerned about remote possibilities that we 
ignore more pressing threats.  We can waste resources on activities 
that are highly ineffective.

But in general, fear very often DOES make us more secure.  And it does 
so with such frequency and efficiency that we hardly notice.  When I 
get on my motorcycle, I feel a slight bit of fear.  Fear that I might 
lose control, or that someone will run me down, that a wheel will fall 
off, or whatever.  And that fear adds a bit of caution to my frame of 
mind; and results in a lot of defensive driving.  And it seems to have 
worked reasonably well, as I've been riding for 30+ years and I'm still 
alive.

When we walk to the edge of a cliff, we hesitate.  Many of those who 
didn't are dead, and died before they reproduced.

For the most part, our emotions exist today because they are effective 
motivators that efficiently interact with the more rational aspects of 
our selves to result in wise decisions.  And because of this, natural 
selection has preserved them.  A little bit of fear, or anger, or love, 
can be a good thing.  It is when we forget to also engage our heads, 
that we often get into trouble.

Excessive fear, which clouds our judgment, can frequently make us less 
secure.  But a little bit of fear will usually motivate us to maintain 
our safety.



From: mskala@ansuz.sooke.bc.ca
Subject: GHB

I'm sorry that your recent Crypto-Gram only mentions GHB as a "date 
rape drug."  I wasn't able to find a good, recent, authoritative 
reference on this, but quick perusal of FAQs and Web sites of people 
who use these kinds of drugs supports my subjective impression that 
persons using GHB far more commonly dose *themselves* rather than 
dosing others.  They either enjoy the neurological effects (similar to 
alcohol, but stronger) or they're trying to use it for bodybuilding 
(I'm not sure exactly how that works, but with a special diet it helps 
raise muscle mass or something).

A couple sources on GHB:
   <http://www.erowid.org/chemicals/ghb/>>
   <http://users.lycaeum.org/~ghbfaq/>>

The "date rape drug" story is arguably an even better example of 
misperception of risks than your carry-a-bottle-opener example; date 
rape may be numerically quite an unpopular use of GHB, but it's the 
sole threat targeted by almost all anti-GHB efforts.  The law making 
GHB a Schedule I controlled substance was called "The Hillory J. Farias 
and Samantha Reid Date-Rape Drug Prohibition Act".  The result is that 
lots of people now think date rape is the only thing anyone ever does 
with GHB.  There seem to be far more cases of people being harmed by 
deliberately mixing it into their own alcoholic drinks, because it 
interacts badly with alcohol, but I've never seen an ad campaign 
warning against that threat.



From: Trammell Hudson <hudson@swcp.com>
Subject: GBH

For a far more elaborate security countermeasure, see this invention by 
a North Wales man:

	<http://icnorthwales.icnetwork.co.uk/news/regionalnews/tm_... 
<http://icnorthwales.icnetwork.co.uk/news/regionalnews/tm_... 
720&method=full&siteid=50142&headline=gadget-will-stop-spiked-drink-peri 
l-name_page.html> or <http://makeashorterlink.com/?Q1A826849>>



From: Greg Walker <Greg.Walker@cityofhouston.net>
Subject: Houston Airport Rangers

The Airport Rangers program is an adjunct security program that, from 
my reading of Mr. Schneier's other articles that are available on the 
web, would appear to be that "out of the box" non-traditional thinking 
that he would normally champion and I must assume that the only reason 
he doesn't champion our program is because he is not fully apprised of 
the background of the airport nor of the place of the Airport Rangers 
in the overall scheme of protection.

Mr. Schneier appears to base his opinion on simply reviewing the 
Houston Airport System website's page(s) about the Airport Ranger 
program, which by the way has over 450 volunteers that have passed 
background checks. It should be noted not all applicants have 
passed.  I believe it would be imprudent of me to discuss the 
perimeters and depth of our background checks in a public forum. 
However, I will state that we security professionals in the HAS Public 
Safety & Technology Division believe it to be at an appropriate level 
considering that the Rangers are basically riding upon public land to 
begin with.  It would appear that Mr. Schneier may believe that we 
depend on the Airport Rangers program as a primary means of perimeter 
security; if so, this would be a tremendous misassumption.  We have 
numerous technological and professional security force resources 
involved in protecting our perimeter and are constantly reviewing the 
latest trends and techniques.  I am forbidden by federal
law to disclose in any further detail our present techniques and as to 
which new techniques we are leaning.

George Bush Intercontinental Airport (IAH) has approximately 11,000+ 
acres of land and was built on what, not too long ago, was a rural area 
close to the City of Houston.  This is a very common type of location 
for airports.   A large portion of the land at IAH is wooded and 
contains a large amount of undergrowth. This is land being held for 
future expansion and a clear zone exists between these areas and the 
security fence around the Airport Operations Area.  This land is 
outside of the area regulated by the federal regulatory authorities and 
is essentially public land.  For many years, as the area where 
equestrians could ride has been greatly reduced due to the development 
that occurs around airports, the equestrian community in North Harris 
County has ridden around this area without having proper permission or 
documentation.

Houston Airport System (HAS) thought it better to work with the 
equestrian community than to fight it.  After all, the land is owned by 
the taxpayers, and as a result a "win-win" situation developed.   The 
equestrians now have a nice place to ride as the Houston Airport System 
has done a number of improvements on the land to encourage daily use by 
the Airport Rangers.  In exchange, the Airport now knows who is riding, 
knows their background and has them wearing picture identification 
cards.  Rangers challenge and report to our Security Dispatch Center, 
by cellular telephone, anyone they come upon who doesn't have the HAS 
issued ID card or anything they deem to be suspicious.  In short, 
Rangers provide extra sets of eyes and ears for the police and the 
security professionals.  Not only do they look for suspicious persons 
or signs of unauthorized entrance or activity, they also report brush 
that is growing too close to the security fence, any attempts by 
animals to dig under th e fence and get onto the runways, etc. so that 
corrective action can be taken to keep the runways and taxiways safer 
places from even just normal everyday type of dangers.  Several 
incidences of trespass have been reported by Rangers and at least two 
thefts of property have been thwarted.

Mr. Schneier worries about civil rights and constitutional protections, 
along with racial profiling.  These are necessary and admirable 
concerns.  However, the Airport Rangers have no powers to arrest or 
detain -- they are simply eyes and ears for law enforcement and 
security professionals -- their sole obligation is to observe, actively 
look for certain things, and report them by cell phone to the HAS 
Security Dispatch Center.

Mr. Schneier opines that the perimeter around an airport used to be a 
no-man's land and anyone on the property was immediately 
suspicious.  Ah, to live in that perfect world.   At most large 
airports today public streets, roads and even highways run just a few 
feet outside of the main security fence.  If the airport is lucky and 
has large acreage on several sides, such as George Bush 
Intercontinental does, then the problem becomes one of manpower to 
patrol all of the areas.  Today, more than ever, law enforcement and 
security agencies need the assistance of every citizen and the Airport 
Ranger Program, at least at George Bush Intercontinental Airport, goes 
a very long way in making that a reality.

As any law enforcement or security agency will tell you, crime, and in 
today's world, terrorism, is substantially reduced when there is a 
visible presence of law enforcement, security, and yes, Mr. Schneier, 
even citizens, especially alert citizens that know who to call and for 
what to report.  I'm pleased to say that law enforcement, at all 
levels, including federal and local, are strongly supportive of the 
program and from time to time provide extra training for the Airport 
Rangers.



From: Folkert van Heusden <folkert@vanheusden.com>
Subject: Processor Microcode Vulnerabilities

 > Turns out that it's possible to update the AMD K8
 > processor (Athlon64 or Opteron) microcode.  And,
 > get this, there's no authentication check.

This is also possible with the Intel Pentium Pro, II, etc.  See: 
<http://www.urbanmyth.org/microcode/>> for how to do this under Linux.



From: "Allan Dyer" <adyer@yuikee.com.hk>
Subject: CIA Privacy Notice

Regarding the CIA's privacy notice, you say, "Um, isn't their job to 
collect personal information about people without their permission?"

Yes, very true.  But isn't it also their job to lie?



From: "Hamlin, Stuart" <SHamlin@GAM.COM>
Subject: Windows XP SP2

With reference to your point about Windows XP SP2, I think you are half 
right and half wrong.  It is true that if fixing security bugs in the 
OS breaks an application, it is the application that is 
wrong.  However, I think the sheer scale of the carnage caused by SP2 
is verging on the ridiculous.

See <http://support.microsoft.com/default.aspx?kbid=884130>>

Microsoft has hardly kept it a secret that some applications might not 
function as before, but the trouble is people are going to look at that 
list and say "well that's everything I run" and give up. No security 
fix is worth that much grief to most people, especially SMEs.  Doubly 
so if they have managed to avoid infection or attack to date.

Of course what is needed is not a 'look what we broke' posting on their 
site, but a comprehensive help resource to get the applications working 
again.  Until they provide it my guess is that most people will balk at 
installing it and that makes us all less secure.

Once again MS fails where it matters most.



From: Jim Reid <jim@rfc1035.com>
Subject: British Emergency Preparedness

"It's a joke site, and worth a 
visit:  <http://www.preparingforemergencies.co.uk/>>"

This is a parody of a pamphlet that the UK government has sent to every 
home in the country. This contains wise advice like "If there is a 
fire, get out, stay out and call 999" and "If a bomb goes off in your 
building, look for the safest way out."  Thank goodness Her Majesty's 
Government told me to do that.  I would never have thought to do any of 
those things if it wasn't for this pamphlet.

The genuine article is at 
<http://www.preparingforemergencies.gov.uk>>.  IMO it's much better 
tragi-comedy than the parody.  It states the bleedingly obvious -- in 
an emergency, call the emergency services and listen to the radio & TV 
for advice and information.  But it doesn't say anything about what to 
do if the phones, radio and TV are down.  Even so, at least someone in 
the civil service has a sense of humour.  The small print says the 
pamphlet can be copied without permission provided it's not used in a 
derogatory manner.



From: BJ Brooks <bobstuff17@hotmail.com>
Subject: FobCam

"Here's a guy who has a webcam pointing at his Secure ID token, so he 
doesn't have to remember to carry it around. Here's the strange thing: 
unless you know who the webpage belongs to, it's still good security."

That's a recent quote from your newsletter regarding the moron that has 
FOB on display for the world to see.  I agree with you saying unless 
you know whose it is, it's still decent security.

In a perfect world, nobody would need a FOB, but all this guy did was 
make himself and more importantly his company a target of would be 
hackers or guys that are bored looking for some fun.  Within minutes of 
being shown this webpage, I had the guys name, address, 4 phone 
numbers, wife's name, son's name and b-day, Company name, job title, 
and several email addresses.  I even had a picture of him and his 
son.  And this was all on the level.  I have no desire to get into his 
company's firewall.  I just wanted to see how hard it would be to 
find.  His username for each email address is identical.  I'd bet my 
next paycheck that it's the same username he's got at work.  With the 
combination of having his wife's and kid's name, not to mention 
birthday, with this guy's level of originality, I'm sure my 8-year-old 
neighbor could figure out his password within an hour.



From: Greg Guerin <glguerin@amug.org>
Subject: ICS Atlanta's Comment About Navajo Code-Talkers

The Navajo code-talkers' "key length" would have been much larger than 
zero.  All code-talkers were specially trained, and memorized the coded 
meaning of a large number of code-words, which were all spoken in the 
Dineh (Navajo) native tongue.  One dictionary example I found appears 
to match others turned up for "navajo code talker 
dictionary":  <http://www.americanindians.com/CodeTalkersDictionary.htm>>

The letter-substitution code alone is clever.  A fair number of the 
coded words are bilingual puns, such as "ant fight" for "about", or 
"weasel tied together" for "which" (A-bout and W-hitch, get it?)..

And that's just the code itself.  It's not even considering the 
cultural context shared by all the code-talkers, or that all the coded 
messages were spoken person-to-person, by native speakers of the language.


** *** ***** ******* *********** *************

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CRYPTO-GRAM is written by Bruce Schneier.  Schneier is the author of 
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Copyright (c) 2004 by Bruce Schneier.